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ABSTRACT
Terrorism is a quintessential psychological operation, involving the use of violence to
convey a message to multiple audiences. As a psychological operation, terrorism produces two
effects; one propaganda and the other psychological warfare. The propaganda effects are
informative, persuasive, or compelling among neutral, friendly or potentially friendly target
audiences. The psychological warfare effects are provocative, disruptive, and coercive among
enemy or hostile target audiences. By comparing the Zionist and the Palestinian terrorist
campaigns, this thesis demonstrates how terrorism produces psychological warfare and propaganda
effects on multiple audiences and the consequences of each. The success of the Jewish resistance
resulted from a strategy of terrorism that identified the psychological vulnerabilities of certain
audiences, controlled for the psychological warfare and propaganda effects on those audiences,
and anticipated audience response. By comparison, the Palestinian resistance did not control for
the psychological warfare and propaganda effects on multiple audiences. Palestinian terrorism was
exclusively psychological warfare, which failed to propagandize their cause beyond their national
constituency. In either case, the success or failure of terrorism should be understood in part by
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INTRODUCTION
Terrorism is the quintessential psychological operation, involving the use of
violence to convey a message to multiple audiences. As a psychological operation,
terrorism produces two effects. The first is the propaganda effect, whereby neutral or
friendly audiences are informed, persuaded, or compelled to support the terrorist's
cause. The second is the psychological warfare effect, whereby enemy audiences are
deterred, disrupted, or provoked to respond in manner consistent with the terrorist's
desires. Each of these effects parallels the conventional wisdom's instrumental and
organizational perspectives of terrorism. The instrumental perspective is essentially
oriented toward psychological warfare; the disruptive, disorienting, demonstrative,
provocative, and vengeance related functions of terrorism. The organizational
perspective relates to the propaganda impact of terrorist violence; the morale building,
competitive, coercive, and persuasive, group-centric functions of terrorism. The
following analysis synthesizes these two perspectives into a framework that considers
the psychological warfare and the propaganda effects of terrorism on neutral, friendly,
and hostile audiences.
This line of reasoning serves as the theoretical basis for the following analysis of
terrorism as a psychological operation. Basically, I am challenging the conventional
wisdom's claim that terrorism is fundamentally "propaganda of the deed." While I
don't deny that terrorism has a propaganda component and a very important one at
that, I do deny that propaganda is the only component. If the essential function of
propaganda is to win friends, then how can an act of terror that victimizes an
individual or group win friends among that same group—not likely. The victims of
terrorist violence are not propagandized toward the terrorist's cause—the effects are
psychological warfare. Yet, terrorism has contributed to some remarkable
achievements. It facilitated the creation of the Jewish state in May 1948 and it got
Yasir Arafat to the United Nations in November 1974. I ask then, what was unique
about their campaigns' of terror or the historical circumstances that allowed these
terrorists to become politicians How does the psychological impact of terrorist
violence induce changes in the attitudes or political behavior of multiple audiences
consistent with the terrorist's political objectives?
Considering the individuals mentioned above and the questions posed, the
following will comparatively analyze the Zionist and the Palestinian campaigns of
terror in an attempt to find an answer Specifically, the analysis will examine Jewish
terrorism from 1944 to 1947 and Palestinian terrorism from 1968 to 1973 Considering
terrorism as a psychological operation will bring into focus the unique features of the
Zionist campaign of terror that ultimately facilitated the creation of a Jewish state on
the one hand, and on the other failed to achieve a similar result regarding the
Palestinian case. Furthermore, the purpose of this analysis is not to disregard the
political and social climate that operated independently of Jewish and Palestinian
terrorism. In other words, it is not my intent to argue that terrorism by itself was
successful, or to separate it from its historic condition. I intend to demonstrate that
terrorism operates in an environment rich with psychological forces exploitable within
the confines of the historic moment. The success of terrorism hinges on strategy that
identifies the psychological vulnerabilities of certain audiences, controls for the
psychological warfare and propaganda effects on those audiences, and anticipates
audience response.
A. TERRORISM IN PERSPECTIVE
In order to keep this analysis within the realm of theoretical reason, I have
decided to synthesize the strengths of the conventional wisdom's instrumental and
organizational perspectives. This will accomplish two things. First, it will demonstrate
that the basis of Jewish and Palestinian terrorism was instrumental reason Both groups
used terrorism as a means to achieve a logical political end—statehood. And second, as
a strategy of a minority, terrorism compensated for the inherent organizational
weaknesses of the two resistance movements. In both cases, the representative elite
were disadvantaged by the dispersion (e.g., displaced person camps and refugee
camps) of their national communities, the lack of less violent means to articulate the
Palestine question, the shortage of logistical and military assets necessary to engage
the target regime in a conventional contest, and lastly, the repressive tendencies of the
occupying authority. Consequently, Jewish and Palestinian terrorism served as a means
to organizationally arouse the revolutionary spirit of their oppressed and dispersed
constituents. Like the propaganda effect, the organizational function of terrorism
focuses on friendly, potentially friendly and neutral audiences, whereas the
instrumental function generally produces a psychological warfare effect on hostile
audiences
The instrumental perspective assumes the terrorist is a rational actor, making
strategic and tactical choices based on an assessment of his operational environment
and the response by other political forces to his behavior (see Table 1-1, below). He
possesses a logic that enables him to calculate the necessary means to achieve the
desired ends. By contrast, the organizational perspective assumes the terrorist is
irrational, operating on impulse within a group that is conflict laden In the
organizational terrorist's model, choices are motivated by the group's psychological
dynamics, which translate into unpredictable acts without a basis in logic or
instrumental reasoning that fail to reflect a balance between means and ends
Table 1-1
THE TWO COMPETING PERSPECTIVES.
The Instrumental Perspective The Organizational Perspective
1. The act of terrorism represents a strategic choice. 1. The act of terrorism is the outcome of internal group
2. The organization using terrorist acts as a unit, on the dynamics.
basis of collective values. 2. Individual members of an organization disagree over ends
3. The means of terrorism are logically related to ends and means.
and resources; surprise compensates for weakness. 3. The resort to terrorism reflects the incentives leaders
4. The purpose of terrorism is to bring about change in provide for followers and competition with rivals.
an actor's environment. 4. The motivations for participation in terrorism include
5. The pattern of terrorism follows an action-reaction personal needs as much as ideological goals.
process; terrorism responds to what the government 5. Terrorist actions often appear inconsistent, erratic, and
does. unpredictable.
6. Increasing the cost of terrorism makes it less likely; 6. External pressure may strengthen group cohesion; rewards
decreasing cost or increasing reward makes it more may create incentives to leave the group.
likely. 7. Terrorism fails when the organization disintegrates;
7. Terrorism fails when its practioners do not obtain achieving long-term goals may not be desirable,
their stated political objectives.
Source: Martha Crenshaw, "Theories of Terrorism: Instrumental and Organizational Approaches," In David C. Rapoport
(ed.) Inside Terrorist Organizations (New York: Columbia University Press. 1988), p. 27.
In order to combine these two perspectives, I begin with the premise that
terrorism is a rational political choice. Both the Jewish and the Palestinian terrorists'
decisions to use terrorism as a means to oppose the occupying authority was based on
their relative military potential, the dispersion of their potential constituencies, and
their disillusionment with political and diplomatic effects to achieve a similar result by
less violent means. In other words, terrorism compensated for their military weakness,
communicated a message to their oppressed diaspora greater in than non-violent acts
could emit, informed the occupying authority that a challenge to their claim to a
territory existed, and announced to international constituencies that the Palestine
question had not been resolved. However, while Martha Crenshaw's contention that an
analysis of terrorist behavior as "rational" must assume that "terrorist organizations
possess internally consistent sets of values, beliefs, and images of the environment," is
valid in theory, it is not necessarily the case in practice.
1 Although the basis of Jewish
and Palestinian terrorist campaigns was rational political choice, it is not entirely clear
that a coherent set of beliefs motivated all acts of violence or all members and
factions. Acts of terror were not exclusively reserved for the occupying authority or
the enemy population. The Stern Gang waged an anti-collaboratonst campaign against
fellow Jews, which led to a spiral of reprisal operations by the mainstream Haganah
and the British. In 1969, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine waged a
similar campaign of terror against fellow West Bank Palestinians in order to intimidate
'Martha Crenshaw, "The Causes of Terrorism," Comparative Politics, 13 (July 1981), p. 385.
them against voting in the local elections Consequentially, both the Jewish and the
Palestinian campaigns of terror manifested organizational and instrumental dynamics,
the former focused on maintaining group cohesion and proper function and the latter
aimed at the undermining the legitimate authority of the occupying power.
There is almost universal agreement that terrorism by itself is ineffective. Austin
Turk contends that "terror is likely to provoke counter-terror instead of conformity,
and to deter potential support more than potential opposition." 2 Similarly, Paul
Wilkinson adds that "by itself terrorism has been regularly unsuccessful in winning
strategic objectives such as the destruction of a whole regime and presumably its
replacement by a regime congenial to the terrorists." 3 Yehezkel Dror puts a different
twist on the ineffectiveness of terrorism. He argues that terrorism serves a positive
function, that of solidifying the forces of counter-terror, promoting innovation, and
mobilizing support for the government. Furthermore, Dror suggests that terrorism
breaks down the government's monopoly on violence and may institutionalize the use
of violence by a disenfranchised minority as a political tool. 4 While terrorism may
provide a target government with a means to increase solidarity among the populace, it
is doubtful that any such government would prefer to sustain terrorism for that reason.
2Austin T. Turk, "Social Dynamics of Terrorism," In Marvin E. Wolfgang (ed.), Annals of the Academy of
Political and Social Science, 463 (December 1982), p. 128.
3
Paul Wilkinson, "The Real World Problems of Terrorist Organizations and Problem of Propaganda," In
Ariel Meran (ed), On Terrorism and Combating Terrorism (MD: University Publications of America, 1985), p.
71.
4Yehezkel Dror, "Terrorism as a Challenge to the Democratic Capacity to Govern," In Martha Crenshaw
(ed.), Terrorism, Legitimacy, & Power (CT: Wesleyan University Press, 1983), pp. 65-90.
Nonetheless, terrorism was in some capacity effective at getting the Jewish resistance a
state and the Palestinian resistance to the United Nations.
B. TERRORISM DEFINED
Terrorism conjures up different literal meaning and mental images during
different periods in history. 5 For instance, prior to 1968, terrorism was
undistinguishable from other subversive activities against the state. 6 During that period,
terrorism was often associated with pre- 19th century anarchists, whom committed acts
of political violence (e.g., assassination) that were designed more to upset the balance
of elite power structures than to destabilize the entire social and political system. 7
Accordingly, E.V. Walter examined the role of terrorism as a means of state control
and popular resistance within the context of traditional societies. He argues that
terrorism includes the state, whereby terrorism was considered to be a process
5Crenshaw states that until the late 1960s terrorism was not usually employed to make specific demands on
a governments. Instead it was a one-shot deal—a simple direct form of political communication: Martha
Crenshaw, "How Terrorists Think: What Psychology Can Contribute to Understanding Terrorism," In Lawrence
Howard (ed), Terrorism: Roots, Impact, Responses (NY: Praeger, 1992), p. 76.
6The League of Nations Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism (1937) defined acts of
terrorism: "All criminal acts directed against a State and intended or calculated to create a state of terror in the
minds of particular persons, or a group of persons or the general public." According to the Convention and
equally ambiguous, the category of terrorism includes all acts as well as attempts that cause death or bodily
harm to Heads of State or Government, their sponsors, and other public figures; that cause damage to public
property; that endanger the lives of the public; and that deal with arms and ammunition for commission of these
offenses in any state. Ezzat A. Fattah, "Terrorist Activities and Terrorist Targets: A Tentative Typology," In
Yonah Alexander and John M. Gleason (eds.), Behavioral and Quantitative Perspectives on Terrorism (New
York: Pergamon Press, 1981), p. 17.
7Maximilien Robespierre, 2nd Great Reign of Terror (1793-94), serves as the historical basis of the terms:
"terror," "terrorism" and "terrorists." Albert Parry, Terrorism: From Robespierre to Arafat (New York: Vanguard
Press, 1976), p. 39. However, Fromkin points out that Robespierre used terror to sustain government rather than
destroy it. David Fromkin, "The Strategy of Terrorism," Foreign Affairs, 53:1 (October 1974), pp. 683-698.
managed by the state in order to control its subjects The subjects, he argues, have the
right to use violence as a means to express their political grievances, because
constitutional mechanisms have not yet developed to promote less violent methods of
political communication All considered, Walter's explanation of the process of terror
imagines an authoritarian state, which uses violence literally to control popular
resistance. The "zones" of occupation, for both the British and the Israelis, tended
towards this authoritarian violence against a popular resistance. However, the world
does not wholly resemble Walter's paradigm, the traditional "zones of terror" have
given way to a world held hostage by small groups using systematic violence in order
to destroy the whole structures of the state By the mid-20th Century, the balance of
terror had shifted away from the state to disenfranchised minorities using a campaign
of political violence to break the grip of occupied control.
While Walter's case studies bare little significance to the cases considered here,
his process of terror remains relevant no matter the characteristics of the political and
social system. He argues that the process of terror involves a source of violence, a
victim, and a target, all of which possess a specific sphere of influence. Walter argues
further that the process of terror's influence may be restricted to specific zones (e.g.,
township or region) or may expand to encompass an entire system (e.g., authority).
"Any zone is clearly linked to the rest of society in many ways, but this larger society
is itself not a system of terror unless all the members are involved, in one role or
another, actually or potentially in the terror process."
8 One such system where all
members are involved in the terror process is terrorism; what Walter calls a "siege of
terror." It is this siege of terror that drives the terrorist to destroy the authority system
through systematic use of violence. Therefore, Walter concludes that "in the terror
process, no one can be secure, for the category of transgression is, in reality,
abolished. Anyone may be a victim, no matter what action he chooses. Innocence is
irrelevant."
9 For the British and the Israeli authorities transgression was costly,
innocence mattered, and impulses to wage systemic forms of terror in the occupied
territories had to become more zone specific. On the other hand, the Jewish and
Palestinian resistance initiated a systematic use of violence to destroy the authority
system in the occupied territory, which transgressed beyond the source of the dispute
to involve multiple audiences. Therefore, Walter's process of terror is indispensable,
because it brings into focus the use of terrorism as a systematic means designed to
achieve political ends
Therefore, the Jewish and the Palestinian resistance held exclusive rights to a
campaign of terror, because the liberalizing world was antithetical to British or Israeli
systematic use of terror as a method of social control. This does not disregard a
tendency of either of the occupying authorities to impose draconian measures, what
8Eugene V. Walter, Terror and Resistance: A Study of Political Violence (London: Oxford University Press,
1969), pp. 6-7.
'Walter, p. 26.
Walter and others would call terrorist, on the populations of their occupied territories. 10
Both the authority and the resistance possessed a peculiar mix of traditional and
modern impulses that constrained and facilitated the existence of terrorism as a means
of political influence (as discussed in Chapter II). Consequently, a traditional social
setting or an authoritarian political system is more conducive to "terrorism from
above," while a modern social setting and a liberal political system is more conducive
to "terrorism from below." 11
Therefore, the challenge of the Jewish and the Palestinian campaigns of terror
was to provoke the occupying authorities to submit to primordial authoritarian
tendencies that manifest in repressive methods of social control, contradicting the
legitimate foundations of their political existence. Thomas Thornton argues that terror
is a tool to be used rationally, whereby acts of terror are instituted as parts of planned
campaigns to achieve political objectives, thereby also excluding nonpolitical terror. 12
If terror is a tool then the state has other means at its disposal to enforce its authority.
I do not intent to get bogged down in the semantics of terrorism. Suffice it to say that
l0For an account of state terrorism in general and Israeli state terror in particular: Noam Chomsky, Pirates
and Emperors: International Terrorism in the Real World (Brattleboro, VT: Amana Books, 1990).
"The contemporary literature on terrorism often differentiates between state and non-state terrorism as
terrorism from above and terrorism from below. Furthermore, Noam Chomsky, op cit., labels state terrorism as
wholesale or emperors terror and a retail or pirates as non-state terror. For a discussion of the Jewish resistance
as terrorism from below: Robert Kumamoto, "Diplomacy from Below: International Terrorism and American
Foreign Relations, 1945-1962," Terrorism: An International Journal, 14 (1991), pp. 32-39; Furthermore,
Thornton refers to state terror as "enforcement terror" and non-state terror (terror from below) as "agitational
terror": Thornton, "Terror as a Weapon of Political Agitation," In Harry Eckstein (ed), Internal War: Problems
and Approaches (CT: Greenwood Press, 1964), p. 72.
12Thomton, p. 71.
10
both the British and the Israelis used terror as a tactic, but not as an all consuming
ideology. By contrast, terrorism was an ideology for the Jewish and the Palestinian
resistance, the exclusive and systematic use of violence as a strategic means to
achieve political ends
All considered, a definition of terrorism must reflect a process that systematically
uses acts of terror as a tool to convey a political message to an occupying authority,
his constituency, and his allies. Furthermore, this process must also influence known
or potential supporters of the terrorist group Accordingly, Alex Schmid's definition of
terrorism proves to be the most applicable In his book, Political Terrorism: A
Research Guide to Concepts, Theories, Data Bases and Literature, he reviews 109
expert definitions and concludes the following:
Terrorism is a method of combat in which random or symbolic victims serve as
an instrumental target of violence These instrumental victims share group or
class characteristics which form the basis of their selection for victimization.
Through previous use of violence or the credible threat of violence other
members of that group or class are put in a state of chronic fear (terror). This
group or class, whose members' sense of security is purposefully undermined, is
the target of terror The victimization of the target of violence is considered
extranormal by most observers from the witnessing audience on the basis of its
atrocity, the time (e.g., peacetime) or place (not a battlefield) of victimization, or
the disregard for rules of combat accepted in conventional warfare. The norm
violation creates an attentive audience beyond the target of terror; sectors of this
audience might in turn form the main object of manipulation The purpose of
this indirect method of combat is either to immobilize the target of terror in
order to produce disorientation and/or compliance, or to mobilize secondary
targets of demands (e.g., a government) or targets of attention (e.g., public
opinion) to changes of attitude or behavior favoring the short or long-term
interests of the users of this method of combat. 13
13Alex Schmid and Albert J Jongman, Political Terrorism : A New Guide to A ctors, A uthors, Concepts, Data
Bases, Theories and Literature (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1988), p. 1-2. Following the receipt of
feedback from the research community, Schmid changes his definition somewhat on page 28, nonetheless the
11
Undoubtedly, Schmid's definition is difficult to consume, so I will bite of key pieces
in order to make it more digestible.
Schmid has essentially defined what I call the terrorist's psychological battlefield,
which encompasses the extranormal violent act and the four target audiences (target of
violence, target of terror, target of demands, and target of attention). Schmid later
expands his definition to include a fifth audience, the target of opportunity (e.g.,
foreign opinion, terrorist organization itself, sympathsizers). The proximity to and level
of identification with the victim (target of violence) dictates the extent of audience
participation in the terror process On the terrorist's psychological battlefield, the
terrorist purposefully expands the scope of the conflict to include the psychological
dispositions of multiple target audiences. The terrorist does not succeed by occupying
or seizing key terrain ordinarily associated with conventional forms of warfare. His
success hinges on the occupation of psychological positions in the minds of multiple
target audiences. In effect, the terrorist carves a place for himself on the cognitive map
of multiple audiences, which imprints his cause on the forefront of local and
international agendas Therefore, terrorism is a two pronged assault along local and
international fronts. Locally, terrorism directly attacks the target of violence, the target
of terror, and target of demands. And internationally, terrorism indirectly assaults the
target of attention and target of opportunity. However, the terrorist's selected target
array may consist of as few as two audiences or as many as all five, depending on the
one cited stands as the most pertinent to this inquiry.
12
type, features, and substance of the violent act. Furthermore, as audience involvement
increases, so too does the scope of the consequences, expanding from local to
international responses. Thus, the terrorist's psychological battlefield is multifaceted
consisting of five target audiences and multidimensional with local and international











The Process of Terror: Target Audiences
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C. THE PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY OF TERRORISM
Terrorism is the weapon of the weak. It avoids the enemy's strengths and targets
his weakness. It evades direct confrontation with the enemy's security forces preferring
to attack his sources of power rather than his centers of power Wilkinson states
"terrorism is essentially a psychological weapon aimed at its immediate victims, but
also at a wider audience." 14 Moreover, the basic aim of terrorism is to influence
changes in political and social behavior conducive to fulfillment of the terrorist's
objectives. In order to create changes advantageous to the terrorist's cause, he must
devise a strategy that considers the impact of acts of political violence on multiple
audiences. The terrorist devises a strategy that exploits the psychological
vulnerabilities among enemy and friendly populations in order to compensate for
physical and material weaknesses. Ultimately, terrorism is a psychological operation in
that success is achieved by an audience response that confirms the terrorist's
conception of reality and facilitates those psychological and political changes he
desires. Accordingly, Wilkinson states:
Terrorism is, of course, a preeminent mode of psychological and propaganda
warfare. The terrorist and the government fight a war of wills... 15
Therefore, the strategy of terrorism as psyop is two-dimensional. It combines
psychological warfare and propaganda into a campaign of terror that manipulates
psychological vulnerabilities in neutral, friendly, and hostile audiences that will




support the achievement of psychological and political objectives. The term
psychological warfare, as used in this analysis, refers to those activities of the terrorist
organization which are directed against the forces of the enemy (and allies directly
hostile to them) with the aim of causing chaos within his ranks, of demoralizing and
disorganizing him so as to reduce, in a minor or major degree, his ability as a security
force and their legitimacy as an occupying power. The term propaganda covers, on the
other hand, all those activities of a terrorist organization which are directed at neutral
(relative to the terrorist organization) domestic and foreign public opinion, to the
members of the same terrorist organization and its sympathsizers with the aim of
securing as broad support as possible to the political aspirations, and to maintain, or
raise to a higher level the moral force of the terrorist organization and of its
constituents.
16
In essence, propaganda aims at occupying and retaining the moral high
ground, whereas psychological warfare aims at destroying the state's moral reputation
denying them the minimum comfort of the front slope.
Therefore, terrorism as a psychological operation assaults the psychological
battlefield along the psychological warfare and propaganda axis targeting vulnerable
audiences in its path. To be effective, the terrorist must anticipate and control for
psychological effects produced by psychological warfare and propaganda, thereby
exploiting conditions that already exist and manipulating those circumstances he
16Ejub Kucuk, "Political Terrorism as a Means of Psychological Warfare," Socialist Thought and Practice 21
(August 1981): p. 79; and Maurice Tugwell, "Terrorism and Propaganda: Problem and Response," Conflict
Quarterly 6 (Spring 1986): p. 5; referring to the North Atlantic Alliance for a definition of propaganda: any
information, ideas, doctrines or special appeals disseminated to influence the opinion, emotions, attitudes or
behavior of any specified group in order to benefit the sponsor either directly or indirectly.
15
creates Along each of the axis, the terrorist must target specific audiences in order to
provoke the desired psychological and political response. Psychological warfare
typically targets the opposing forces defined by the locus of dispute, assaulting the
enemy's psychological will in-depth (target of terror and target of demands, refer
Figure 1-2 below). The psychological warfare effects are disorienting, disruptive,
retaliatory, provocative, and demonstrative. By contrast, propaganda targets a broader
less clearly defined and less hostile audiences, residing away from the source of
conflict but involved because of a real or perceived vulnerability to the broadening
scope of the violence (targets of attention and opportunity, Figure 1-3 below). The
propaganda effects are cohesive, competitive, coercive, and persuasive. Ultimately, the
psychological warfare and propaganda effects translate into short-term instrumental and
organizational objectives, which will be discussed in Chapter IV. In combination,
psychological warfare and propaganda encompass the psychological strategy of










Terrorism as Psychological Warfare: Target Audiences
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Figure 1-3
Terrorism as Propaganda: Target Audiences
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Accordingly, the Jewish and the Palestinian psychological strategy of terrorism
will be evaluated on their ability to select appropriate victims and target audiences,
which combine to produce the intended psychological and political result. Although
the contemporary literature considers the basis of terrorism to be rooted in a political-
military strategy, the intent here is to dispense of the military component and thereby
regard the phenomenon as first psychological and subsequently political. The
psychological component considers the propaganda and the psychological warfare
effects produced by an act of violence, and relates those effects to specific target
audiences The political component balances violent means to achieve ultimate
political ends, whereby victims are selected and audiences are targeted in order to
control for unintended consequences Regarding the groups, the analysis combines the
mainstream, dissident and united resistance strategies into a campaign of terror
designed to achieve political success. Moreover, within the Jewish and Palestinian
campaigns of terror each group assumed a role, either enhancing or detracting from the
psychological effect and the political result. The role of the mainstream was to control,
the dissidents to publicize, and the united resistance to win. The efficacy of these roles
varied in both the Jewish and the Palestinian cases, while the objectives remained the
same.
The terrorist's use of violence produces psychological warfare and propaganda
effects that readily translate into objectives, which the terrorist has either previously
anticipated or subsequently prepares to manipulate The terrorist's rhetoric is full of
grandiose military schemes that are designed to deceive the enemy and compensate for
18
his own material and physical disadvantages and psychological insecurity. Removing
the military veneer exposes a conflict entirely psychological in nature that drives a
wedge between the target regime and its constituents, and neutralizes, coopts, and
builds sympathy among other populations. For the outside observer to believe in the
military capability of terrorism is no great error, but for the terrorist to believe his own
military rhetoric is a magnificent flaw.
It is important to note that neither psychological warfare nor propaganda have
the ability to change in a single stroke belief systems and attitudes of target audiences
that have taken years to form. The best use of psychological warfare and propaganda
is to confirm existing beliefs, highlighting inconsistencies, thereby enhancing the
positive and exploiting the negative. The essence of psychological warfare and
propaganda is the truth. The terrorist act may psychologically confuse or deceive his
audiences, but once the smoke clears from the violent episode the truth must be on the
terrorist's side. Furthermore, since violence is the terrorist's only means of
communication, then the dissemination of that message must have a clearly defined
source.
The identification of the source is more critical to propaganda than it is to
psychological warfare. As discussed above, psychological warfare targets the will of
the enemy, whereby the source of violence is generally understood. Terrorist




Essentially, the terrorist must speak with one voice; more
than one or none at all, distorts the propaganda message. However, there is an
exception. In those instances when the act of terror is designed to appeal to the
terrorist's constituency or potential sympathsizers, the source does not have to be
clearly defined Nonetheless, neither the Jews nor the Palestinians could achieve their
desired political objectives without propagandizing their campaign beyond their
national audiences. Therefore, success of the Jewish and Palestinian campaigns hinged
on not only their ability to propagandize their national audiences, but international
audiences as well. All considered, the efficacy of terrorism hinges on a psychological
strategy of terrorism that exploits the psychological warfare and propaganda effects to
achieve a political result. The success or failure of Jewish and Palestinian terrorism
can only be understood by viewing their campaigns of terror through the prism of
psychological operations.
''Classification of propaganda includes shades of white, grey, and black: white propaganda is disseminated
and acknowledged by the sponsor or by an accredited agency; grey propaganda is not specifically identified with
any source; and black propaganda is identified with a source other than the true one to mislead the target
audience. Considering terrorism as propaganda and psychological warfare does not warrant a conventional
interpretation for its employment. Terrorism attempts to make maximum gams with limited resources, therefore
to confuse the audiences is a waste of resources. US Army, Psychological Operations Techniques and
Procedures FM 33-1-1 (Coordinating Draft-November 1992); p. 14-3.
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D. THE ORGANIZATION OF THIS STUDY
Accordingly, the remainder of this study examines the Jewish and Palestinian
resistance through the prism of psychological operations. As such, the analysis
considers the Jewish and Palestinian terrorists' operational environment, the terrorists
themselves as the source of violent communication, the characteristics of the target of
violence and its connection to the other audiences either directly or indirectly involved
in the process of terror, and then comparatively analyzes each of cases. A general
description of each chapter is provided below.
Chapter II, The Environment, comparatively analyzes the Jewish and the
Palestinian resistance within the context of their unique historical circumstances that
either constrained or benefitted the effectiveness of the terrorism. The chapter is
broken down into four sections The first section discusses the technological
innovations that provided the Jewish and the Palestinian terrorists the means to wage
their campaigns of terror. Essentially, I argue that the technological differences
between the two periods were relative, because independent of available technologies
the terrorists had to device a strategy consistent with the social, political, and
economic circumstances during that period in history. For instance, while the
technological innovations available to the Palestinians undoubtedly made the conduct
of international terrorism more feasible, at the same time these innovations made the
environment infinitely more complex. In the absence of these technologies, the Jewish
terrorists had to device other means to communicate their cause to international
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audiences; either going to more extreme lengths to shock or devising less violent
alternatives.
Section two of Chapter II comparatively analyzes the impact of urbanization on
terrorism, which inevitably provided the terrorist greater access to targets of violence,
the media, other target audiences, and made the social, political, and economic
structures of the modern state more vulnerable to the impact of extranormal acts of
terror. Section three examines the social dimension of terrorism, consisting of the
historical circumstances that justified the use of violence as a means of influencing
political change and the ability of the Jewish and Palestinian constituencies to condone
such violent methods. The final section of Chapter II examines the international
dimension of terrorism relative to Jewish and Palestinian cases. Essentially, this
section brings into focus the diffuse character of terrorism, whereby the act of violence
becomes a transnational phenomenon. This reflects the contagion or competitive
aspects of terrorism that detract from the clarity of the violent message. For instance,
while both the Jewish and the Palestinian campaigns of terror operated during periods
when access to the media was complicated by competing international events (e.g.,
World War II and post-war reconstruction for the Jews, and Vietnam and Soviets in
Czechoslovakia for the Palestinians), only in the Palestinian case do we observe a
multitude of terrorist groups using violence to place their cause on the forefront of the
international agenda. Finally, Chapter II concludes with a brief discussion of the non-
violent mechanisms exploitable by the terrorists, which aid in creating predispositions
among potential supporters that help frame the image of the terrorist's violent message.
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Considering terrorism as a psychological operation requires a discussion of all
the psychological aspects of the phenomenon. Moreover, as a means of
communication, the analysis must include the source. Therefore, Chapter III,
Considering the Source, introduces the psychological characteristics of the individual
terrorists and the terrorist groups comparing both the Jewish and the Palestinian cases.
The analysis of the profiles of the Jewish and the Palestinian terrorists demonstrates
that these individuals were not a bunch of psycho-paths who enjoyed blowing up
things or killing lots of people. In fact, the most common characteristic of the terrorists
was their extranormality. In most cases, they were extremely well educated and had a
rational grasp of the present situation. In both the Jewish and the Palestinian cases, the
formation of the terrorist groups provided the organizational means to achieve
instrumental ends. Moreover, the terrorist group committed to violent example was the
most appropriate alternative given the existing political and social circumstances.
Chapter III does not examine in any depth the organizational function of the group
except to mention both the Jewish and the Palestinian terrorists' concern for
imprisoned comrades.
Chapter III concludes with the establishment of a typology of the Jewish and the
Palestinian resistance. The purpose of the typology is to illustrate the similarities and
differences relative to each of the cases and to highlight any potential ldiosyncracies
that may account for the Jewish success. Furthermore, the groups are sub-divided into
mainstream and dissident factions and the united resistance. The mainstream groups
were the Jewish Haganah and the Palestinian al-Fatah. Representative of the principle
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Palestinian dissident groups were the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine
(PFLP), the PFLP-General Command, and the Popular Democratic Front for the
Liberation of Palestine (PDFLP) The Jewish dissidents were the Irgun and the Stern
Gang. The united resistance is a misleading label, because in neither the Jews nor the
Palestinians formed a united front on all aspects of the armed struggle. The united
resistance was essentially a movement by all terrorist groups to internationalize the
plight of their oppressed peoples during the same time period. In the Jewish case this
was the "single serious incident" and the Palestinian case this was Munich.
Furthermore, each group is broken down according to where they line up ideologically
and politically in order to better understand their goals and the constituencies they
appealed to.
Chapter IV, Methodology, discusses the analytical components which will be
used to evaluate the Jewish and the Palestinian acts of terror in the subsequent two
chapters. Accordingly, Chapter's V and VI, examine first the Jewish resistance and
second the Palestinian resistance It is beyond the scope of this inquiry to analyze all
the acts of terrorism committed by either of the two Resistance movements. Therefore,
I have selected four from each in order to demonstrate the impact of psychological
warfare and propaganda on multiple target audiences. Ultimately, the true test of the
effectiveness of either Jewish or Palestinian terrorism rested on the ability of the
audiences' to respond favorably to the terrorists' cause. As will be shown, Jewish
terrorism was instrumental in creating a favorable response, whereas Palestinian
terrorism did not achieve a similar result. As a psychological operation, Jewish
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terrorism assaulted the psychological battlefield along a dual axis, on the local axis,
the target of violence generated a psychological warfare effect on the targets of terror
and demands; and on the international axis, the target of violence produced a
propaganda effect on the targets of attention and opportunity. By contrast, Palestinian
terrorism assaulted the psychological battlefield along a single axis, generally
provoking a psychological warfare effect on all target audiences, except for collateral
propaganda effects on their own community and other terrorist groups. In other words,
the Palestinian terrorists' indiscriminate selection of targets of violence created a real
or perceived fear among the targets of attention and opportunity due to their high level
of identification with the victim. Consequently, a comparison of the Jewish and
Palestinian terrorism reveals the implications of the psychological impact of acts of
violence on multiple audiences. Terrorism is a psychological operation that consists of
two effects—one propaganda and the other psychological warfare—and communicates a
political message to multiple target audiences, whose response dictates the success or
failure of the operation.
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II. THE ENVIRONMENT
The intent of the following section is to bring into focus how terrorism was
possible relative to the conditions unique to each period. I will argue that despite the
twenty plus years that separated the Jewish and Palestinian cases, similar conditions
benefitted the possible existence and effectiveness of terrorism within each historic
period. Martha Crenshaw, Paul Wilkinson, and Alex Schmid suggest that the existence
of permissive factors—modernization, urbanization, social facilitation, and government
inability or unwillingness to prevent terrorism—creates an environment in which the
manifestation of political violence is most common. Nonetheless, this conventional
interpretation of those factors that make terrorism possible are too abstract for the
purposes of this inquiry. Therefore, I intend to add that while terrorism's effectiveness
was enhanced by changes in the external environment, it also created a more complex
environment within which to communicate its violent message. The basis of this
conclusion considers the relative balance of forces that constrained the use of terrorism
as a viable means of political expression consistent with each period in history. The
constraints are those forces external to the group that complicate its ability to wage a
campaign of terror: such as, the complexity of the environment, a lack of sophisticated
technologies necessary to enhance a campaign of terror, and other competing groups or
events. There are limitations as well, which are those conditions internal to the group
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that restrict its ability to operate ' While important, limitations reflect group and
organizational dynamics, which will be briefly discussed in the next chapter
Ultimately, the possible existence and effectiveness of terrorism depends on conditions
external to it.
Therefore, I will add those conditions that constrain the possibility of terrorism
to the conventional wisdom's preconditions in order to establish a more realistic
interpretation of the Jewish and Palestinian terrorist campaigns. Beneficial conditions
include certain external events, developments, or popular modes, which may make the
possibility of a terrorist campaign more likely. Crenshaw suggests that terrorism
becomes possible when certain "preconditions" or "permissive causes" are present. She
provides four preconditions, three of which will serve as points of reference for the
remaining discussion of how terrorism may be possible during a given period These
preconditions include: modernization, urbanization, national social facilitation, and
transnational communication. 2
A government's inability to totally extinguish a terrorist minority for fear of
popular alienation as a consequence of an indiscriminate campaign of counter-terror is
Crenshaw's fourth precondition. She and other analysts of terrorism conclude that
'One could argue that terrorism is also "limited" by external political and social mechanisms, i.e. the former
Soviet Union. However, for the purposes of this discussion limitations are internal to the terrorist organization
and constraints are external impediments to the terrorist groups operational ability.
2Martha Crenshaw, "The Causes of Terrorism," Comparative Politics 13 (July 1981): pp. 381-383. For a
review of Crenshaw's interpretation: Alex Schmid and Albert J. Jongman, Political Terrorism: A New Guide to
Actors, Concepts, Data Bases, Theories and Literature (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1988), p. 117.
See also E.V. Walter, Terror and Resistance (London: Oxford University Press, 1969), pp. 340-343.
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liberal democracies are typically constrained in the security measures they can impose,
whereby at the expense of reducing civil liberties the costs of an effective campaign of
counter-terror are too high 3 While this may in fact be true, it does not categorically fit
the situations in Mandate Palestine or the Israeli-occupied territories after 1967. I find
it difficult to conclude that the British administration of the Mandate and the Israeli
occupied control of the West Bank and Gaza Strip as anything resembling fullfledged
democracy, therefore each of the occupying authorities could expend the means of
effective of counter-terrorism without exceeding the costs of a legitimate democracy in
their home territory. Accordingly, each occupying authorities did impose collective
measures that substantially reduced civil liberties; martial law, curfews, and cordon
and search operations. 4 Therefore, Mandate Palestine and the occupied territories of the
West Bank and Gaza Strip were "garrison states," which provided the occupying
authorities the ability to impose penalties on the local population with scant reference
to democratic principle. 5 However, in both instances terrorism had a peculiar way of
3The historical record indicates that terrorism has been wholly ineffective at toppling democracies, however
more often than not terrorism provokes democratic states to implement right wing initiatives in order to curb
terrorist violence (i.e. Uruguay and Argentina). See Martha Crenshaw (ed.), "Introduction: Reflections on the
Effects of Terrorism," Terrorism, Legitimacy, and Power (Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press, nd.).
"During the Arab Revolt (1936-1939), the British administration imposed regulations authorizing arrest and
search without warrant, deportation, occupation of buildings, seizure and use of vehicles, and the imposition of
curfews and censorship. Furthermore, severe penalties were imposed for firing on police and troops, bomb
throwing, and illegal possession of arms. J.C. Hurewitz, The Struggle for Palestine (NY: WW. Norton, 1950), p.
69. For similar British emergency measures during the Jewish Revolt (1944-1948): Bell, Terror Out of Zion, p.
151. For a similar discussion of the Israeli counter-terror campaign in the West Bank and Gaza Strip: Bard E.
O'Neill, Armed Struggle in Palestine: A Political-Military Analysis (CO: Westview Press, 1978), pp. 90-102.
5For more on the garrison state in Mandate Palestine: J. Boyer Bell, Terror Out of Zion: Irgun Zvai Leumi,
LEHI, and the Palestine Underground, 1929-1949 (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1977), p. 153; and Gordon
Rayford, The Righteous Executioner: A Comparative Analysis of Jewish Terrorists of the 1940s and the
Palestinian Terrorists of the 1970s (New York: City University Ph.D. Dissertation, 1980), p. 192. For the Israeli-
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highlighting the contradictions of undemocratic measures imposed by the occupying
authorities to their home constituencies (examined more in chapters five and six).
Crenshaw goes on to distinguish between what she calls "permissive causes" and
"direct causes," whereby the former set the stage for terrorism and the latter instigate
violence against the state. She contends that the instigating circumstances (direct
causes) go beyond merely creating an environment in which terrorism is possible, they
provide motivation and direction for the terrorist movement. Moreover, she adds,
whereas the preconditions (modernization, urbanization, social facilitation) present
opportunities for terrorism, background conditions provide the reasons for violence
against the state; they essentially precipitate the violence. She identifies four
background conditions which include: concrete grievances, the lack of opportunity for
political participation, an elite power struggle, and a precipitating event. Nonetheless, I
find it difficult to separate these background conditions from the preconditions in
general and the social facilitation in particular
The permissive causes set the stage for terrorism, framing its operational
parameters. Therefore, within these parameters manifest the "direct causes" that
instigate the violence against the state. It will not categorically divide this section into
preconditions and causes, because it makes more sense to mention direct causes when
the preconditions are set. For example, the existence of popular grievances against the
state suggests a weakness in the modernization process, whereby the rewards of
occupied territories: Hanon Alon, Countering Palestinian Terrorism in Israel: Toward a Policy of
Countermeasures, N-1567-FF (Santa Monica, CA: The Rand Corporation, August 1980), pp. 71-81.
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modernity are insufficiently distributed to unsatisfied sectors of the population This
grieving and unsatisfied sector of the population contains an elite minority willing to
be the vanguard of their cause Finding themselves deprived of a legitimate political
means to express their grievances, they are inclined to more radical behavior;
demonstrations, protests, riots and sabotage. The government's repression of the
grieving minority's radical behavior serves as the precipitating event that gives
terrorism its origin. Although this oversimplifies the actions that might cause an
outbreak of terrorism, it does illustrate that the preconditions and the direct causes are
so intertwined that it is difficult to distinguish between the two.
To make this clear I will use the permissive causes of modernization and
urbanization to set the stage for the Jewish and the Palestinian brand of terror during
each historical period; 1944-1948 for the former and 1968-1974 for the latter. While
modernization encompasses a broad range of social, political, and economic changes,
the discussion will focus specifically on technological differences relative to each
period. As a consequence of modernization, the section on urbanization is devoted to
the benefits and the opportunities the urban environment provides the terrorist. This
will provide the background for the final permissive cause of terrorism—social
facilitation. Within the framework of social facilitation, I will discuss the instigating
circumstances for the use of violence against the occupying authority. There are a
multitude of events that precede the outbreak of terrorism and it seems more a matter
of opinion than historical fact as to which event or condition was the most influential
regarding the outbreak of terrorism My intent is not to pass historical judgement—
I
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will reference those who have—but to provide a sketch of the operational environments
that benefitted and constrained terrorism during two distinct historical periods. I have
put my own personal twist on Crenshaw's framework, not because it is inadequate, but
because it must provide the reader an appreciation of the operational environments
confronted by the Jewish and the Palestinian terrorists. As an administrative note,
when mentioned: Palestine will reflect 1944 to 1948 and Israel 1967 to 1974 in order
to categorize the periods examined
A. TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION AND ITS IMPACT ON TERRORISM
Both Jewish and Palestinian terrorists were products of the modernization The
ability of each to wage a campaign of terror was reflective of the output of
modernization manifest during that specific period in history. Increased levels of
modernization produce benefits that create political, social, economic, and military
capital for the state. The state retains those benefits that strengthen its hold on power,
and allocates the remaining benefits relative to the needs of individual constituencies
The aspiring terrorist is typically at the end of the line awaiting his beneficial portion
of modernization Consequently, the aspiring terrorist is one of many consumers
demanding the benefits of modernization, which are largely independent of the
terrorist's needs or actions. Relegated to a consumer, the aspiring terrorist is thus at the
whims of the level of modernization manifest during that particular historic moment
Therefore, we should expect nothing more of the terrorist than modernization can
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provide, because it is he who decides how to maximize the means of modernization to
achieve specific ends
Undoubtedly, modern societies provide the aspiring terrorist with greater access
to targets of vulnerability and the means to wage a devastating campaign of terror The
modern society with its vast array of communication and transportation networks,
centralized administrations, bureaucracies, specialization, industrialization, and reliance
on public works is more easily disrupted than more traditional social settings. As
Crenshaw points out, Noble's invention of dynamite in 1867 provided the aspiring
terrorist the technological means of destruction previously unimaginable. 6 Therefore,
the advent of modern industrial society and technological innovations provided the
aspiring terrorist vulnerable targets and a means to destroy the same. By bombing an
electrical generating facility for instance, the modern terrorist could black-out an entire
city or suburban area disrupting the lives of many millions of people. By contrast,
traditional societies lack such elaborate infrastructures vulnerable to similar acts of
terrorist sabotage. Consequently, the terrorist's impact is more localized in traditional
societies. Moreover, while terrorism in both modern and traditional societies can be
devastating, only in the former can the terrorist achieve a broader and more pervasive
impact. I only point out the differences between traditional and modern societies to
illustrate that there are levels of modernization, and it is this level that forms the
6Martha Crenshaw, "The Causes of Terrorism," p. 382. For a studies of the anthology of terrorism refer:
Albert Parry, Terrorism From Robespierre to Arafat (NY: The Vanguard Press, 1976); Lewis Gann, Guerrillas in
History (CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1971); and Walter Laqueur, The Age of Terrorism (MA: Little, Brown
and Company, 1987).
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terrorists operational parameters. The terrorist is a product of his environment, modern
or otherwise. He is presented with more or less vulnerable targets and more or less
available means to inflict damage on those targets. His modernization parallels the
environment's modernization.
The most profound difference between the case studies regarding levels of
modernization was the more numerous networks of transportation and communication
and lethal weapon systems available to the Palestinians. The improvements in
communications, transportation, and weapons technologies provided the aspiring
Palestinian terrorist a greater means of publicity, mobility and destruction than was
possessed by his Jewish predecessor. The modern technologies of jet airliners,
televised communications, and surface-to-air missiles provided the aspiring Palestinian
terrorist the ability to fly to Turkey one morning, shoot down an aircraft from a
concealed location outside Istanbul by mid-day, and catch a return flight to Lebanon
that afternoon and watch news footage of the destroyed the aircraft on the evening
news in a Beirut hotel. By contrast, an aspiring Jewish terrorist hardly conceived of
such international operations, and when considered, the ocean liner or cargo ship was
the most sophisticated means of regular international transportation available, and
shooting down an aircraft was out of the question. Furthermore, the daily newspaper
was as sophisticated as the media coverage got during the Jewish campaign of terror
Table 2-1 below illustrates the technological differences between the two periods
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TABLE 2-1







Wireless telegraph, light signals, carrier
pigeons, courier service (children),
clandestine AM radio (2), cinema, mail
service, manual typewriters, black and
white photography
International: diesel engine cargo ships
and ocean liners, 2 or 4 radial air cooled
engines propeller driven aircraft: 1940
340 commercial aircraft world-wide
(Boeing 247Ds, McDonald-Douglas
DC2-3)
Domestic: stolen taxis and buses,
Desotos, Packards, Model-Ts, single
speed bicycles, two motorcycle, steam
locomotives
1939: 69,404,000 tons
1944: Home-made mortars, 30 rifles; 1
Bren-machinegun; 60 pistols, Sten guns;
V-3 rocket bomb; less than a ton of
explosives including nitroglycerin and
TNT. 1947: 700 arms including the
Thompson sub-machinegun and the Ml
Carbine, and 5 tons of explosives.
Telephone, infrared signals, diplomatic
pouch, clandestine AM-FM radio,
television, walkie talkies, CB radios,
electric typewriters, computers, color
photography,
International: nuclear propulsion ocean
cruise liners (and hydrofoils), turbine
powered subsonic aircraft: in 1969, the
US alone possessed 2,200 commercial
aircraft (Boeing 747, McDonald-Douglas
DC8-10)
Domestic: unlimited military and
civilian vehicles (MG, Volkswagon,
Mustang, Cutlass), multiple speed
bicycles, racing motorcycles, diesel-
electnc locomotives
1971: 247,303,000
Unlimited arms and ammunition: Czech
made VZ-58V assault rifle, Kalashnikov
Soviet AK-47, Beretta Model 12
Submachine gun, 82mm mortars, RPG-2
grenade launchers, RPG-18 anti-tank
rocket, and various pistols (Beretta,
Browning Marakov). Strela Soviet made
SA-7, RPG-7 anti-tank rocket
Sources: The above was compiled from the bibliographical sources cited in the body of the text. This is not a
complete list by any means, but it does give some indication of the differences between the two periods.
Unfortunately, there is no single source that lays these assets out completely, however the Encyclopedia
Britannica does cover the historical development of transportation, which demonstrates its development. Refei
to Christopher Dobson and Ronald Payne, The Terrorists: Their Weapons, Leaders, and Tactics (New York:
Facts on File, Inc, 1982) for a description of the types of weapons.
Nonetheless, these more sophisticated means available to the Palestinians are not
sufficient cause to conclude that the possibility of campaign of terror was a more
viable option for the them than the Jews during a less sophisticated or technologically
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advanced period The means available are the product of the given historical moment.
Whereby, the Jews made do with less sophisticated technologies, or none at all
comparable to those later available to the Palestinians. Moreover, similar technologies
were available to those that opposed the manifestation of terrorism as well Thus,
while the increased levels of modernization provided the Palestinians a greater access
to more vulnerable targets, mobility and publicity, these were mere tactical
considerations which if exploited improperly might well lead to strategic failure. 7
Paradoxically, modernization provided the aspiring terrorist more tools of the trade,
vulnerable components, and access to critics.
All considered, increased levels of modernization may not have created an
environment advantageous to Palestinian terrorism, because as the environment became
more modern there were more pieces to consider within the strategic calculus. Simply,
Palestine was less modern than Israel. While this is an obvious statement and perhaps
oversimplifies the conditions under which the Jews operated, it puts into perspective
the complex world the Palestinians had to calculate. Accordingly, the Jews had to
devise a campaign of terror within the parameters of modernization dictated by the
historic moment. Modernization provided the aspiring terrorists opportunities and
7For an interesting discussion of the impact of modernization on terrorism: Gabriel Ben-Dor, "The Strategy
of Terrorism in the Arab-Israel Conflict: The Case of the Palestinian Guerrillas," In Yair Evron (ed),
International Violence: Terrorism, Surprise and Control (Jerusalem: Hebrew University, 1979), p. 136; Ben-Dor
argues that the terrorist's dependence on the technological benefits of modern society relates to the law of
"diminishing returns," as dependence on supplies, guns, and missiles increases so does the terrorists visibility
and need for sanctuary. Essentially, the terrorist unwittingly sacrifices the security of anonymity for a
conventional benefit of greater technological advanced weapons systems and the tactics that correspond with
those weapon systems.
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vulnerable targets unique to their operational environment. The challenge for both the
aspiring Jewish and Palestinian terrorists was to translate the factors of modernization,
as available means, into an equation consistent with the given period and appropriate
for the ends desired A comparison of these two cases reveals that as the level of
modernization increased so too does the complexity of opportunities Moreover, with
greater access to the more vulnerable targets and benefits of publicity available
through more modern communications, the terrorist's violence, once localized, has
taken on a life of its own producing intended and unintended consequences. Therefore,
modernization in and of itself is not a sufficient cause of terrorism, because there are a
host of interrelated facts that further contribute to the possible existence and potential
effectiveness of modernity's techno-terronsm.
B. TERRORISM ON LOCATION
As a consequence of modernization, the growth and expanse of the modern city
provides the modern terrorist with an increase in the number and the accessibility of
targets and methods of terror. The urban area has become the center of government,
commerce, industry, and social and cultural life in the modern society. In 1936 for
example, seventy percent of the Jewish population in Palestine lived in Tel Aviv,
Haifa, and Jerusalem, with the remaining thirty percent clustered in nearby agricultural
settlements. By the late 1960s, the Middle East was second to Latin America in urban
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growth. 8 The cumulative effects of modernization, industrialization, and centralization
of governments have made the urban center the locus of the state's political, economic,
and social well-being. Unlike Europe, Latin America, and Southeast Asia, the aspiring
terrorist in the Middle East in general and Palestine-Israel in particular does and did
not have a rural option. The region's expansive desert area limits the aspiring terrorist
to the city. The city is both his battlefield and sanctuary. There, his security depends
on anonymity, the cohesion of a minority dedicated to violent action, and a
constituency sympathetic to such an example.
Access to the media is perhaps the greatest benefit a campaign of urban terror
can provide the aspiring terrorist. The spectacular and lethal nature of a terrorist act
provides the media with hard-copy of the latest in gore and devastation that shock and
amaze the popular mind. 9 The lack of censured press enables the terrorist through
"propaganda of the deed" to transmit his message to multiple reading and viewing
audiences. Acts of violence on the periphery or rural areas rarely receive the media
attention comparable to similar acts conducted within the confines of urban metros.
However, media access is not a sufficient cause for terrorism's favor of the urban
option, it is simply a benefit unique to the environment.
8Abdulaziz Y. Saqqaf (ed.), The Middle East City: Ancient Traditions Confront a Modem World (New
York: Paragon House Publishers, 1987).
9Alex Schmid points out an interesting difference, an act of terrorism committed in the 1940s took 12 hours
to be reported in an international newspaper, whereas in the mid-1960s a similar at of terrorism would take
seconds to make the headlines or the television screen: Alex Schmid and Janny de Graaf, Violence as
Communication.Insurgent Terrorism and the Western News Media (CA: Sage Publications, 1982), p. 17.
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P N Grabosky states that "cities are a significant cause of terrorism in that they
provide an opportunity (a multitude of targets, mobility, communications, anonymity,
and audiences) and a recruiting ground among the politicized and volatile
inhabitants."
10
Thus, Grabosky suggests that there is a positive relationship between the
level of urbanization and opportunities for terrorism. However, this reasoning does not
consider the relationship between relative levels of urbanization and opportunities for
terrorism. For instance, while Palestine was less urban than Israel, the Jews were no
less opportunistic than the Palestinian's use of terrorism in a more urbanized world.
Opportunities were less a function of the number of cities and more a function of
access to those cities and the repressive strength of the occupying authorities. The
Jews transplanted their terrorist campaign from the Warsaw ghetto to the streets of
Jerusalem, whereas the Palestinian terrorists began their campaign from Israel's
periphery to the cities of Cairo, Damascus, Amman, and Beirut. All considered,
urbanization exists somewhere within the modernization process, during which, greater
methods and access to more vulnerable targets of terror are available to the aspiring
terrorist.
C. NATIONALIST JUSTIFICATION AND TOLERANCE OF TERRORISM
Crenshaw uses Gurr's concept of social facilitation as the third "precondition" for
terrorism, focusing on national motives and justification for political violence She
10
Cited in Martha Crenshaw, "The Causes of Terrorism," p. 382; P.N. Grabosky, "The Urban Context of
Political Terrorism," In Michael Stohl, (ed.), The Politics of Terrorism (New York: M. Dekker, 1979), pp. 51-76.
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contends that social facilitation is a dynamic force that brings about civil strife.
Moreover, social facilitation reflects how a particular social group communicates its
grievances to the authority, whereby the "social habits and historical traditions that
sanction the use of violence against the government, making it morally and politically
justifiable, and even dictating the appropriate form, such as demonstrations, coups, or
terrorism (assassination)." Crenshaw contends therefore that social myths, traditions,
and habits permit the development of terrorism as an established political custom. 11
Accordingly, she notes the Irish tradition of resistance, dating back to the eighteenth
century, is manifested in the present by IRA-Provisional perpetual existence as a
terrorist organization. While compelling and based on empirical analysis in the field of
social-psychology, it is not my intent fully explore the traditional justifications for the
Jewish and Palestinian use of terrorism except to mention their unique differences.
1. The Facilitation of Jewish Terrorism
Jewish political Zionism initially supported diplomatic means as the
preferred course to political change, but as time progressed terrorism became a more
viable alternative.
12 The wave of European anti-semitism that escalated from the late
Crenshaw, "The Causes of Terrorism," p. 382. and Paul Wilkinson, Terrorism and the Liberal State
(London: MacMillan, 1977), p. 96.
l2Theodore Herzl's book The Jewish State politicized the European Jewish community by highlighting the
rampant anti-semitism ragging through Europe. In 1897, Theodore Herzl convened the World Zionist Congress
in Basle Switzerland, whereby the foundations of the World Zionist Organization established the initial motives
to "create for the Jewish people a home in Palestine." Don Peretz, The Middle East Today, 2d Ed. (New York:
Holt, Rhinehart and Winston, 1971), pp. 247-249.
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19th Century through the early 20th Century culminating in Hitler's Holocaust13
radicalized those Jews directly targeted by these pogroms. Furthermore, the 1920,
1921, 1929, and 1936 to 1939 Arab uprisings in Palestine focused on the immigrating
Jewish community as well (refer Appendix A, table A-3 for Jewish casualties). The
combined impact of these incidents created a level of civil strife sufficient to consider
terrorism as a means of political expression. However, terrorism was not necessarily
the best alternative, because the Jews in general and the Zionists in particular still
hoped that the British would fulfill their promise of creating a Jewish national home as
expressed in the Balfour Declaration. 14 Despite the level of Jewish civil strife, the
Jewish leadership feared that history might repeat itself, whereby the Zealot revolt
against the Roman occupier that concluded in a bloody civil war and no political
solution may again confront the modern day Zealots in their quest for a national
home. 15 Therefore, fearful of history repeating itself, the Jews guarded terrorism as a
viable alternative of influencing political change against the potential forces of terrorist
violence that could provoke a civil war.
On 17 May 1939, the British issued a White Paper that favored Arab
demands: restricting of land sales to the immigrating Jews, reducing Jewish
13Refer Table A-2, located Appendix A.
14On 2 November 1917, the Balfour Declaration (letter from Arthur James Balfour of the British Foreign
Office to Lord Rothschild) stated that the British supported "the establishment in Palestine of a national home
for the Jewish people," while protecting the rights of the indigenous non-Jewish communities. Walter Laqueur
(ed.), The Arab-Israeli Reader, 3d Ed. (New York: Bantam Books, 1976), p. 17.
15David C. Rapoport, "Terror and the Messiah: An Ancient Experience and Some Modem Parallels," In
David C. Rapoport and Yonah Alexander (eds), The Morality of Terrorism: Religious and Secular Justifications
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1989), p. 31.
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immigration quota to 15,000/year over the next five years, and establishing a 10 year
target for the creation of a Palestinian state.
16 The White Paper reduced Jewish
immigration to Palestine during a time when it was most needed. 17 Undoubtedly, a
continued flow of Jewish immigrants was essential to the creation of a Jewish national
home in Palestine, but the indications were that the Britain had every intention of
enforcing the White Paper and Hitler's persecution of German and Austrian Jews saw
no end.
18 Consequently, these events precipitated the wave of attacks against British
efforts to control immigration. As Mardor states the White Paper forced the Haganah
(the Jewish defense force) "to rid itself of all squeamishness about the use of arms." 19
Nonetheless, terrorism was merely a tactic at this point in the Jewish struggle against
the British, less violent alternatives remained. The combination of Germany's defeat of
Poland in September 1939 and the fall of France in May 1940 led the Jews to rescind
their anti-British campaign. David Ben-Gunon announced:
16Robert B. Asprey, War in the Shadows: The Guerrilla in History, Vol. II (New York: Doubleday, 1975),
769. For an m-depth discussion of the social and political implications of the White Paper: Hurewitz, The
Struggle for Palestine, pp. 94-1 1 1
.
17
1 935 was the highest year of Jewish immigration, 61,405. During the Arab Revolt (1936-1939), Jewish
immigration totalled 69,536 for the four year period. For more information on Jewish immigration refer Table
A-3. Walid Khalidi (ed.), From Haven to Conquest (Washington, DC: The Institute for Palestine Studies, 1987),
pp. 841-842. See Appendix A, Table A-5.
18Chaim Weizman and David Ben-Gurion, leaders of the World Zionist Organization and Jewish Agency
(the quasi-Jewish government in Palestine) respectively, believed that a Jewish state would be created on an
immigrant-by-immigrant process. Menachem Begin, The Revolt: The Story of the Irgun (New York: Shuman,
1951), p. 47; and Hurewitz, The Struggle for Palestine, p. 77.
19Munya M. Mardor, Haganah, edited by D.R. Elston (New York: The New American Library, 1957), p. 30.
The Haganah, a secret militia, had been formed in the early 1920s to defend Jewish settlements against Arab
attacks. By 1936, it was recognized by the British as a legal force to assist in the continued defense of the
Jewish population during the Arab Revolt [refer: J.C. Hurewitz, Struggle for Palestine (NY: WW. Norton,
1950), p. 42].
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The Jews of Palestine happen to be the only community in the Middle East
whose very survival is bound up with the defeat of Hitler. We shall fight the war
as if there were no White Paper; and the White Paper as if there where no war. 20
While the mainstream Haganah curtailed its anti-British activities, a
breakaway faction emerged that was less willing to cease activities The dissident
Irgun agreed to limit its attacks against the British, which translated into a limited
campaign of arms raids and bank robberies. Avraham Stern, a leader in the Irgun,
believed that the Haganah and the Irgun had sold out, that the Jewish homeland would
not be given, but had to be won. He was convinced that "the British, as foreign
occupier, was the target...and Britain's concessions to the Arabs and restrictions on the
Jews," were his proof.
21 The result was the Stern Gang or the Lehi, which committed
itself to a campaign of personal terror against the occupying British authority.
From May 1940 to January 1944, the Irgun continued its organizing
activities, while the Stern Gang waged its campaign of personal terror by killing
British police and intelligence officers. In November 1943, the World Zionist
Organization met at New York's Biltmore Hotel and established the Biltmore Program
which essentially called for the creation of a Jewish Commonwealth in Palestine. The
Biltmore Program also called for an increase in immigration amid news of Hitler's
concentration camps. The British denounced the Biltmore Program and remained
committed to enforcing the "closed gates" policy of the 1939 White Paper The British
20Barnet Litvinoff, To the House of Their Fathers: A History of Zionism (New York: Praeger Press, 1965),
p. 223.
21
J. Boyer Bell, Terror Out of lion (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1977), p. 63.
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steadfast refusal to accept the Zionist's proposals combined with the concrete evidence
of civil strife caused the dissidents to ally In January 1944, the Irgun and Stern Gang
formed a tacit-alliance in open revolt against the British administration. These
circumstances precipitated the Jewish wave of terrorism, both dissident and
mainstream, that would eventually influence British occupier to leave and create a
Jewish home.
2. Palestinian Facilitation of Terrorism
By comparison, a diplomatic resolution to the plight of the Palestinian
peoples was inconceivable given circumstances. Neither the Israeli occupier nor the
Arab hosts of the Palestinian diaspora were willing to release their claim to all or part
of Palestine. Consequently, one of the mechanisms used by the Palestinian resistance
to legitimize their historic claim to Palestine was propagandizing the myth of the Arab
guerrilla. While Christopher Dobson and others date the mythical origins of Palestinian
terrorism back to two distinct periods, this obscures an objective appraisal of the use
of violence as a means of political expression. For instance, the exploits of the
Palestinian Black September organization are somehow reflective of the Hashish tribe
(the Assassins) of the 11th Century, which operating in groups as small as three or
four, assassinated local elites as a means of influencing political change. 22 More
recently, the historical traditions of Yasir Arafat's al-Fatah originated from the Grand
"Christopher Dobson, Black September: It Short, Violent History (New York: MacMillan Publishing Co.,
1974), pp. 5-6. and Ovid Demaris, Brothers in Blood: The International Terrorist Network (New York: Charles
Scribner's Sons, 1977), pp. 121-123.
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Mufti of Jerusalem Haj Amin el Husseim in the 1920s. 23 The Mufti's fida'is (fedawi or
fedayeen) 24 waged a campaign of terror against the other local Arab elites, the Jewish
community, and the British Administration during the Mandate period (1922-1948).
Furthermore, terrorism as a traditional means of influencing political change was not a
strategy solely unique to the Palestinian people. As John Laffin's interview with a
Libyan cabinet minister reveals, "violence is the muslim's most positive form of
prayer."
2
' Consequently, Dobson and others would lead use to believe that from the
1 1th Century to the Arab uprisings in the 1920s to the revolt against the British and
immigrating Jews in the 1930s, terrorism became a morally and politically sanctioned
means of opposing a government or occupying power. 26
Yet, the fact is that the combination of British counter-terror efforts during
the Arab rebellion (1936-1939) and the Israeli systematic evacuation of the indigenous
Palestinian population during the 1948-49 Arab-Israeli War devastated the remnants of
23Yasir Arafat's (Abu Ammar) mother was a Husseini and he himself was born in Jerusalem. His real name
is Abd el-Rahman Abd el-Rauf Arafat el-Qudwa el-Husseim. For Arafat's biographical information: Thomas
Kiernan, Arafat: The Man and the Myth (New York: W.W. Norton, 1976); Janet and John Wallace, Arafat: In
the Eye of the Beholder (New York: Carol Publishing Group, 1990), pp. 3-112; Andrew Gowers and Tony
Walker, Behind the Myth: Y asser Arafat and the Palestinian Revolution (New York: Olive Branch Press, 1991),
pp. 5-22.
2
*fedawi means devoted one and fedayeen (fida'iyyin), one who sacrifices or goes on a suicide mission. The
contemporary myth of the fedayeen originates in the Arab guerrilla attacks on Israel in the 1950s.
25Cited in: Ovid Demaris, Brothers in Blood p. 120.
26Arabs see great symbolism in this carrying out the fight from one generation to the next: as exemplified by
Ali Hassan Salemeh, a senior intelligence officer in Al-Fatah (Razd), was the son of a legendary Palestinian
leader who was killed fighting the Israelis in 1948. Accordingly, Salemeh acquired much prestige from his
fathers reputation and an implacable desire for revenge for his father's death. Dobson, op cit, p. 45.
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the Palestinian political leadership.
27
Virtually overnight, the Palestinians became a
leaderless and fragmented society, which would take a generation to recreate and
consolidate. In 1949, the Palestinians, once a majority population, became a minority
population in the Jewish dominated state of Israel. 28 Consequently, Palestinian refugee
camps dotted the landscape of the Arab border states: from Egypt's Gaza Strip to
Jordan's East and West Banks to southern Syria and Lebanon. 29 From 1949 to 1967,
the Palestinians therefore were subjected to the political and military adventurism of
their host governments and not entirely free to wage a campaign of terror by their own
design.
30 Moreover, without the conventional means of "throwing Israel into the sea,"
the Arab border states exploited the Palestinian desires to return to their homeland by
27
J.C. Hurewitz, Struggle for Palestine (New York: WW. Norton, 1950), pp, 112-117, 330; Bell, Terror Out
of Zion, p. 21.
28Pre-1948 Palestinian population in Israel (Palestine) was 1.3 million and following the July 1949 armistice
160,000 Palestinian remained in Israel. For a detailed account of the Arab exodus from Palestine: Benny Morns,
The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem, 1947-49 (London: Cambridge University Press, 1987).
29According to the UN Economic Survey (1949) the population of the refugee camps was as follows: Jordan
70,000; Lebanon 97,000; Syria 75,000; Gaza 200,000; Arab Palestine (West Bank) 280,000; Iraq 4,000; and
Israel 31,000. Cited in: Dennis C. Howley, The United Nations and the Palestinians (NY: Exposition Press,
1975), p. 20. Refer original: Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XXI, No. 544 (December 5, 1949), p. 847a-
848a. See also Appendix B, Table B-2: Palestinian Diaspora.
30There were parallel developments to consider, such as the politicization of Palestinian youth within the
refugee camps as well as those within the occupied territories. By 1970, with the help of the UNRWA (United
Nations Relief and World Agency) schools staffed with Palestinian teachers and the propaganda efforts of
Palestinian political organizations [i.e. General Union of Palestinian Students (1959)] created over 50,000
graduates from institutions of higher learning, with an intense consciousness of their plight and a desire for
action to reverse the catastrophes of 1949 and 1967. Howley, The United Nations and the Palestinians, p. 78; for
in in-depth analysis of the political institution building of the Palestinian movement and the politicization of the
Palestinian peoples, refer: Laurie Brand, Palestinians in the Arab World: Institution Building and the Search for
State (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988).
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using them in an unconventional war of attrition against the Jewish colonial outpost of
Western imperialism. 31
Israel's lighting defeat of the Arab armies in the Six-Day War (June 1967)
was the final step in the radicalization process of the Palestinian peoples. Prior to the
June war, the Palestinians in the Gaza Strip in general and the West Bank in particular
identified less with the Palestinian cause and more with their respective sovereigns;
Egypt for the former and Jordan for the latter. Furthermore, many Palestinians became
two-time refugees, twice forced from their homeland by the Zionist armies, and for
many others it was the first time they were subjected to Israeli rule. Consequently,
Israeli occupation of the Gaza Strip and the West Bank facilitated for the inhabitants
their first conclusive sense of Palestinian identity. 32 Most decisive of all was the
humiliation felt by the Arab states bordering Israel, the June War proved that they
were incapable of driving Israel into the sea, which further elevated the Palestinian
question to a higher place on the Arab and Middle East political agenda. Moreover,
the Palestinian question became a central consideration in the Arab-Israeli dispute,
because of the over one million Palestinians subjected to Israeli occupation in Egypt's
3I
Y. Harabi, "The Arab Slogan of a Democratic State," In Yonah Alexander and Nicholas N. Kittrie (eds),
Crescent and Star: Arab & Israeli Perspectives on the Middle East Conflict (New York: AMS Press, 1973), p.
28.
32David Howley, The United Nations and the Palestinians, suggests that the Palestinian identity was also
reflected in their literature, arts, poetry, and songs. He states a central theme has been the plight of the
Palestinian refugee, his sense of injustice and his longing for a "return" to his homeland. He notes how
strikingly similar this dynamic is to Zionism. Accordingly, Howley cites A.L. Tibawi's article in Middle East
Journal (Autumn 63, p. 507-9) on Palestinian art and poetry: "There is a new Zionism in the making, an "Arab
Zionism" with the aim of returning to the homeland." Howley, p. 74. For an analysis of Zionist expression
through the arts and literature see, Alfred M. Lihenthal, Zionist Connection What Price Peace (New York:
Dodd, Mead, & Co., 1978).
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Gaza Strip and Jordan's West Bank. The stage had been set for the Palestinians to take
control of the strings from their Arab host puppeteers. In sum, the Palestinian question
had shifted from a peripheral to the central issue in the Arab-Israeli dispute, thereby
facilitating a level of social strife conducive to the existence of terrorism. 33
All considered, from 1949 to the mid-1960s, a new generation of
Palestinians developed, which was educated by the host Arab states and United
Nations relief agencies and exploited by the former in its self-indulged campaign of
terror against Israeli occupier. Consequently, by the mid-1960s, from the Palestinian
masses emerged a leadership sufficiently educated and trained in the merits of terrorist
tactics, which strove to take control of the political destiny of the Palestinian peoples
and reclaim their lost territory by means of armed struggle This emerging Palestinian
leadership referred to themselves as the "Generation of Revenge," and openly
denounced the "Generation of Disaster" for its failure to rid their homeland of the
foreign usurper. 34 Consequently, an objective interpretation of those circumstances that
facilitated the Palestinian use of terrorism or violence against the state indicates that
their decision paralleled the Jews.
Furthermore, diplomacy was not a viable option given the involvement of
Arab states in Palestinian affairs and the location of the Palestinian population outside
"For a discussion of the effect of the Six-Day War and Arab politics: Zvi Ankori, "The Continuing Zionist
Revolution," In Yonah Alexander and Nicolas N. Kittne (eds.) Crescent and Star: Arab & Israeli Perspectives on
the Middle East Conflict (New York: AMS Press, 1973), p. 96; and Don Peretz, The Palestine Arab Refugee
Problem, RM-5973-FF (Santa Monica, CA: The Rand Corporation, October 1969), pp. 54-64.
34John Laffin, Fedayeen: The Arab-Israeli Dilemma (New York: The Free Press, 1973), p. 7; and Thomas
Kieman, Yasir Arafat: the Man and the Myth (New York: WW. Norton, 1976), p. 168.
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the country of occupation While the creation of Palestinian Liberation Organization in
1964 marked a significant change in the recognized right of a Palestinian entity to self-
determination, this right addressed less the Palestinian question and more the pan-Arab
desires for solidarity among the Arab states in an eventual showdown with the Zionist
imperial outpost. From 1964 to the June 1967 War, the Palestinian right to a homeland
in all or part of Israel (Palestine) remained an unresolved question. The humiliating
defeat of the Arab armies against Israel in June 1967 provided the Palestinians their
first real opportunity at unmanipulated political expression. Yet, the Israelis nor the
Palestinians recognized the political existence of the other, or other's right to historic
Palestine Consequently, violence became the means of diplomatic dialogue.
Furthermore, the Arab states bordering Israel continued to exert their influence over
Palestinian affairs by creating their own Palestinian terrorist organizations or by
providing financial or material support to Palestinian organizations previously in
existence. 35 In sum, it is oversimplified to conclude that contemporary Palestinian
terrorism is the present manifestation of a tradition of violence against authority.
Palestinian terrorism is the result of complex array of political and social
circumstances that fostered acts of terror as the most appropriate means to achieve the
desired political ends. Like the Jews, rational strategic choice was the basis of
Palestinian terrorism.
35The Gulf States were the principle financiers of the Palestine Liberation Organization. For a discussion of
Arab states' sponsorship and creation of Palestinian resistance groups (e.g., Syria's Al-Sa'iqah and Iraq's Arab
Liberation Front): John W. Amos, Palestinian Resistance: Organization of a Nationalist Movement (NY:
Pergamon Press, 1980), pp. 89-112.
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In both cases civil violence against authority became an almost regular
activity. The Jews refused to relive the catastrophe of the Zealot revolt two thousand
years before, terrorism was to fit within present situational parameters or not at all.
Similarly, the Palestinians sought to reverse the historical failure of the "Generation of
Disaster," by seeking revenge against the Zionist occupation of their homeland. 36 In
essence, neither Jewish nor Palestinian terrorism can be considered normative
behavior, as Dobson and Laffin would lead us to believe Both the Jews and the
Palestinian used the oppressive circumstances of their respective diaspora as a moral
weapon, which justified violence as a political necessity against the occupying
authority in the absence of less violent alternatives By the 20th Century, the Jewish
violent opposition to authority had long since lapsed. In effect, the Jews had to
recreate a strategy of terrorism, based less on historical myth and more on recent
experience The combination of military experience in the World War I and II
(conventional in the former and unconventional in the latter) and defense against the
Arab rebellions from 1920 to 1939 created a unique appreciation for the merits of
terrorism. 37 Accordingly, the Jews depended less on terrorism as a means of popular
identity and more as a means of achieving a political result (discussed in more detail
36
Jillian Becker, The PLO: The Rise and Fall of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (London:
Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1984), p. 32.
37
For a concise history of the Israeli Defense Forces: Ze'ev Schiff, A History of the Israeli A rmy (New
York: MacMillan Publishing Company, 1985); and for a discussion of Palestinian Arab and Jewish enlistment in
World War II, the latter representing the overwhelming majority: J.C. Hurewitz, The Struggle for Palestine
(W.W.Norton, 1950), pp. 119, 128-130.
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in Chapter V). By contrast, terrorism became an integral component of Palestinian
(and Arab) identity and a means of achieving a political solution.
However, this image is based on political and social circumstances. For
instance, if the majority of Palestinians lived under the occupied control of the Israelis
(as did the Jews under British control), then the Palestinians would have had the
ability to conduct non-violent dialogue with the occupying authority and
simultaneously continue a campaign of terror as necessary to expedite those social and
political circumstances they desired. Accordingly, the Palestinians would have
depended less on terrorism as a means of popular identity and more as a means of
achieving a political solution. But as it was, the Palestinians were victims of
circumstances, those they perpetuated through popular myth and those imposed on
them by non-Palestinian Arabs elites. Considering the contextual circumstances, the
basis of Zionism was passivism, whereas the basis of Palestinian nationalism was
armed struggle, which may inevitably account for their unique brands of political
violence and the ultimate political result. Nonetheless, a comparison of the origins
Palestinian and Jewish terrorism reveals very little without considering the relative
capacity of their respective constituencies to support such violence.
3. The Popular Toleration of Political Violence
Therefore, a crucial component of the utility of terrorism during any given
historical moment is the specific constituency's cultural and social predisposition
toward violence as a means of challenging authority While terrorism thrives best in a
climate of social strife, its utility is contingent on a popular constituency which
50
regulates violence within its own social and cultural normative structures Yet, a
unique feature of terrorism is its extra-normal character, which typically exceeds the
bounds of social regulation. A characteristic of both Zionist and Palestinian campaigns
of terror was that each periodically exceeded the bounds of social regulation.
Accordingly, E.V. Walter contends that a community's tolerance of violence reflects
"socially approved coercive techniques beyond established limits... specified as
legitimate or illegitimate by social definition." 38 In other words, terrorism generated
violent acts that typically exceeded the normal standards of active political protest or
"political agitation." How then does a particular society condone the use of armed
violence against an apparently legitimate authority? And how did the Jewish (Yishuv)
and the Palestinian communities differ in their absorptive capacity of violent acts
committed by a militant fringe?
Thomas Thornton suggests that "the appropriateness of terror varies
according to the degree of political support enjoyed by the terrorists [insurgents],"
whereby "terror is only appropriate if the terrorists [insurgents] enjoy a low level of
actual political support but have a high potential for such support." 39 Both the Zionist
and the Palestinian terrorists possessed a high potential for political support from their
respective constituencies. In spite of this, however, the degree of actual political
38Eugene V. Walter, Terror and Resistance (London: Oxford University Press, 1969), p. 23. For more on the
social threshold of violence: R.D. Crelenstein, "Terrorism as Political Communication: The Relationship between
Controller and the Controlled," In P. Wilkinson and A.M. Stewart (eds.) Contemporary Research on Terrorism
(MD: Aberdeen University Press, 1987), pp. 3-23.
39Thomas P. Thornton, "Terror as a Weapon of Political Agitation," In Harry Eckstein (ed.) Internal War
(CT: Greenwood Press, 1964), p. 74.
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support enjoyed by the terrorists was often negated by the consequences of their
violent acts Terrorism typically provoked the occupying authority to administer
repressive measures against the entire community instead of targeting only those
known to be sympathetic to the terrorists 40 In order to protect themselves from the
authority's reprisals, each community, Jewish or Palestinian, tolerated violence to a
certain level. Once this threshold was broken the citizens, who previously condoned
armed violence as a legitimate expression of their grievances, reversed their allegiance
by supporting the authority's counter-terror efforts. 41
A couple brief examples will bring into focus when a constituency might
reverse its support for a campaign of terror to backing the occupying authority's
campaign of counter-terror. As discussed in the introduction, the bombing of the King
David Hotel by the Irgun and the Stern Gang outraged both world opinion in general
and local opinion in particular. The killing and wounding of over 100 persons
exceeded the bounds of the Yishuv's social regulation, which led to open collaboration
between the Jewish Agency's Haganah and the British authorities. They declared an
open "season" on the dissidents and began a campaign to liquidate terrorism once and
40Accordingly, Hurewitz points out that the British meted out collective punishment as a matter of principle,
whereby whole villages or districts whose unidentifiable residents were responsible for the offenses: Hurewitz,
Struggle for Palestine, p. 69.
"'This popular reaction to terrorist violence that exceeds social regulation is also referred to as the "backlash
effect." Irving Louis Horowitz, "The Routinization of Terrorism," In Martha Crenshaw (ed.), Terrorism,




Similarly, the Palestinian campaign of terror was not immune to the effects of
violence that exceed the cultural bounds of its constituency. The combined effect of
the assassination of a member of the Shatti refugee council and an attempted
assassination of a former mayor in the Gaza Strip led to open protest by local
Palestinians against this recent wave of murderous violence and to the circulation of a
petition calling on the Arab world to help curb the Palestinian guerrilla attacks in the
Gaza Strip. Consequently, in both cases terrorism exceeded the normal bounds of
social regulation, which led the local constituents to reverse their support for the
terrorist's campaign of terror to support for the liquidation of the terrorists by the
occupying authority.
Within the Jewish and Palestinian communities, the tolerance of violence
was a function of geography, the proximity to the occupying authority, and the length
of the conflict or the cumulative impact of the occupying authority's counter-terror
initiatives. In the Jewish case, the more removed the diaspora was from the locus of
conflict the less tolerant they were of terrorism as a means of political resolution.
Although more tolerant than Jews outside Palestine, the Yishuv was reluctant to
condone the terrorist paradigm. Incidents such as the one mentioned above and the
42
Bell, Terror Out of Zion, p. 128-136: This was the second (Aug - Oct 46) of the so-called open "seasons"
against the Irgun by the Haganah and the British administration, which resulted in the Haganah's handing over
to the British more than a thousand Irgun suspects including 25 ex-Irgunists serving in the British Army in
Cairo. The first occurred shortly after the assassination of Lord Moyne (British Minister of State for the Middle
East) on 6 November 1944 and lasted from January to May 1945. An elaborate examination of Lord Moyne's
assassination can be found in: J. Boyer Bell, "Assassination in International Politics, Lord Moyne, Count
Bernadotte, and the Lehi," International Studies Quarterly, Vol 16, No. 1 (March 1972), pp. 59-82.
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assassination of Lord Moyne exceeded the Yishuv's absorptive capacity of terrorism. 43
As the conflict progressed, however, the British persistence in meting out collective
punishment and lack of a resolve for the Jewish question, the Yishuv's tolerance of
violence increased. By contrast, the Palestinian diaspora tolerated terrorism as a means
of political agitation more so than their brothers in the occupied West Bank and Gaza.
In the refugee camps that dotted the Arab states bordering Israel, terrorism was a
morally and politically justified means of reclaiming their lost homeland—Palestine.
Furthermore, terrorism was a traditionally sanctioned means of maintaining Palestinian
autonomy within the confines of a host state Essentially, terrorism emanating from the
refugee camps created states within states, whereby Palestinian terrorism manipulated
and was manipulated by the host government.
There were unique differences in threshold levels of the occupied territories
as well. The Gaza Strip was inhabited by mostly refugees, whereas many of the West
Bank residents had been inhabitants of the area for many decades. Furthermore, the
residents of the West Bank were descendants of the Hashemite Kingdom, linking them
socially and culturally to Jordan The Gazans lacked a similar cultural link to a
neighboring state, and therefore possessed a more exclusive claim to territory within
Israel's 1949 border. Consequently, historic Palestine provided the basis of Gazan-
Palestinian identity, whereas the West Bank Palestinians were not necessarily
interested in the same exclusive claim. Therefore, the Gazans had more to gain from
43For the Yishuv response to the Irgun's and Stern Gangs violence: J. Boyer Bell, Terror Out of Zion: Irgun
Zvai Leumi, Lehi, and the Palestine Underground (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1977), pp. 121, 126 & 135.
And for a Sternist's interpretation of the events: G. Frank, The Deed (New York: Ballentine, 1963).
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any political solution that Palestinian terrorism might bring. By contrast, the West
Bank Palestinians allied first with the King of Jordan in anticipation that he would
reunite the East and West Banks. Therefore, the West Bank Palestinians possessed a
violence threshold lower than Palestinian occupants of the Gaza Strip. 44 Nonetheless,
the Palestinian communities (like the Yishuv) condoned increased levels of violence as
Israeli reprisal raids continued and the Arab states and world community proved
incapable of resolving their grievances. Furthermore, the combination of King
Hussein's campaign of counter-terror against Palestinian guerrillas and his recognition
of the PLO as representative of the Palestinian people undermined the previous
distinction between the absorptive capacity of violence between the West Bank and the
Gaza Strip. In the end, Crenshaw best summarizes how terrorism became the preferred
course for the Palestinians:
The Arab defeat in the 1967 war with Israel led Palestinians to realize that they
could no longer depend on the Arab states to further their goals. In retrospect,
their extreme weakness, [dispersion, manipulation by their Arab hosts, and
Israel's failure to recognize their existence] in the Middle East made it likely that
militant nationalists should turn to terrorism. Since international recognition of
the Palestinian cause was a primary aim (given the influence of outside powers
in the region) and since attacks on Israeli territory were difficult, terrorism
developed into a transnational phenomenon. 45
44
For similar conclusions: William B. Quandt, Palestinian Nationalism: Its Political and Military Dimensions
R-782-ISA (Santa Monica, CA: The Rand Corporation, November 1971), pp. 34-37; and Bard E. O'Neill, A rmed
Struggle in Palestine: A Political-Military Analysis (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1978), pp. 90-102, 113-123.
45Crenshaw, "The Causes of Terrorism," p. 389.
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D. TRANSNATIONAL TERROR
The transnational character of terrorism introduces multiple actors into the
terrorist's drama. The terrorist drama is not limited to the local stage, projecting a
demonstration and contagious effect on audiences beyond the source of the conflict.
Domestic and international communities either wittingly or unwittingly become
spectators or vulnerable participants in the violent episodes of the theatrics of
terrorism. The modernization of transportation, communication, and weapons
technologies has greatly facilitated the transnational character of contemporary
terrorism, such that the absence of modern technologies limited the effects of terrorism
to the locus of dispute. For the modern terrorist the whole world is his stage, because
as Freedman aptly describes:
The terrorist appears suddenly on the scene, an anonymous figure who attacks
the very structure of society either by selecting a powerful figure or by
challenging authority and social mores by violating the security of accepted
social procedures. The sudden assault and apparent fearlessness communicates a
sense that the terrorist can in fact work miracles in upsetting the state. The
terrorist's belligerent denial of the normal effective reactions, other than anger
and resolution, assaults the sensibility of the spectator. The sudden unexpected
fall of someone in power assaults the sense of security of the spectator. 46
While the terrorist's theatrical performance captures the imagination of an attentive
transnational audience in the present, its current screenplay may well be based on a
past series of violent episodes that used terror to effect reactions favorable to the
achievement of terrorist goals.
46Lawrence Z. Freedman, "Why Does Terrorism Terrorize?" In David Rapoport and Yonah Alexander (eds.),
The Rationalization of Terrorism (MD: University Publications of America, 1982), p. 27.
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The success of resistance movements in the 1920s, 50s, and 60s served as
credible evidence that an imperial power was not immune to defeat by a smaller force
Consequently, the Jews used the IRA's success in the 1920s and the 1936-39 Arab
uprising against the British as credible evidence of the effectiveness of terrorism as a
means of challenging authority. According to the leader of the Irgun, Menachem
Begin, all revolutionaries are "brothers in arms. All the world's fighters for freedom
are one family "
47
Similarly, the Palestinians translated the success of the FLN in
Algeria, the Viet Cong in Vietnam, and Fidel Castro's and Che Guevara's revolutionary
success in Cuba into their struggle against the imperialist backed, colonizing Zionists. 48
While the Jewish and the Palestinian terrorists were influenced by the success of
previous resistance movements, only the latter could exploit the competitive and
contagious effects of resistance movements elsewhere.
The Jewish terrorist had at his disposal a peculiar mix of the 19th and 20th
Century's technologies, possessing the explosive potential to destroy buildings and kill
numerous people but lacking sophisticated communication and transportation
technologies, which aid in the transmission of the physical and psychological effects of
violence beyond the source of conflict. By contrast, the Palestinians faced no such
47Menachem Begin, The Revolt: The Story of the Irgun (New York: Shuman, 1951), pp. 47-48, 55-56.
48John Laffin points out that Yasir Arafat met Che Guevara in 1965 and suggests that Arafat was probably
influenced by Guevara's revolutionary ideas: John Laffin, Fedayeen: The Arab-Israeli Dilemma (New York: Free
Press, 1973), p. 16.
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constraints in their potential to broaden the scope of conflict. As Abu Iyad49 (Yasir
Arafat's number two man in al-Fatah and later, the leader of Black September) puts it
"when deprived of our elementary right to our own territory in order to dislodge the
usurper, it is natural that we should enlarge the field of battle That is why we are
asking all our fighters to preserve their sacred right to fight by retreating into the most
complete secrecy.'00
This reflects a unique dimension of transnational terror that the Palestinians
possessed almost exclusive claim. And that is the competitive and contagious
components of the violent action that expand the terrorist's field of battle to include
other terrorist groups. 51 Palestinian terrorism existed during a period in history when
similar campaigns of terror and resistance were being waged elsewhere: the Tupamaros
in Uruguay, the ERP in Argentina, the PLA in the Philippines, the Baader-Meinhof
gang in West Germany, Basque Separatists in Spam, and so on By contrast, the
Jewish terrorists operated during a period when there were far fewer groups waging a
campaigns of terror: IRA-Provos in Northern Ireland and the EOKA in Greece.
Consequently, the effect of the Palestinian campaign of terror was diffused by the
49For more on Abu Iyad: Abu Iyad (Salah Khalaf) My Home, My Land: A Narrative of the Palestinian
Struggle (New York: Times Books, 1978).
50Dobson, Black September, p. 44.
51For the contagion of terrorism: Midlarsky et al., "Why Violence Spreads: The Contagion of International
Terrorism," International Studies Quarterly 24 (June 1980): 2, pp. 262-298; Frederick J. Hacker, "Contagion and
Attraction for Terror and Terrorism," In Yonah Alexander and John M. Gleason (eds.), Behavioral and
Quantitative Perspectives on Terrorism (New York: Pergamon Press, 1981), pp. 73-85; and Edward Heyman and
Edward Mickolus, "Imitation by Terrorists: Quantitative Approaches to the Study of Diffusion Patterns in
Transnational Terrorism," op cit., pp. 175-195.
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competitive desires of terrorist campaigns elsewhere that attempted to capture the
attention of the world through acts of violence. While the Jews competed with fewer
groups, their ability to capture world attention was undermined by less sophisticated
means of communication and world events Although the effects of the Holocaust were
well known by the international community, world attention was consumed by post-
war reconstruction and resettlement of other refugees besides the Jews 52 The
Palestinian's strategic environment was complicated by world events as well (Vietnam,
Soviets in Czechoslovakia, etc), but the innovations in communications and
transportation technologies easily compensated for their competitive grasp on world
attentive. Furthermore, the existence of other groups waging campaigns of terror
provided the Palestinians vital allies during periods when the oppressive security forces
were in hot pursuit. This advantage the Jewish terrorist could not boast.
While terrorism is indeed theatrical, it is certainly not the only show in town. If
the central purpose of terrorism is to capture an audiences attention, then during
periods of competing dramas terrorism must reach new heights in spectacular appeal.
In 1968, with the US bogged down in Vietnam, Europe engaged in student riots, and
the Soviets in Czechoslovakia representing the major events gripping the world's
attention, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine broke this grip by hijacking
an El Al 707 airliner enroute from Rome to Tel Aviv diverting it to Algeria. This
terrorist drama occupied a major portion of the world's stage for over a week involving
"For example, from 1931-1940, the Jewish immigrants numbered a total of 137,445 out of 528,431 total
foreign immigration to the United States for that period: US Department of Justice, Immigration and
Naturalization Service and the Jewish Year Book. Refer Appendix A, Table A-5.
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the International Red Cross and the Algerian, Italian, and the Israeli governments.
Modernity provided the Palestinian terrorists the ability to capture world attention with
a dramatic single stroke, but the Palestinians did not possess an exclusive claim to the
theatrics of hijacking and it was not long before other terrorist groups exploited the
same elevated stage to gain recognition for their cause Consequently, hijacking was
contagious and competition for world recognition was diffuse The following year
attempted hijackings doubled (38 in 1968 to 82 in 1969), and the world could no
longer distinguish between the Palestinian message and those of the many other
terrorist groups that used the world's airlines as a means to communicate similar
appeals.
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Therefore, it is hardly a secret that the Palestinians have enlarged the field of
battle. It is my contention that the Jews enlarged the field of battle as well, but
without the benefit of sophisticated technologies that were at the Palestinians' disposal
and the solidarity of other groups waging similar campaigns of terror. Unquestionably,
the most salient feature of Palestinian terrorism was its transnational character. The
Irgun and the Stern Gang neither had the luxury nor conceived of conferring with
other national resistance leaders to discuss revolutionary strategy. By comparison, the
Palestinians considered that standard procedure. For instance, at a symposium
"Refer: Richard Clutterback, "The Politics of Air Piracy," Living With Terrorism (New York: Arlington
House Publishers, 1975), p. 95; Alona E. Evans, "Aircraft Hijacking: What is being done," In M. Cherif
Bassiouni (ed.) International Terrorism and Political Crimes (Springfield, IL: Charles C. Thomas, 1975); and J.
Boyer Bell, Transnational Terrorism (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institute Press, 1975), pp. 80-84. For an analysis of
the contagion of hijacking: Robert T. Holden, "The Contagiousness of Aircraft Hijacking," American Journal of
Sociology, 91:4 (January 1986), pp. 874-904.
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organized by North Korea's Worker's Council, George Habash met with 400 other
delegates from around the globe to discuss revolutionary strategy. He concluded that
"there are no political and geographical boundaries or moral limits to the operations of
the people's camp."
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Therefore, the Jews were less technologically capable of
transmitting their violent message to transnational audiences, than the Palestinians who
had the benefit of more communication and transportation technologies with which to
do so
However, it is central to my thesis that for terrorism to be successful it must
transcend national boundaries and become a transnational dynamic, independent of
available technologies. The aspiring terrorist must prepare his psychological battlefield
by exploiting every available means to communicate his message, undistorted by
competing organizations or world events. The Jews did introduce outside actors into
the Palestine drama by committing acts of indiscriminate terror, which generally
outraged international opinion but created an awareness of their cause nonetheless.
Similarly, the Palestinian terrorists committed acts of indiscriminate terror that placed
their cause on the international stage as well, but without the same political result.
This raises an interesting question: once the violent message reaches the international
stage, what happens to it and how is it received?
As discussed above, the local Jewish and Palestinian communities possessed an
absorptive capacity for acts of violence, and as the conflict progressed and the
54Demaris, Brothers in Blood, p. 196.
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occupying authority was seen as more illegitimate, the absorptive capacities generally
increased. But, in both cases the resolution of the Palestine question did not rest
entirely with the occupying authority. The most decisive point of decision was the
occupying authority's source of power The United States and the occupying
authorities' popular constituencies were representative of both the British and the
Israeli sources of power. In the Jewish case for example,
The ultimate seat of authority was with the British government in London. It was
here, not in Jerusalem, that the operative decisions were made, and it was
London that Zionist pressure could most effectively be applied. Pressure might
reach the British Government in Whitehall through three channels. The Jewish
Agency in Jerusalem could transmit pressure through the High Commissioner to
the Colonial Office and thence, through the Secretary of State for the Colonies,
to the Cabinet. Secondly, the mechanism of what we now call "Public Relations"
could be brought to bear upon public opinion in England, through Members of
Parliament, and then to Minsters in general, among them the Secretary of State
for the Colonies Third, by similar means public opinion could be influenced in
other countries, especially in the United States of America, so that pressure
would be brought through Embassy channels on the Foreign Office and thus on
the Colonial Secretary and the Cabinet. 55
No matter the geographic location of the seat of authority, the terrorist must find a
means to frame his acts of violence, such that they are viewed less for their violent
quality and more for the quality of their cause. Furthermore, the effectiveness of the
terrorism is constrained by public opinion, which indirectly impacts the manner in
"Michael Ionides, "Zionists and the Land," In Walid Khalidi (ed.) From Haven to Conquest (Washington,
DC: Institute of Palestine Studies, 1987), pp. 259-260. By comparison, Hurewitz points out that the US
Congress was equally sensitized to public opinion. This, in so far as it was articulate on Palestine, was markedly
Pro-Zionist, primarily because of the plight of the European Jews and the effective public relations program of
American Zionists: Hurewitz, p. 226. The road to London, in Zionist strategy, led all agreed through
Washington,. ..the militants contended, could be moved through pressure of public opinion. ..creating an American
awareness: Zvi Ganin, Truman, American Jewry and Israel, 1945-48 (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1979), pp.
12-29.
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which the terrorist's violent example is understood. Operating within the context of the
given historical moment, the audiences level of identification with the terrorist cause
also constrains the efficacy with which his cause is understood
For terrorism to be effective, the terrorist must finally determine how local and
international channels will receive the violent message. As should be obvious from the
discussion above, the terrorists direct exposure to local audiences makes him fully
aware of how those audiences' respond to acts of violence On the other hand, the
terrorists' knowledge of international audience response is doubtful. Accordingly, in
order to manipulate international audiences toward the terrorists cause, the terrorist
must develop mechanisms to create favorable audience predispositions Where these
predispositions are weak or absent the terrorist (or his ally) must prepare those
audiences for the eventual violent act. Violence as the terrorists primary means of
communication must be as clearly understood. Consequently, when audiences are
predisposed to react negatively toward violence, as most Western audiences are, then
the terrorist must device a means to prepare his audiences for the eventual violent act.
The intent is for audiences to identify less with the violence and more with the
terrorists cause. However, as is most often the case, audiences initial response is to
frame the violent act within preexisting intellectual constructs and images, which in
most cases are based on prior exposure, media portrayal, and elite interpretation of the
event.
56 Consequently, the terrorist must develop a mechanism to influence the media's
56For an in-depth analysis of the American image of the Arab transmitted by the popular press: Edmund
Ghareeb (ed), Split Vision: The Portrayal of Arabs in the American Media (Washington, DC: American-Arab
Affairs Council, 1983).
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portrayal and elite interpretation of the event that creates positive images within the
popular mind and a climate of opinion favorable to the terrorist cause.
How then does transnational terrorism overcome negative predispositions?
Although it is beyond the scope of this study to discuss the influence of interest
groups, lobbies, public opinion, or conventional propaganda campaigns, a few general
comments are necessary, because terrorism was not the exclusive mechanism that
created a Jewish state on the one hand, and left the Palestinians in the refugee camps
or the occupied territories on the other. While the international community was well
aware of the atrocities of the Holocaust, their was not an overwhelming drive by the
international community to insure that the Jews had a home in Palestine. In fact, many
of the leading Zionists had complained about the complacency of the American public
towards their drive for a Palestinian home. 57 Consequently, terrorism became a violent
reminder of the plight of desperate peoples' quest for a Jewish national homeland.
Moreover, the public image of the Jews was not of a terrorist, but of a Jew awaiting
Hitler's infernos, which reflected the media portrayal of the terrorist incidents and elite
interpretation. By comparison, the general image held by the international community
of the Palestinian and Israeli dispute was a terrorist for the former and a desperate
nation surrounded by hostile Arab states for the latter. 58 In 1972, Israeli Premier Golda
Meir's selection as "woman of the year," is indicative of the Jew's ability to shape
57For a discussion of the Zionist criticism of US support: Richard P. Stevens, American Zionism and US
Foreign Policy, 1942-1947 (NY: Pegeant, 1962), pp. 29-36; and Laqueur, A History of Zionism, p. 549.
58
Refer: Richard H. Curtis, A Changing Image: American Perceptions of the Arab-Israeli Dispute
(Washington, DC: American Educational Trust, 1982).
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favorable images, despite the numerous Israeli raids into southern Lebanon killing
scores of innocent civilians. 59 By comparison, the hooded Palestinian terrorist at the
1972 Munich Olympics remains as one of the most salient images on the international
popular mind, which predisposed international audiences to see first the act of violence
and perhaps never see or understand the Palestinian cause.
How then did the Zionists create their image? And by comparison what didn't
the Palestinians do to shape a similar positive image among international audiences?
Moreover, how did the world learn to interpret the Jewish struggle versus the
Palestinian struggle? There has been volumes written on the Zionist propaganda
campaign and very little comparable literature written on the Palestinian campaign.
Therefore, I have chosen to explore some facts. Table 2-2 below lists the quantity of
publications produced by the Jewish/Zionist and the Arab communities during four
distinct periods.
TABLE 2-2
COMPARISON OF TOTAL PUBLICATIONS
IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND PALESTINE
Pre- 1945 1946-1948 1949- Unknown

















Note: D = Daily, W = Weekly, and M = Monthly/Quarterly publication; Unknown refers to the
existence of that publication during that period but lacking a founding date.
Source: The Middle East, 1958, 6th Ed. (London: Europa Publications Limited, 1958), pp. 226-29.
For a complimentary survey of the available publications during the Mandate period through 1949:
J.C. Hurewitz, The Struggle for Palestine (NY: WW. Norton, 1950), pp. 363-388.
59Refer Appendix B, Table B-l, for a chronology of the Palestinian resistance and Israeli reprisals.
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The data indicates that the Jews produced considerably more lterature than the
Arabs. However, this literature was primarily published for their local communities,
therefore it was necessary to find additional data on publications or information
provided to international audiences as well Both the Zionists and the Palestinians
waged extensive propaganda campaigns targeting the international community. The
Zionists had considerable success among the American Jewish community after 1945
and the Palestinians developed a popular following among the New Left in Europe, the
United States, and most of the Third World after 1967. 60 Yet, only the Zionists were
able to gain decisive access to the political decision makers vital to a solution to the
Palestine question In 1945, approximately one-third of American Jewry subscribed to
the pro-Zionist Yiddish press. Moreover, twenty of the twenty-four American
periodicals were characterized as pro-Palestine, if not actually Zionist during the mid-
1940s.
61
Despite the existence of the New Left support in the United States, the
Palestinians were unable to exploit comparable access to the media, and therefore were
unable to create the perception necessary to address the Palestine question without
radicalism or political violence clouding the discussion Ultimately, the ability of the
Zionists to exploit the popular media enabled them to control the image of the Jewish
resistance. The media framed the public perception, and in doing so unwittingly
60For a discussion of the Zionist international propaganda campaign: Stevens, pp. 95-160. And the
Palestinians: Zeev Schiff and Raphael Rothstein, Fedayeen: Guerrillas Against Israel (NY: McKay, 1972), pp.
158-174; and Kemal Kirisci, The PLO and World Politics: A Study of Mobilization of Support for the
Palestinian Cause (NY: St. Martin's Press, 1986), pp. 69-126.
61Stevens, p. 20.
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promoted the interpretation of events as scene through the cameras eye or the front
page headlines from the Zionist perspective. Accordingly, James Abourezk states:
Descriptions by the media of terrorism committed by both Arabs and Jews boiled
down to public perceptions, an act of terrorism committed by an Arab is labeled
what it is 'terrorism,' but an act of terrorism committed by an Israeli is usually
applauded as a 'daring raid' or 'retaliation' or as 'seeking out the terrorists.'62
What does all this mean? The preceding discussion was meant to illustrate that
under no circumstances will terrorism be wholly effective at bringing about the desired
political result. The success of terrorism depends on the ability of the perpetrators to
frame their violence m such a manner that it becomes justifiable to the international
community given the desperate circumstances of the terrorist's constituency. In
essence, violence is hardly an acceptable means of political change considering
Western audiences, but it can become more palatable provided the West has been
predisposed to understand the circumstances that provoked the violent event. Even
today the Jews continue to dominate the media. Israeli publications total 1079 versus a
combined 621 total publications produced by the Arab states bordering Israel. 63
Consequently, until such time as the Arab states in general and the Palestinians in
particular shift their propaganda campaign to the West and create a more favorable
image, then the international perception of the Palestinian problem will continue to be
blurred by the negative label of terrorism. Ultimately, terrorism must be complimented
"James Abourezk, "Preface," In Ghareeb, op cit., p. x.
63These figures were obtained by conducting a literature search on Ulrechts (1992) CD-Rom. Total figure for
all Arab Gulf and Levant States is 1202. A complimentary word-search to locate publication titles considering
Israeli or Palestinian sources indicated a similar advantage for the former: 712 publications contained the words-
-Zion, Israeli, Jew, or Hebrew—versus 54 contained the words—Palestine or Palestinian.
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by a non-violent propaganda campaign that enables international audiences to view the
violent incident less for its violent quality and more for the quality of the underlying
cause.
E. SUMMARY
In sum, modernization equipped the Jewish and Palestinian terrorists with the
means and access, urbanization set the stage with its multiple and vulnerable targets,
and social facilitation provided the justification and direction for a campaign of terror
against the occupying authority. Their terrorist campaigns were urban, without a rural
option The city was their sanctuary and battlefield. The level of modernization
represented the most salient difference between the two cases. But it was a relative
difference: the technological innovations available to the Palestinian terrorist made
domestic and international actions more feasible, whereas similar actions were
unimaginable to the Jewish terrorist. Both the Jews and the Palestinian terrorists
viewed terrorism as politically justified means to achieve the desired political ends,
due to the social and political circumstances confronting their respective communities.
Furthermore, both the Jewish and Palestinian histories of violence against authority
had lapsed, which translated into a morality based on present circumstance, not
mythical hapstance as the conventional wisdom suggests in the latter case.
Furthermore, the Palestinian terrorist's technological advantages had a short shelf-life,
spoiled by superior technologies available to the forces of counter-terror and the
competitive use by other terrorist groups exploiting similar technologies. While the
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impact of the Palestinian campaign of terror was diffused by other terrorist groups, the
Jewish terrorists confronted no comparable interference or contagion effect. In both
cases, terrorism competed with world events, which occasionally led the terrorist
groups to commit indiscriminate acts of terror with more newsworthy potential. Only
in the Zionist case do we observe efforts to create mechanisms independent of
terrorism to shape images and frame their cause such that violence serves as only a
reminder of the unresolved Palestine question. Considering either the Jewish or the
Palestinian case, for terrorism to aid in the resolution of the Palestine question it had
to exploit the psychological battlefield, with its vast array of domestic and
international audiences, by depending less on technological means and more on
strategic design, which considered audience response as central.
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ffl. CONSIDERING THE SOURCE
A. THE INDIVIDUAL TERRORISTS
Although the study of individual terrorist psychology is not the focus of this
inquiry, a brief mention of their individual characteristics here will dispel any potential
concerns as the analysis progresses into other areas. The psychological study of
individual terrorists has provided little conclusive evidence suggesting a relationship
between individual psychosis and the conduct of acts of terrorism. This is no less the
case regarding the Jewish and Palestinian terrorist organizations. In both cases, the
leadership was represented by mature men with higher than average education levels.
For the Jewish terrorists there were men like Menachem Begin, a Polish Jew and
leader of the Irgun (1942), graduated from the University of Warsaw with a degree in
law.
1 Another prominent Irgunist was Avraham Stern, a German Jew, who prior to
arriving in Palestine was the first Jew to teach mathematics in Germany. 2 Similarly,
the Palestinian leadership was represented by men with strong educational
backgrounds Yasir Arafat, muslim leader of al-Fatah and the chairman of the PLO
(1969), obtained a degree in engineering from the University of Stuttgart. Similarly,
Ahmed Jibnl, the leader of the PFLP-GC, received a degree in engineering from the
'At age 34, Menachem Begin was the oldest member of the Irgun. Doris Katz, The Lady was a Terrorist
(New York: Shiloni Publishers, 1953), p. 38. Asprey points out that "young intellectuals in the Polish tradition"
represented the leadership of the Irgun. Robert Asprey, War in the Shadows: The Guerrilla in History1 Vol. II
(New York: Doubleday, 1975), p. 771.
2For more on the characteristics of the leadership of the Stern Gang (LEHI): J. Boyer Bell, Terror Out of
Zion.Irgun Zvai Leumi, LEHI, and the Palestine Underground, 1929-1949 (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1977),
p. 84-85.
Syrian Military Academy. George Habash, the christian leader of the PFLP, received a
medical degree from the American University in Beirut. From the same university,
Wadi Haddad, the PFLP's number-two man, received a degree in dentistry. 3 All
considered, the terrorist leadership was represented by men with professional
backgrounds, who for reasons not entirely psychological in nature set there
professional careers aside for a life committed to the salvation of their people
By contrast, there were some unique differences between the rank and file
membership of the Jewish and the Palestinian terrorist groups The Jewish terrorist
groups were composed of individuals who had came to Palestine from European
ghettos or displaced person camps. The typical individual of the Irgun or the Stern
Gang was a teenager with little or no college education. By comparison, while the
Palestinian rank and file may have originated from a refugee camp, his age and level
of education typically exceeded the Jewish terrorist 4 One can not dismiss the
Palestinian use of teenagers, and in some cases pre-teens, in the campaigns of terror in
the occupied territories, but this was not representative of the typical profile of a
3For short biographies on the Palestinian resistances' leadership: John W. Amos II, Palestinian Resistance:
Organization of a Nationalist Movement (New York: Pergamon Press, 1980), pp. 47-55, 72-76, 91-93; Zeev
Schiff and Raphael Rothstein, Fedayeen: Guerrillas Against Israel (New York: David McKay, 1972), pp. 1 lu-
ll 1; and Ehud Yaari, Strike Terror: The Story of Fatah (New York: Sabra Books, 1970), pp. 211-212, 215-217.
Note: Members of the Palestinian Black September Organization were predominately graduates of the American
University in Beirut.
""Recruiting Palestinians in the occupied territories differed as well; after the Six-Day War (June 67) Egypt's
Palestinian Liberation Army disbanded leaving many militants to reside in the Gaza Strip, accordingly these
individuals provided the Palestinian terrorist organizations a ready source of recruits. The West Bank, on the
other hand, did not possess the recruiting advantage of ex-militants, but the teen-age population tended to be the
most willing recruits.
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Palestinian terrorist ? The Palestinian terrorist had either completed secondary
education or completed both secondary education and was attending or had completed
college In both cases, women were present in the terrorist groups, filling roles that
differed little from their male counterparts. 6
The evidence suggests that the rank and file membership of both the Jewish and
the Palestinian terrorist groups originated from similar oppressive conditions, the
squalor of displaced persons camps or refugee camps. 7 The most salient difference
between the two cases concerns the age and the level of education of the individual
terrorist, whereby the typical Palestinian terrorist was older and more educated than
the Jewish terrorist. Nonetheless, it is difficult to conclude whether this was an
advantage or a disadvantage for either of the two groups. Moreover, a review of the
literature suggests that the Jewish or the Palestinian terrorist profile was more a
function of the level of national consciousness than it was of some peculiar personality
5
Likewise, the Jewish terrorist groups used youths, but restricted their activities to courier duties and
propaganda dissemination.
6For a memoir of a female Stemist refer: Geula Cohen, Woman of Violence: Memoirs of a Young Terrorist,
1943-1948, trans. Hillel Halkin (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1966); and female Irgumst Doris Katz,
The Lady was a Terrorist (New York: Shiloni Publishers, 1953). And a memoir by a female Palestinian terrorist:
Leila Khaled, My People Shall Live: The Autobiography of a Revolutionary (London: Hodder and Stoughton,
1973).
7As discussed in Chapter II, from the late- 1890s to the mid- 1940s, International Jewry became conscious of
their threatened existence due to the wave of the European anti-Semiticism and Hitler's systematic genocide.
Similarly, from 1949 to 1967, the Palestinian identity developed amid the squalor of the refugee camps and the
host Arab states exploitation of their desires to return to their homeland by commiting them in guerrilla-type
attacks on the Israeli occupier. Once their Arab hosts were humiliated by the Israeli's lighting victory during the
June 1967 War, the Palestinian awareness of their threatened existence increased exponentially. The Israeli
occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip and the systematic resettlement of Jews in the occupied territories
threatened the very existence of what it meant to be a Palestinian. Independent of age or educational level, both
national groups became fully aware of their threatened identity.
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trait or reflective of age or education level. 8 Therefore, a comparison of the
psychological profiles of Jewish and Palestinian terrorists suggests that little or no
empirical evidence can be gained from further exploration into this level of analysis.
An understanding of terrorism is not contingent on an individual psychological
analysis, because much of it is based on pure speculation rather than empirical fact.
Martha Crenshaw, Walter Laqueur, and Paul Wilkinson are equally skeptical
about the merits of continued probe into the terrorist personality. Wilkinson and
Laqueur conclude that there is no convincing profile of the political terrorist. 9
Similarly, Crenshaw argues that the most common characteristic of terrorists is their
normality. Moreover, she contends that terrorism seems to be the connecting link
between widely varying personalities. 10 By contrast, Jerold Post, a major contributor in
the field of individual terrorist psychology, suggests that characteristics associated with
abnormal psychology correspond to similar personality traits among terrorists. He
concludes that terrorists are typically action oriented, exhibit aggressive behavior,
dehumanize, project blame, and their own bad characteristics onto their opponent. Post
notes the high incidence of fragmented families and loss of a father among West
8
Bell points among the members of the Stern Gang (LEHI) were Sephardim, Yemeni dervishes, communists,
dropouts from the Irgun, new recruits who knew neither Hebrew nor Palestine, and sabras (second generation
Palestinian Jews). Similarly, the one half of the Irgun was oriental Jewry with the Yemenites and the
Sephardims the prime source of recruits. Bell, Terror Out of Zion, p. 85.
9 Walter Z. Laqueur, Terrorism (London: Weidefeld and Nicolson, 1977), p. 129; and Paul Wilkinson,
Terrorism and the Liberal State, (London: MacMillan, 1977), pp. 75, 193 .
l0Martha Crenshaw, "The Causes of Terrorism," Comparative Politics 13 (July 1981): p. 390; and Maxwell
Taylor, The Terrorists (New York: Brassey's, 1988), p. 139. Taylor notes the heterogeneity of individual
terrorists considering all ages, education levels, psychological profile, and gender.
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German terrorists as other distinguishing characteristics that may contribute to an
individual's choice of a terrorism as a means of political influence. Yet, he is unable to
account for similar individuals that do not chose the terrorist option. Unfortunately,
Post and others are restricted in their ability to provide conclusive evidence that these
traits are common among all terrorists. Furthermore, ex-terrorists are either dead, in
jail, not willing, or not allowed to submit to psychological examination. And those that
are available are not in sufficient quantity to provide a valid sample for conclusions of
universal applicability. 11
B. THE TERRORIST GROUP
Maxwell Taylor and Albert Bandura contend that the terrorist group takes on an
independent collective identity that transcends individual characteristics. 12 This
suggests that the individual's psychological identity is submerged within the group,
whereby the individual's psychological potential conforms to the greater needs of the
group Inevitably, the group provides the individual with the emotional needs he so
"Jerold M. Post, "Terrorist psycho-logic: Terrorist behavior as a product of psychological forces," In Walter
Reich (ed.) Origins of Terrorism (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990), p. 25-29; and Martha
Crenshaw, "The Psychology of Political Terrorism," In Margaret G. Hermann (ed.) Political Psychology (San
Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass, 1986), p. 382. Crenshaw provides an in-depth review of the literature on the
individual and group psychology of terrorism.
12
Taylor, pp. 163-176; and Albert Bandura, "Mechanisms of Moral Disengagement," In Walter Reich (ed.)
Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, States of Mind (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990),
pp. 161-191: Taylor discusses the psychological processes of "de-individualization," whereby the individual's
psychology is submerged within the group. Bandura adds those group psychological mechanisms that allow
individual participants to disengage from the immorality of their acts, which make them socially acceptable
within the group's value structure.
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desires. Menachem Begin's description of the Irgun exemplifies the collective identity
of the terrorist group He refers to members of the group as friends, and "more:"
We were all like brothers. And the mutual deep affection, the affection of
fighters, than which there is no greater, was the source of happiness, perhaps the
only happiness in the darkness of the underground...there reigned a profound
spirit of fraternity... It was not by chance that one of the pseudonyms we used for
the Irgun was 'the fighting family'. ..We were a family [based on] mutual
trust...Each was prepared to give his life for his comrade." 13
The terrorist group is a family based on loyalty, trust, affection and the supreme self-
sacrifice of giving one's life for one's comrade. The group furnishes the individual a
source of identity, restricts his freedom, indoctrinates him to specific norms of
behavior, a value structure, security, and a sense of dependence and belonging. 14
Therefore, the psychology of the individual terrorist becomes a non-entity; submerged
in the terrorist underworld his psychology is the group psychology—emotionally
absorbed and politically expressed
The Jewish and Palestinian terrorist groups' preoccupation with their imprisoned
comrades testifies further to the importance of the group. Bell notes that prison breaks
were the most costly operations the Irgun performed; large sums of money, high risk,
meticulous planning, and more men than were typically employed in other operations.
Similarly, on 23 July 1968, the PFLP used hijacking as a means to gam release of
13Menachem Begin, The Revolt: The Story of the Irgun (New York: Shuman, 1951), p. 73.
'"For more on terrorist group dynamics: Martha Crenshaw, "Decisions to Use Terrorism: Psychological
Constraints on Instrumental Reasoning," In Donatella Delia Porta (ed.), International Social Movement
Research, Social Movements and Violence: Participation in Underground Organizations 4 (Greenwich, CT: Jai
Press, 1992), pp. 29-42.
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1,200 Arab commandos held in Israel. 1 ' Crenshaw uses the memoirs of two Irgumsts
to further illustrate the psychological dynamics of the terrorist group:
Mendor, a member of the Irgun High Command, felt 'high spirits' and
'satisfaction' when arrested by the British because he now shared the suffering
that all fighters had to experience. He almost welcomed the opportunity to prove
that he had felt 'morally uncomfortable,' whereas afterwards he felt 'exalted
'
Begin expressed similar feelings. Once, waiting as the British searched the hotel
where he was staying, he admitted anxiety and fear, but when he knew there was
'no way out,' his 'anxious thoughts evaporated.' He 'felt a peculiar serenity mixed
with incomprehensible happiness' and waited 'composedly,' but the police passed
him by. 16
The preceding examples demonstrate what James Turner refers to as the "affective"
function of the group. The individual becomes psychologically consumed by the
terrorist group, whereby his psychological and cognitive ability to freely interpret the
world around him becomes framed in the group's perception of the world.
Crenshaw argues that understanding how the terrorist group's perceive the world
and themselves is essential to explaining terrorism. She states that "the psychological
relationships with the terrorist group—the interplay of commitment, risk, solidarity,
loyalty, guilty, revenge, and isolation—discourage terrorists from changing the direction
they have taken." 17 Yet, terrorist groups do change direction, conducting ideological,
15Hijacking was used to gain the release of hostages on 29 August 1969, 22 July 1970, and 6 September
1970: Richard Clutterbuck, "The Politics of Air Piracy," Living with Terrorism (New York: Arlington House,
1975), p. 98-101. Refer Table B-5 in Appendix B for additional hostage situations that demanded release of
jailed terrorists.
16Cited in Crenshaw, "The Causes of Terrorism,"p. 395. See original citations in: Ya'acov Meridor, Long is
the Road to Freedom (Tujunga, CA: Barak Publications, 1961), pp. 6, 9; and Menachem Begin, The Revolt,
111. Note: Mendor's, Long is the Road to Freedom, ork provides an enlightening portrayal of an imprisoned
terrorist's desires to escape and return to his comrades.
17Martha Crenshaw, "The Causes of Terrorism," p. 396.
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strategic, or tactical shifts in order to continue to exist and achieve short and long-term
objectives. For instance, when the Second World War started, the Haganah and the
Irgun decided to curtail their subversive activities. In this sense, the terrorist groups
became less radical in their methods, awaiting a more conducive external environment
from which to continue the armed struggle. Appropriately, Turner contends that the
terrorist group's ability to change direction, make strategic and tactical shifts consistent
with its concept of reality, is dependent on its level of radicalization. He defines
radicalization as "the movement of an individual from a position within a set of
cultural guidelines for dissent to one outside the framework." Furthermore, Turner adds
that radicalization occurs in stages. Initial dissatisfaction with a government policy or
action leads to passive methods (lobbying, demonstrations, protests) in order to
aggregate demands, but when blocked, ignored, or repressed, they lead to more
aggressive methods (strikes, riots, sabotage, terrorist acts). 18
A survey of the literature on terrorist group dynamics tends to weigh heavily on
the relationship between the group's emotional function and its level of radicalization.
The literature suggests that a positive correlation exists between levels of group
frustration and radicalization, such that the more frustrated a group becomes so too
does it become more radical. While this seems valid in a practical sense, in reality
such a relationship does not always exist For example, in 1940 the Irgun High
Command's decision to cease anti-British activities was not universally accepted by
18James T. Turner, "Systematic Conception of Acts of Terror," Journal of Political and Criminal Psychology
1 (March 1985): p. 36.
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other Irgunists in general and Avraham Stern in particular Consequently, he broke
away from the Irgun and formed his own terrorist group—the Stern gang. While the
Stern gang was more radical than the other Jewish terrorist groups, there is no
conclusive evidence that suggests they were more frustrated than any other group. 19
The dynamics of the terrorist group serve not only an organizational (emotional)
function, but an instrumental function as well. The instrumental function of the
terrorist group encompasses the maintenance and goal-directed activities of the group,
whereas the emotional function concentrates on its psychological health. It is not
entirely clear where the group's emotional function ends and the instrumental function
begins, because the group's instrumental activities can combine both roles. For
instance, a terrorist group conducts a bank robbery in order to acquire funds to
purchase arms and to finance future operations, an instrumental function. But, during
the same operation, the terrorist group overcomes overwhelming odds in pulling off
the robbery, which either provokes admiration among friendly audiences, curiosity
among neutral audiences, and motivates other terrorist groups to conduct similar acts
or more spectacular acts, all of which serve the emotional (organizational) needs of the
terrorist group. Therefore, the act provides the terrorist group the instrumental means
to continue operations and the emotional means to appeal to their own sympathesizers,
potential constituents, and other terrorist groups engaging similar activities
"Similarly, the Palestinian PFLP splintered into the PFLP-GC in October 1968 and the PDFLP in February
1969, the former calling for an escalation of attacks on international Israeli targets and the latter calling for a
more liberal approach to the Palestinian-Israeli dispute (a bi-national state). In both cases the group's dissention
was more a difference of perspective than it was radicalization. For instance, Jabril the PFLP-GC leader was a
former Syrian army officer, therefore it should be suprising that he favored intense military operations.
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Accordingly, Turner distinguishes between the two by defining: the instrumental
function as goal directed, characterized as logical and coherent acts; and the
organizational or emotional function as effectual, arising from feelings of frustration
related to group goals or from the emotional needs of the person(s) dominating the
group, characterized as senseless, shocking or counter-productive acts. 20 Consequently,
when the instrumental motives of the terrorist group become frustrated they manifest
in more spectacular and emotional acts. It would seem evident at this point that there
is a link between internal group dynamics and its translation into external violence,
whereby terrorism is a self-defeating proposition. While instrumental acts are directed
by rational strategic choice, organizational acts encompass psychological barriers that
undermine logical choice The challenge to the Jewish and the Palestinian terrorist was
to remain instrumentally focused, while maintaining organizational coherence
Moreover, the efficacy of Jewish and the Palestinian terrorism hinged on the
management of a psychological balance, whereby subordinating the groups'
organizational function to the instrumental function would allow the political object to
remain in focus. Therefore, the self-defeating potential of emotionally driven acts
would be supplanted by a strategic logic dominated by instrumental reason.




based on instrumental reasoning :i Therefore, there are political, strategic, and
contextual considerations that compensate for the negative effects of emotionally
driven violence and make possible the political result—a homeland.
C. MILITANT MINORITY
Terrorism is the strategy of a minority. A terrorist group is generally the most
radical element of a broader political movement. A political movement, observing that
conventional methods of political influence are denied by the existing political
institutions, spawns a militant wing, or "lunatic fringe," which adopts terrorism as a
means to preempt the desired political result In the Zionist case, the Revisionists
represented the their political interests of the Irgun and the Histadrut (Jewish Labor
party) politically represented the Haganah. The Stern Gang had no above ground
political representative. Similarly, Palestinian political movements in Egypt (and later
Kuwait), Lebanon, and Syria eventually gave birth to militant political factions; the
General Union of Palestinian Students' al-Fatah (Palestine National Liberation
Movement), the Arab Nationalist Movement's PFLP (Popular Front for the Liberation
of Palestine), and the PFLP's splinter groups, the PFLP-General Command and the
PDFLP (Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine) respectively. The
militant faction, appropriately radicalized, spawns a militant wing that uses terrorist
violence to engage the target regime in order to provoke the desired political outcome
21
renshaw, "Decisions to Use Terrorism," p. 29.
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In both the Jewish and the Palestinian cases, the militant wing represented a
mere fraction of the entire organization. For instance, the Irgun had six-hundred
members, but only forty were hardcore fighters living in the underground and relying
on the remainder of the organization for its survival. By comparson, the Palestinian
resistance boasted that they possessed large organizations. Al-Fatah, for instance, had a
few as 1000 members in 1967 and as many as 20,000 members in 1970, but the actual
fighting strength was a mere fraction of that total Like the Irgun, al-Asifa, Fatah's
combat forces numbered around 6,000. The remaining Palestinian groups boast large
organizations as well, but much of it is above ground, dedicating itself to political
organizing in the refugee camps and supporting a small fraction of hardcore
terrorists.
22
1. Terrorist Groups by Type
The political militancy of the terrorist groups provides the basis for the
establishment of a group typology. A typology of the terrorist groups is important
because it brings into focus the group's political motives, likely goals, and which
potential constituency it is apt to represent. Alex Schmid contends that "typologies are
ideal type classifications, not 'true' reflections of the real world which includes impure
cases and exceptions." 23 Following a review of existing typologies, I have concluded
that none sufficiently represent the Jewish and the Palestinian groups Therefore, I
22Refer Appendix B, Table B-4 for the Strength and Support of the Palestinian Resistance; and Appendix A,
Table A-4 for a similar outline of the Jewish Resistance.
23Alex Schmid and Albert J. Jongman et al, Political Terrorism: A Guide to Actors, Authors, Concepts, Data
Bases, Theories, and Literature (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1988), p. 49.
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have devised a typology that best reflects the groups considered 24 It is not my intent
to elaborate excessively on the complexity of each group, because to do so would
detract from the central purpose of this inquiry. Consequently, it is important to keep
in mind that the purpose of this analysis is to understand the process of terror in
general and the influence a terrorist act has on multiple audiences in particular The
typology is meant to reveal potential ldiosyncracies that may either detract or enhance
the effectiveness of a campaign of terror.
The resistance groups were divided into three categories: mainstream,
dissidents, and united resistance. Political representation in major political groupings
was the major feature that distinguished mainstream and dissident groups. Furthermore,
mainstream groups typically disassociated themselves with the dissident groups'
indiscriminate acts of terror. Moreover, the mainstream groups took it upon themselves
to control dissident violence that might detract from diplomatic initiatives being
formulated by aboveground constituencies. In the end, the mainstream groups' distance
from indiscriminate acts of terror and control of dissident violence was meant to create
a more favorable image among their local constituencies in general and international
constituencies in particular. Such an image would enable the mainstream groups to
24
A11 the groups, Jewish and Palestinian, were (are) nationalistic. Yet, this label is excluded from the
typology because it lacks comparative insight. Nationalism does not capture the essence of the Zionist and the
Palestinian struggles, because such a term assumes an exclusive ethnic dimension. Certainly, there was an ethnic
component to their struggles, but communal more accurately reflects their grouping. Communalism, meaning
Jewish and Palestinian in a holistic sense, encompassing those oppressed peoples subjected to the repressive
policies of the occupying authority and a diaspora whom longed for a united homeland.
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transition from a resistance movement or quasi-government status to a representative
political body once the enemy occupier had withdrawn.
The Haganah, the Jewish Agency's defense force, represented the Jewish
mainstream; with its offensive strike force, the Palmach, bearing the brunt of the
terrorist activity. Politically, the Haganah was representative of the Histadrut, the
Jewish Labor party. By comparison, al-Fatah embodied the Palestinian mainstream,
possessing an offensive strike force, el-Asifa By 1969, al-Fatah dominated the
Palestinian Liberation Organization and was the de facto official spokesman for
Palestinian diaspora and resistance.
The dissidents on the other hand, were more militant, clandestine, and
politically removed than the mainstream resistance. The Irgun and the Stern Gang
comprised the Jewish dissident groups. And, the PFLP, the PDFLP, and the PFLP-GC
represented the major Palestinian dissident groups. By comparison, the Palestinian
dissidents were more politically represented than the Jewish dissident groups. Once the
militant arm of Revisionism, the Irgun cut political ties with the movement once the
"Revolt" began in 1944. Similarly, the Stern Gang, an apparent social revolutionary,
could never claim an above ground political constituency. For the Irgun and the Stem
Gang, politics would be addressed once the British withdrew. 25 By comparison, the
Palestinian dissidents possessed strong political motives, ranging from communism to
25Following independence in May 1948, the Irgun became the Hentt party and the Stern Gang was absorbed
within the Histadrut. For more on the political structure and parties in Mandate Palestine: J.C. Hurewitz, The
Struggle for Palestine (NY: WW. Norton, 1950), pp. 38-50.
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social democracy For instance, the PFLP was a Marxist-Leninist group and the
PDFLP was a social democratic group, with the PFLP-GC somewhere in between. 26
The united resistance represented a tacit-alliance between mainstream and
dissident factions during periods when diplomatic initiatives seemed their worst: May
1939-May 1940 and November 1945 to June 1946 for the Jews; and September 1970
to March 1973 for the Palestinians. Furthermore, the united resistance dissolved when
violence exceeded the bounds of social regulation (King David Hotel July 1946, and
Khartoum Embassy assault March 1973), whereby the mainstream's representative
credibility deteriorated because its constituents perceived them incapable of controlling
the violence. As discussed above, it was imperative that the mainstream groups
distance themselves from dissident violence; while the Jews accomplished this with
relative ease in 1946, the Palestinian mainstream did not have as easy a separation in
1973. The inability of the Palestinian mainstream to disassociate itself from dissident
violence (discussed in more detail in Chapter VI) undermined its potential to achieve
the desire political result.
The resistance is further differentiated by political/ideological
orientation and type of revolutionary strategy. Richard Shutz distinguishes
revolutionary and sub-revolutionary strategy as follows:
26For more on the ideological and political orientation of the Palestinian resistance: Bard O'Neill, Armed
Struggle in Palestine. A Political Military Analysis (CO: Westview Press, 1978), pp. 125-161; and William B.
Quandt, Palestinian Nationalism: Its Political and Military Dimensions, R-782-ISA (Santa Monica, CA: The
Rand Corporation, November 1971), pp. 9-77. For the Jewish Resistance: Walter Z. Laqueur, A History of
Zionism, 2d Ed. (NY: Schocken Books, 1972), pp. 374-378, 382; and J. Boyer Bell, Terror Out of Zion: Irgun
Zvai Leumi, LEHI, and the Palestine Underground, 1929-1949 (NY: St. Martin's Press, 1978), pp. 19-37, 62-70,
and 111-113.
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Revolutionary terrorism may be defined as the threat and/or employment of
political violence, in varying degrees, with the objective of successfully effecting
a complete revolutionary change of fundamental political-social processes... Sub-
revolutionary terrorism may be defined as the threat and/or employment of
extranormal forms of political violence, in varying degrees, with the objective of
effecting various changes in the structural-functional aspects of the particular
political system. The goal is to bring about changes within the body politic, not
to abolish it in favor of a complete system change. 27
In other words, the revolutionary terrorist focused on the total territorial withdrawal of
the occupying authority, while the sub-revolutionary terrorist settled for territorial
compromise.
2. THE TYPOLOGY
Table 3-1 below categorizes the mainstream, dissident, and united
resistance groups by their political/ideological orientation. Interestingly, al-Fatah and
the Irgun were largely apolitical, appealing to broad constituencies. The left-wing
Palestinian dissident groups, preaching the communist line, were more exclusive in
their appeal. Their appeal focused on the educated and idealistic youth and the middle-
class Palestinian. While left-wing, the Haganah was more social democratic than
communist. Consequently, when the Haganah called for the Jewish community to
revolt (1945) against the British, their words—lacking the ideals of Marx and Lenin—
27Richard Schultz, Conceptualizing Political Terrorism: A Typology," Journal of International Affairs 32
(1978): No. 1, p. 9-10. See also: G. Davidson Smith, "Counterterrorism Contingency Planning and Incident
Management," In David A Charters (ed.) Democratic Responses to International Terrorism (New York:
Transnational Publications, 1991), 137. Smith lists six classifications of terrorist groups: combining Nationalist-
Separatist-Irredentist into one type focusing on "nationality" with ethnic overtones; Issue types are single-issue
oriented; Ideological pursue radical ideals, i.e. fascism, anarchism or nihilism; Exile oppose the prevailing
situation in homeland; State and State-sponsored conduct covert/surrogate warfare; and Religious conflict over
fundamental beliefs or doctrines.
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appealed to the entire Jewish community Again, while the intent here was not to
elaborate in detail on the complexion of the terrorist groups, it was to establish a
frame of reference from which to later suggest the unique political and social features
of the groups that either enhanced or reduced the effectiveness of their particular brand
of terrorism.
It is important to note that the Black September Organization did not truly
represent a physical alliance between the Palestinian mainstream and the dissidents. It
is defined as such because of the psychological implications of the Black September
international activities, whereby both Palestinian mainstream and dissident
internationalized the psychological and physical effects of their campaign of terror. In
both cases, the operational alliance between mainstream and dissident groups was





THE ZIONIST AND PALESTINIAN TERRORIST GROUPS
Resistance Group Revolutionary A-political Marxist-Leninist Sub-Revolutionary
Maximalist Right-Wing Left-Wing Minimalist
Mainstream
Haganah /- /
Al-Fatah 1967-72 / 1973-
Dissidents
Irgun /- /





Tenuat Humeri / /- /-
Black September / / /-
Notes: Maximalist and minimalist refers to the groups orientation toward the occupying authority and the
ability to commit the local community to armed-struggle. Such that: al-Fatah called for total commitment
from 1967-72, but from 1973 on the shift was to partial independence and organization.; the PFLP /+
indicates a total withdrawal and the radicalization of the Arab border states against Israel. Right wing
indicates the groups location on the political spectrum relative to the remaining groups, not meant to suggest
fascism in any way; commonly referred to as such by the remaining groups as well. V- Marxist Leninist
column indicates social democracy. United resistances' political orientation was mixed, all groups
participating and fighting for the ultimate objective—statehood.
38/-Crenshaw, "The Causes of Terrorism," p. 385-6. The groups not pertinent to this analysis, but discussed by
Crenshaw include: minority separatists (secessionist, ethnic, national irredentist), reformists (single-issue), and
reactionaries (prevent change). For a critique on typologies, see: Alex P. Schmid and Albert J. Jongman et al,
Political Terrorism : A new guide to actors, authors, concepts, data bases, theories, and literature (New
Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1988), 39-48.
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D. SUMMARY
In sum, both the Jewish and the Palestinian resistance were similarly subdivided-
-mainstream, dissident, united resistance—each contributing to the achievement of their
ultimate objective in their own unique way Although not mentioned above but
analytically significant was the exclusive role played by the dissidents in placing their
cause on the world stage. In both cases, the dissidents' indicriminate acts of violence
were instrumental in introducting to the world the plight of their disperate peoples. For
instance, the Jew's Stern Gang used the assassination of Lord Moyne and the PFLP
used hijacking. Yet, the introduction of outside actors confers no advantage, unless the
terrorists are prepared to illustrate the contradictory policies of the occupying authority
over the course of subsequent violent exchanges. The occupying authority's reprisals,
searchs, arrests, and detention must be made to look blatantly unprovoked and
repressive. In the end, the mainstream must control the indiscriminate tendencies of the
dissidents in order to keep the violence within the bounds of the acceptable, whereby
the psychological fear inducing impact of indisciminate violence do not inappropriately




In order to be effective on this psychological battlefield, the terrorist must device
a strategy of terror that exploits the psychological vulnerabilities of target audiences
along both local and international fronts. Along these fronts, terrorism as a
psychological operation produces psychological warfare and propaganda effects on
multiple audiences. The targets of attention and the targets of opportunity are
particularly vulnerable to the impact of terrorist propaganda, whereas the targets of
terror and demands are more prone to psychological warfare effects This Chapter will
define the components of the terrorist's psychological battlefield and establish a model
for the subsequent analysis of the Jewish and the Palestinian campaigns of terror.
Ultimately, the terrorist's selection of a target of violence fulfills the instrumental and
organizational needs of the terrorist group and its cause The linkage between the
target of violence and the remaining target audiences generates either a psychological
warfare or a propaganda effect. The success of terrorism as a psychological operation
depends on the selection of a target of violence that produces psychological warfare
effects on the targets of terror and demands, and generates a propaganda effect on the
targets of attention and opportunity. Figure 4-1 below depicts terrorism as a




















Terrorism as a Psychological Operation: Target Audiences
As Schmid's definition contends, the victim of terror is a mere medium through
which the terrorist communicates his message to multiple target audiences. If the
medium lllicites a response that is inconsistent with the terrorists objectives, then the
medium will be changed not the method. Crenshaw contends that "as audience grows
larger, more diverse, and more accustomed to terrorism, the terrorist must go to more
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extreme lengths to shock."
1 Moreover, the terrorist changes his medium to both
recapture the audiences' attention and retain his emotional advantage on the
psychological battlefield.
All considered, the military function of terrorism is negligible, because the
terrorist does not defeat the enemy by force of arms. 2 The terrorist's victory is won in
the mind, he defeats his opponents psychological will to persist. Accordingly, Martha
Crenshaw adds that "the intent of terrorist violence is psychological and symbolic, not
material." 3 Therefore, the success or failure of terrorism is best understood by focusing
on the psychological components of the battlefield. By virtue of the psychological
complexity of the terrorist battlefield each component must be understood relative to
its psychological significance. The terrorist group, the act of violence, the target
audiences and their responses to acts of violence create an intense array of
psychological forces. The inter-relationship of these psychological forces encompasses
the process of terror and will therefore serve as the analytical components of the
Jewish and the Palestinian campaigns of terror.
The process of terror involves the inter-relationship between the terrorist's
strategic selection of a victim manifest in an act of terror, relative to the terrorist's
'Crenshaw, "The Causes of Terrorism," p. 386; and Jeffrey Rubin and Nehemia Friedland, "Terrorists and
Their Audience: Theater of Terror," Current 284 (July-August 1986): pp. 38-39.
2
Thornton, p. 75.
3Regarding the military function of terrorism, Martha Crenshaw's definition of terrorism is particularly apt:
"The systematic use of unorthodox political violence by small conspirital groups with the purpose of
manipulating political attitudes rather than physically defeat an enemy...Terrorism is premeditated and purposeful
violence, employed in a struggle for political power." Crenshaw, Terrorism Legitimacy and Power, p. 2.
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objectives and target audiences, and the subsequent audiences' response to terrorist
violence and any apparent future change in the terrorist's psychological strategy of
terror. In order to make the process of terror more comprehensible, the terrorist's
psychological battlefield is broken down into four components. The first component is
the act of violence contributing to the second; attainment of the short-term
instrumental or organizational objectives and the long-term ultimate political objective;
relating to the third, the target audiences and their response to the act of violence;
being interrupted by a fourth component, competing events and political forces; i.e.
inappropriateness of the victim or misinterpretation of the violent message.
Furthermore, audience response (third component) will be measured relative to
physical and material changes in the terrorist environment, because the emotional
responses are too subjective to be valid. Each of these components will be discussed in
separate sections below and later applied to the case studies in the following chapters.
1. The Act: Target of Violence
Acts of terror are multi-dimensional, consisting of type, selection criteria,
feature, and substance. There are at least eleven different types of terrorist acts, which
include: bombing; kidnapping; arson; assassination; robbery; sabotage; raids,
ambushes, and assaults; skyjacking/hijacking; and seizures of facilities The Jewish
terrorists can claim credit for conducting the first nine, while the Palestinian terrorists'
repertoire of terror included all eleven. The type of act reflects terrorist capability,
which is generally consistent with the specific historical circumstances; as discussed
above (modernization, urbanization, social facilitation, transnationalism). Ultimately,
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the combination of terrorist group's capability and its strategic choice of an anticipated
response dictates the type of act committed. Therefore, the terrorist commits a violent
act based on a selection criteria, limited by internal capability and constrained by
external circumstances. 4
a. Access to the Target of Violence
As discussed above, the process of modernization has provided the
terrorist a target rich environment consisting of potential victims and vulnerable
audiences. The communication, transportation and weapons innovations have
magnified the scope of terrorism from the confines of the source of dispute to an
outgrowth of international tension. 5 Therefore, the terrorist must now chose from
among an increasingly vulnerable mix of victims, the one most accessible and
appropriate to prompt the desired response. The accessibility of victims is a relative
function of "soft" or "hard" depending on the victim's availability, the terrorist group
capability, and the level of protection or security afforded the victim. In other words,
"soft" is less defended and therefore more accessible, than a more defended "hard"
target which is obviously less accessible. 6 For instance, the Stern Gang's initial and
"The terrorist group's limitations include previous activities, available manpower, experience level, and self
confidence; and external constraints include political events, previous successes or failures of terrorist acts, debts
owed to other groups: Robert H. Kupperman and Darrell M. Trent, Terrorism: Threat, Reality, Response
(Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1979), p. 190.
5For a review of the impact of modernization and technological innovations on terrorist targetting: Paul
Wilkinson, "Terrorist Targets and Tactics: New Risks to World Order," Conflict Studies 236 (London: Research
Institute for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism, 1990).
6For a discussion of the different acts of terrorism relative to group capabilities, weapons availability,
general support apparatus, cadre, experience, unique skills, operating environment, target pool, government
counter-measures, level of sophistication, clandestine havens, and external support: Kupperman and Trent, p.
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subsequent failures to assassinate British High Commissioner Sir Harold McMichael
was the result of a parallel increase in his personal protection making it less feasible to
assassinate him on subsequent occasions Therefore, an act of terror against an
apparently soft target, becomes hardened in order to prevent subsequent attempts. A
final example will bring into focus the extent to which this is possible and its
implications concerning the terrorists ability to commit subsequent acts.
From 1968 to 1972, the Palestinian terrorism became synonymous with
aircraft hijackings, which motivated airports world-wide to install metal detection
devices in passenger boarding ways and submit passengers to the unpleasantly of
random searches of personal luggage in order to reduce the likelihood of further
hijackings. While the international airline industry made obvious security precautions
against hijacking, less obvious was the measures taken by the Israelis. El Al, the
Israeli international airlines, received the brunt of Palestinian assaults From Bangkok
to Brussels, Israeli airlines and ticket agencies were both vulnerable and accessible to
Palestinian terror. Consequently, the Israeli authorities hardened both ticket agencies
and aircraft with inconspicuous armed guards and reinforced the cockpits and baggage
compartments of their passenger aircraft with steel plating in order to absorb a bomb's
explosive impact and enable the aircraft to land with passengers unharmed. In
February 1969, Israeli airport security were put to the test during an attack on an El Al
plane taking off from Zurich. As the plane was taxiing, four Palestinian terrorists
193.
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riddled the plane with bullets, wounding three passengers and three crewmen. An on-
board Israeli security guard jumped from the cargo door, pursuing the terrorists in an
exchange of gun fire, shot and killed one terrorist, and would have killed the other
three if Swiss police hadn't arrived to place the remaining three terrorists in custody
Consequently, Palestinian hijacking became considerably more costly as the years
passed.
A final distinction needs to be addressed relative to the accessibility of
victims. The modern media provides the terrorist an additional means to increase the
influence of his violent message. The selection of a victim must capture the attention
of not only local audiences, but international audiences as well. Therefore, the terrorist
will select a victim based on not only its accessibility, but also its sensational appeal
to the modern media and its ability to lllicite intended responses by multiple
audiences.
7
Furthermore, the amplification of terrorist violence through the modern
media increases the likelihood that the newly informed audiences will become
psychologically vulnerable. 8 To psychologically manipulate his target audiences, the
terrorist must reverse the process of victimization, whereby he becomes the victim of
violent atrocities committed by the occupying authority and only in desperation and
7Both the Jewish and the Palestinian terrorists completely understood the importance of media coverage. In
those instances were media access/coverage was insufficient or occupied by other more newsworthy events the
terrorists took it upon themselves to use their own propaganda appartus, or shifted their target selection to more
newsworthy acts of terror. Alex Schmid notes that although the Palestinian terrorists had the financial ability to
develop an extensive propaganda appartus capable of keeping international audiences informed of their exploits,
they relied exclusively on Western news sources to propagandize their causes: Schmid and de Graaf, pp. 27-3 1
.
Additionally, the terrorist's access to the media facilitates contagion of violence among other terrorist
groups: Robert G. Picard, "News Coverage as the Contagion of Terrorism: Dangerous Charges Backed by
Dubious Science," TVI Report 7 (1987): 3, pp. 39-45.
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self-preservation does he commit acts of extreme violence. 9 Nonetheless, the terrorist's
access to victims, the media, and audiences dissipates over time because of the forces
of counter-terror committed to denying such access, and the existence of more
captivating and newsworthy events occurring elsewhere. In order to regain the access
to multiple audiences so vital to the process of terror, the terrorist must make a
qualitative leap in his act of violence. Fattah contends that "inaccessibility of specific
(victims or) targets may lead to the use of indiscriminate or random terror." 10
b. Indiscriminate or Random Acts of Terror
The most salient feature of an act of terror is indiscrimination and
randomness, which makes terror unpredictable and therefore more disorienting, which
contributes to the creation of anxiety " However, Calvert suggests that acts directed
toward specific groups can create anxiety and disorientation among specific target
audiences He points out that "there are many degrees of discriminating terror, and the
fact that it is carefully directed and calculated does not make its impact on its target
any less devastating." 12 For example, in the case of Sir Harold MacMichael discussed
9Alex Schmid refers to this process as self-victimization, for more information: Alex Schmid and Janny De
Graaf, Violence as Communication: Insurgent Terrorism and the Western News Media (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage
Publications, 1982), p. 18-19.
10Ezzat A. Fattah, "Terrorist Activities and Terrorist Targets: A Tentative Typology," In Yonah Alexander
and John M. Gleason (eds.) Behavioral and Quantitative Perspectives on Terrorism (New York: Pergamon Press,
1981), p. 27.
"Fattah, p. 20; Crenshaw, "The Causes of Terrorism," p. 387; and Thornton, p. 81. Note: Fattah refers to
categories indiscriminate or random acts of terror as "generalized" and selective or discriminate acts of terror as
"personalized." pp. 28-29.
12
Peter Calvert, "Terror in the Theory of Revolution," In Noel O'Sullivan (ed.) Terrorism, Ideology, and
Revolution (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1986), p. 32.
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above, there was sufficient anxiety created not only within MacMichael, but regarding
subsequent high commissioners who made it a matter of routine to travel heavily
guarded or avoid travel all together during periods deemed most threatening.
Nonetheless, Thornton argues that terror must always have at least one element of
indiscrimination, else it becomes predictable, loses its broad character, and can no
longer be legitimately designated as terror. 13 In effect, a particular act of terror
becomes routine and therefore fails to maintain the extranormality of violence
necessary to provoke audience response Rubin and Friedland refer to this effect as the
psychology of satiation, whereby a target audience becomes accustomed to particular
acts of terror. They conclude that "a terrorist action if repeated too often, causes the
audience to turn away in boredom. To be effective, terrorists cannot strike too often in
the same place or in the same way." 14
Turk argues that randomization of victim selection is the hallmark of
political terror. He states that "randomization can be accomplished in two ways: first
by the largely indiscriminate selection of one or many persons representing a social
category viewed as somehow a 'problem,' such as an enemy, obstacle, or irritant;
13Thornton, p. 81. For a contrasting perspective: Rubin and Friedland argue that knowing the inevitable
outcome of the plot in no way detracts from audience involvement or appeal; if anything, predictability
heightens anticipation and involvement, p. 37.
'"Rubin and Friedland, p. 37; and Thornton, pp. 80-81. Note: The literature also refers to the psychology of
satiation as "routinization." For the purposes of this analysis, routinization or satiation will not be considered
entirely negative, such that the continued existence of the terrorists and a threat of violence maintains a constant
level of psychological tension. In other words, it is the dramatic events involving multiple casualties or
>articularly bloody incidents that result in the projection of violence to multiple audiences, while low-level
violence (e.g., sniping, sabotage, etc) sustains a level of psychological tension providing the target of terror a
lonstant reminder that a terrorist threat still exists.
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second, by creating a generalized risk of injury or property loss for anyone who
happens to be in, or have property in a target site." 15 Randomization creates a
generalized fear that innocence is irrelevant. The closer the audiences' identify with the
victim the more acute the fear. Miller contends that "by its very nature terrorism can
only function if it can disseminate fear. The essence of terrorism is to create a climate
of fear in which the weaknesses of the terrorists are hidden through the distortion of
public perception." 16
The combination of indiscriminate and random acts of terror create a
general perception that the terrorist group is larger than life and his system of terror
encompasses all who oppose his objectives. According to Robert Asprey, "anyone who
opposed creation of a Jewish state became fair game" in the eyes of the Stern gang
and its followers. 17 Similarly, George Habash, the leader of the PFLP, states that there
are "no innocent victims" in this world 18 Yet, in reality, the terrorist is weak and his
words don't always match his deeds. Furthermore, the terrorist's system of terror does
not involve all those who oppose his objectives. The degree of discrimination and
level of randomization do not provide the basis of the terrorist's selection of a victim,
they are mere characteristics of the violent act as perceived by the audiences
15Austin T. Turk, "Social Dynamics of Terrorism," In Marvin E. Wolfgang (ed.), The Annals 463 (December
1982): p. 122.
16Abraham H. Miller, "Terrorism and the Media in the United Kingdom: Government Policy as Symbolic
Ritual," In David A. Charters (ed.) Democratic Responses to International Terrorism (New York: Transnational
Publishers, 1991), p. 312.
17
Asprey, p. 848.
18Kupperman and Trent, p. 191.
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Ultimately, the desired response governs the degree of discrimination and level of
randomization to be used in terrorism. In other words, the terrorist selects his victim,
person or thing, according to the consequences he intends to provoke and the access
he needs to multiple audiences in order to convey his cause.
c. Appropriatness of the Target of Violence
Most importantly, the terrorist selects a victim because it is appropriate
given the outcome he anticipates Fattah defines an appropriate victim as "one whose
destruction or victimization would help best the terrorist's cause and would assist them
in achieving their goals." 19 For example, in the MacMichael case, his inaccessibility
led the Stern Gang not to random or indiscriminate acts of violence, but to search for
another more accessible and equally appropriate victim. On 6 November 1944, the
Stern Gang assassinated Lord Moyne, the British Colonial Secretary for the Mid-East,
which appropriately compensated for the less accessible and then still living
MacMichael. While the British viewed this act as highly inappropriate, the Stern Gang
found it highly appropriate given the circumstances and the message they intended to
project. Consequently, those audiences finding themselves victimized or targeted by
terrorist violence typically perceive acts of terror as wholly inappropriate, while on the




d. Symbolic Significance of the Target of Violence
The appropriateness of an act of terror can only be completely
understood by considering its symbolic substance. An act of terror can be perceived as
symbolic only if the target audiences realize that the act implies a broader meaning
than the physical or material destruction it creates. For example, the Sir Harold
MacMichad's fulfillment of the British Jewish immigration policies made him a prime
candidate for a symbolic terror. Bell notes, "as a symbol of the closed gates and the
oppressing power in Palestine, the Lehi [Stern Gang] believed MacMichael would be a
suitable victim.
"
20As discussed above, the MacMichael's assassination was never
realized, and Lord Moyne became an appropriate symbolic substitute. Similarly, the
Palestinian terrorists' victimized El Al airlines and travel agencies as symbolically
representative of Zionist occupation of their homeland. 21
Thornton makes two crucial distinctions regarding the symbolic concept of
the terrorist act: between terror and sabotage and between terror and assassination. He
discusses further:
Although sabotage is virtually always directed against objects rather than against
people, while terrorism is generally directed against people, a distinction can not
be made solely along these lines—for terrorism is occasionally used against
objects. The proper distinction—which coincides with persons vs. objects
distinction in most cases—is to be found in the psychological, rather than the
physical objective of the act If the objective is primarily removal of a specific
thing (or person) with a view towards depriving the enemy of its usefulness, then
20
J. Boyer Bell, Transnational Terrorism (Standford, CA: Hoover Institute Press, 1975), p. 23.
21A review of the airlines servicing Israel's international airport indicates that most if not all Palestinian
hijackings can be considered symbolic: BOAC, Cyprus Airways, KLM, Sabena (Belgium), SAS (Sweden),
Swissair, and TWA.
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the act is one of sabotage. If, on the other hand, the objective is symbolic, we
are dealing with terror. 22
Therefore, the essence of an act of terror is the symbolic connection between the
victim and the audience. 23 But, what are symbolic acts? Violent acts take on a
symbolic significance when they represent the following: repressive or contradictory
policies of the state, dates of historic significance for the enemy or the resistance,
oppressive institutions or structures, persons or things that signify the dominant power,
and so on. The list is not exhaustive, but it does provide an indication of what is
generally characteristic of a symbolic act Ultimately, the more symbolic the act of
violence the less the act will be subject to misinterpretation by the target audiences.
e. Summary
In sum, randomized acts typically target larger audiences, whereas
selective acts target smaller and more specific audiences. Accordingly, the more
random or indiscriminate the violent act is perceived, the more the violent message is
misinterpreted and the greater access it provides to multiple audiences Adding a
symbolic substance to the act reduces message distortion. However, this is provided
that the audiences have been previously predisposed to understand the violent act's
symbolic significance. Consequently, the act's symbolic significance, randomness or
indiscrimination must be considered in the context of the terrorist's strategic choice
and the historic and political circumstances during a given period. Furthermore, it is
"Thornton, p. 77-78.
23George Gerbner, "Symbolic Function of Violence and Terror," In Yonah Alexander and Robert Latter
(eds.), Terrorism and the Media (New York: Brassey's, 1990), pp. 93-99.
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important to keep in mind that purpose of an act of terror, random or selective, is to
influence behavioral changes among target audiences Walter states, "as long as terror
is directed toward an end beyond itself (audience response) ..it has a limit and remains
a process."
24
The randomness and indiscrimination were generally the most salient
features of the Jewish and the Palestinian campaigns of terror, giving the impression
that certain acts of terror were mere ends in themselves. However, this considers the
violent acts from a spectators point of view, which fails to recognize the systematic
aspects of the campaign from the terrorist's perspective Furthermore, if a single act--
indiscriminate, random, or otherwise—could achieve the terrorist's ultimate objective in
a single blow, then there would be no need for a campaign of terror. Terrorism is
essentially a war of attrition that defeats the enemy incrementally by wearing down his
psychological will to resist in order to achieve a political victory.
2. Target Audiences
Prior to a discussion of the objectives of terrorism, an introduction to the
audiences is essential because it will clarify those audiences that are an integral part of
the psychological strategy of terrorism. For the purposes of this analysis, the four
audiences (plus the one) introduced in Schmid's definition of terrorism above will
suffice To review, the five audiences include the target of violence, the target of
terror, the target of demands, the target of attention and target of opportunity. Relating
"Walter, p. 14.
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the process of terror to the communication process will demonstrate the psychological
link between each of the audiences. The initiator of the process of terror is a terrorist
organization, or an individual terrorist. It, or he, establishes relations with the social
environment, sending to it certain messages in the form of violent acts, namely to:
(l)the victim (e.g., person or thing), who is the target of violence; and (2) the specific
groups most closely identified with him, who are the target of terror (e.g., political,
social, economic, and political groups or elites); (3) and to a more broadly defined
forces hostile to it, who are the target of demands (e.g., the colonial administrator, the
occupying authority, or the organs of the state structure—the decision makers); (4) and
to the domestic audience, who constitute the target of attention (e.g., those social-
political groups linked to the administration and authority of the state); (5) the foreign
public or target of opportunity (e.g., indirect popular constituencies, other terrorist
organizations, and neutral audiences or potential supporters), including also the
members of the terrorist organization itself and its national and international
constituency (diaspora). Table 4-1 below depicts these audiences graphically in order
to clarify an potential misunderstanding.
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TABLE 4-1
GENERAL TYPOLOGY OF JEWISH AND PALESTINIAN TARGET AUDIENCES
Resistance Target Audiences
Movements Violence Terror Demands Attention Opportunity







Palestinian Symbol of Israeli and Israeli Arab Public Third World
Israeli Allied- Authority Opinion Opinion
Colonization of International
Palestine Constituency
The target of violence represents the medium through which the terrorist
psychologically communicates to other target audiences. The target of violence is not
always symbolic, but as discussed above this substantive feature of the act clarifies the
violent effect by making it more distinguishable from random and indiscriminate acts.
Considering for a moment that the target audiences exist along a continuum, from the
target of terror to opportunity, the level of identification with the target of violence
(victim) decreases as each audience becomes further removed from the target of
violence Furthermore, the greater the target audience identifies with the target of
violence, the greater the perceived vulnerability of that audience to future acts of
terror. Therefore, the terrorist selects a victim (target of violence) to target specific
audiences in order to create the conditions he desires. For instance, if the terrorist is
most concerned with manipulating the psychological vulnerabilities of the target of
attention, then he selects a target of violence easily identifiable to or representative of
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something or someone that audience considers important. Clearly then, the terrorist
anticipates the consequences of a violent act and the behavioral response it will
motivate. Yet violence, like other forms of communication, is subject to distortion,
creating a wave of unintended consequences.
Crenshaw states that "terrorism as a process gathers its own momentum,
independent of external events ," 25 As a consequence of the terrorist's violence, this
momentum creates negative perceptions and images in the minds of multiple
audiences, all of whom may or may not have been considered in the terrorist's
strategic design. In effect, the extranormality of the violent act exceeded the bounds of
social regulation, whereby those audiences previously friendly or neutral have become
hostile to the terrorist shifting their support to forces of counter-terror. The terrorist's
challenge becomes one of recreating an image favorable to his continued existence and
two, shifting the momentum to his advantage, whereby he distances himself from
further acts of similar terror and commits acts that create consequences consistent with
his objectives. Kupperman concludes that the terrorist's "prime concern is a positive
outcome from each operation ...leading to respectability before some constituency, the
embarrassment of a government, and an ill-conceived reaction by that government
while under pressure to 'do something.' 'The main point,' George Habash (the leader of
the PFLP) once said, 'is to select targets where success is 100 percent assured. To
"Crenshaw, "The Causes of Terrorism," p. 396.
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harass, to upset, to work on the nerves through unexpected small damages." 26
Therefore, it should come as no surprise that the objectives of terrorism logically link
an act of violence to target audience response, which in turn creates psychological and
political consequences favorable to terrorist success.
3. Objectives of Terror
The next analytical component is the relationship between the terrorist's
ultimate political and psychological objectives to the target audiences. In both the
Jewish and the Palestinian case, the terrorists'—mainstream or dissident—ultimate
objective was the establishment of a homeland. Each viewed the authority, the British
or the Israelis, as illegitimate occupiers of their historic homeland. Accordingly, both
the Jews and the Palestinians used terrorism as a logical means to achieve their
ultimate political ends—statehood. Additionally, the terrorists waged a campaign of
terror producing multiple psychological effects, each in some way linked to the
achievement of their political objective. The psychological effects serve organizational
or instrumental objectives, providing a formula that links the violent act to a target
audience. While an act of terror can be broken down into its constituent parts, it is
analytic impossibility to separate the terrorist's objectives from audience response,
because the objective consists of a violent action and a subsequent reaction. Moreover,
the success or failure of terrorism does not hinge on the act itself, but on how the
audiences' respond to it Therefore, the terrorist strategically selects victims consistent
26Kupperman and Trent, p. 191; and Jay Mallin (ed), Terror and Urban Guerrillas: A Study of Tactics and
Documents (Coral Gables, FL: University of Miami Press, 1971), p. 46.
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with objectives in order to provoke responses he anticipates. In both the Jewish and
Palestinian cases, the ultimate objective remained constant, while the organizational
and instrumental objectives varied relative to their contribution to the former.
Therefore, the analysis of the organizational and instrumental objectives will bring into
focus the use of terror as a psychological means to achieve political ends.
a. Organizational Terror
The organizational and instrumental objectives create psychological
warfare and propaganda effects among specific target audiences. Essentially,
organizational terror consists of those violent acts that have propaganda value to the
terrorist group. They serve the morale building, competitive, coercive, and persuasive
needs of the group. Morale building activities are those acts of violence that maintain
and reinforce group and constituent cohesion and esprit. Terrorist violence also
generates a competitive or a demonstration effect, whereby a spectacular act of terror
communicates to other terrorist groups that a new standard of violence has been
reached, whereby all future acts of violence will be measured. Acts of terror are
coercive when the terrorist group uses such acts as punishment or control within the
group itself or among its sympathesizers. Similarly, acts of violence may be
persuasive, advertising or propagandizing through "propaganda of the deed."
Ultimately, organizational terror is group-centric, whereby acts of violence keep the
group in business and propagandize its cause to neutral and friendly audiences.
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b. Instrumental Terror
While organizational terror focuses exclusively on propaganda
objectives, instrumental terror is a mixture of both psychological warfare and
propaganda effects Therefore, a single act of instrumental terror can produce multiple
effects. Psychological warfare aims at enemy forces or those audiences hostile to it. Its
effects include disruption, demonstration, revenge, and provocation. The propaganda
influence serviced by instrumental terror is a collateral benefit. Whereby, a successful
act of instrumental terror that disorients the enemy forces or his constituents may
benefit the terrorist organization by boasting morale among his constituents,
persuading neutral audiences that his goals are genuine, or generating a competitive
atmosphere among other terrorist groups Nonetheless, the intent is to attempt to
isolate the impact of psychological warfare and propaganda in order to evaluate their
contribution to achievement of the ultimate political objective (statehood). Ultimately,
organizational and instrumental terror motivates selected target audiences to behave in
a manner advantageous to the terrorist organization, which is consistent with the
intended impact of psychological warfare and propaganda [Table 4-2 , below provides
a summary of the organizational and instrumental objectives (terror)].
A terrorist act motivates psychological responses ranging from
curiosity to despair among the five target audiences. The target of violence is scared to
death at least psychologically, or perhaps physically. Therefore, the target of violence
is only significant in as much as the other target audiences identify with him or it.
Furthermore, the ability of the remaining target audiences to perceive themselves as
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potential victims is proportional to the level of discrimination Moreover, there is a
negative relationship between levels of discrimination and identification, such that a
highly discriminate act combined with a low level of audience identification may at
the most create acute anxiety Kucuk argues that to induce a state of fear in a target
audience is not the only goal of terrorist activity. Organizational terror aims at
inspiring such responses as enthusiasm, curiosity, and anxiety. By contrast,
instrumental terror is more decisive, motivating anxiety, fear, and despair. Kucuk
contends further that while intimidation may be a component of the terrorist act
targeted at specific audiences, there are other components of the act that transmit an
effect less salient than intimidation. The target of terror and demands may be
frightened or provoked, the target of attention informed of the existence and objectives
of the terrorist group, and the target of opportunity, also informed, persuaded or won
over to the terrorist's cause. Ultimately, terrorism is a means of psychological warfare
on the one hand, and propaganda on the other. 27
27
Cited in Ejub Kucuk, "Political Terrorism as a Means of Psychological Warfare and Propaganda," op cit, p.
78. See also Brian Jenkins, "International Terrorism: A New Mode of Conflict," (Washington, DC: 1976), p. 7;
Abraham Kaplan, "The Psychodynamics of Terrorism," Terrorism: An International Journal No. 3-4 (1978), 239;
David L. Milbank, "Research Study, International and Transnational Terrorism: Diagnosis and Prognosis," CIA,
(Washington, DC: CIA, 1976),p. 8; Robert H. Kupperman, "Treating the Symptoms of Terrorism: Some
Principles of Good Hygiene," Terrorism: An International Journal 1 (1977): p. 37; and Gerlad Holton,
"Reflection on Modern Terrorism," Terrorism: An International Journal 3-4 (1978): p. 320.
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TABLE 4-2
PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE AND PROPAGANDA EFFECTS





Undermines the people's trust of political Morale
institutions in a certain society. Presents Building
occupying authority as incapable of maintaining
order, peace, and security: inducing a state of
fear out of proportion to the damage created by
the act of terror, leading to feelings of
insecurity, distrust, and irritation for the ruling
authority, aimed at disorganizing or creating
havoc in the ranks of the occupying authority or
state institutions.
Degrades the morale standards of the occupying
authorities security forces—take the morale high
ground away; attacking the enemy's will to fight
Damages international prestige of the occupying
authority, by threatening foreign interests in a
certain country, upsetting good relations among
states or intensifying distrust among them, by
exercising pressure on the real and potential,
foreign and domestic supporters of anti-terrorist
activities etc.
Proves that despite the military strength of the Competitive
occupying power, the terrorist still possesses
freedom of action
Seeks vengeance for present and past injustices Coercive
or the repressive policies of the occupying
authority
Compels the occupying authority to introduce Persuasive
repressive measures which do not affect only the
terrorist organization but the entire population of
the respective country, degrading the occupying
authority's prestige by exposing to the world
audience the contradictory policies pursued by
the target regime. .intensifying the resentment of
the people against the repressive measures of the
authorities and to secure the legitimacy of
terrorist violence
Success breeds admiration and pride among
local and international constituents
Through spectacular and daring acts the terroris
group creates a new standard ...becoming
potentially contagious
Focuses terror on its own constituents as a
means of control. ..denying constituents from
collaborating with the security forces. ..deterring
dissident violence from escalating beyond levels
necessary to achieve desired results
Wins the sympathies of certain social classes
and strata, as well as support for the terrorist
organization. Representing the vanguard in the
struggle against world imperialism...
Note: The above objectives are a synthesis of the academia's reference to goals, aims, purposes, functions, and types.
Sources: Thomas P. Thornton, "Terrors as a Form of Political Agitation." In Harry Eckstein (ed.) Internal W ar (CN: Westview, 1964),
pp. 82-84; Ejub Kucuk, "Political Terrorism as a Means of Psychological Warfare," Socialist Thought and Practive 21 (August 1981): pp
80-81; Martha Crenshaw. "The Causes of Terrorism," Comparative Politics 21 (July 1981), pp. 387, 394; and Ezzat A. Fattah, "Terrorist
Activities and Terrorist Targets: A Tentative Typology," In Yonah Alexander and John M. Gleason (eds.) Behavioral and Quantitative
Perspectives on Terrorism (NY: Pergamon, 1981), pp. 11-32.
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c. Typology of Instrumental and Organizational Terror
Tables 4-3 a and b depict the organizational and instrumental
typologies of terrorism (see next page) Table 4-3a illustrates the relationship between
the propaganda effects, the typical target audiences, and the level of discrimination of
an act of terror that provokes relatively positive emotional responses. For instance, the
propaganda effect of competition is accomplished by commiting an indiscriminate act
of terror that arouses ethusiasm among the target of opportunity (e.g., another terrorist
group).
TABLE 4-3A.
ORGANIZATIONAL (EMOTIONAL) TYPOLOGY OF TERRORISM
Propaganda Effects Discrimination Target Audience Response
Morale Building Irrelevant Attention-Opportunity Ethusiasm
Competitive Irrelevant Opportunity Ethusiasm
Coercive High Demands-Attention Anxiety
M Medium Terror-Attention Anxiety
Persuasive High Attention-Opportunity Curiosity
Sources: Refer Table 4-3b.
By comparison, Table 4-3b below represents the relationship between
the psychological warfare effects, the typical target audiences, and the level of
discrimination of the act of terror that provoke relatively negative emotional responses.
Regarding the levels of discrimination, table 4-3b is lower than table 4-3 a, reflecting
the destructive intent of psychological warfare against target audiences more closely
identified with the target of violence. The purpose of these two typologies is to
111
summarize the preceding discussion into a tabular format that brings into focus the
impact of psychological warfare and propaganda on targeted audeinces targeted,
relative to the level of discrimination and the audiences potential response. The
material and physical destruction created by an act of either instrumental or
organizational terror obscures the real psychological effects lurking below. Considering
the significance of the objective and the effect of the act, the audiences, and their
response highlights the intense array of psychological forces that dominate the process
of terror.
TABLE 4-3B.
INSTRUMENTAL TYPOLOGY OF TERRORISM
Psychological Warfare
Effects Discrimination Target Audience Response
Disruptive Low Terror-Demands Fear
Demonstrative High Terror-Demands Anxiety
" Low Terror-Attention Anxiety-Fear
Revenge High Terror Anxiety
M Low Terror-Attention Despair
Provocative Low Terror-Demands Fear
Sources: The above typologies are a synthesis of Martha Crenshaw's and Philip Karber's "Typologies
of Terrorism," cited in Alex P. Schmid and Alber J. Jongman, Political Terrorism: A New Guide to
Authors, Concepts, Data Bases, Theories and Literature (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books,
1988), p. 52-53; Martha Crenshaw, Revolutionary Terrorism (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution,
1979), pp. 36-37; and Philip A. Karber, "Urban Terrorism: Baseline Data and a Conceptual
Framework," Social Science Quarterly 52 (December 1971): pp. 528-529.
d. Summary
An analysis of the objectives to be obtained through terrorist activity
clearly reveals that terrorism is both a instrumental means of waging psychological
warefare and an organizational means of propoganda. The objective of terrorism
112
through which the terrorist organization frightens the enemy, causes chaos with his
ranks and destroys his forces, or harms his interests in another way, constitutes a first
class weapon of psychological warfare. But, a terrorist act is not meant to be only a
means of psychological warfare with the forces hostile to the terrorist organization, but
also as a organizational means of propaganda with the members of the terrorist group
itself, its real and potential sympathesizers, as well as the neutral parts of foreign and
domestic population. The basic objective of propaganda is to morally strengthen the
terrorist organization, to encourage its sympathesizers and to persuade the neutral parts
of the population to commit themselves in any possible way to the goals of the
terrorist organization. 28 Terrorism is the quintessential psychological operation,
translating psychological warfare and propaganda objectives into a process of terror
that uses instrumental terror to directly target enemy audiences and organizational
terror to target known or potential friendly audiences.
B. ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
The preceding discussion provides the theoretical background for the
development of an analytical framework. Martha Crenshaw contends that "the political
effectiveness of terrorism is importantly determined by the psychological effects of
violence on audiences." 29 But, how does this occur? How does the psychological
impact of terrorist violence induce changes in the attitudes and political behavior of
^Kucuk, 83-84.
29Crenshaw, "The Psychology of Political Terrorism," p. 400.
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multiple audiences? The answer can be obtained by breaking the previous discussion
down into its component parts (table 4-4). First, a campaign of terror is composed of
actors—mainstream, dissidents, and united resistance—all performing specific roles.
Second, the selection of a target of violence is based on accessiblity, appropriateness,
and symbolic significance that relates to creating vulnerable audiences. Relating to the
third, certain audiences identify with the target of violence or the terrorist group,
which motivates the fourth, audience response. Each of the component parts will be
discussed briefly below.
1. Roles
The efficacy of the Jewish and the Palestinian campaigns of terror hinged
on the ability of specific groups to perform specific roles. The role of the mainstream
was to essentially keep the campaign of terror focused on the political objective,
avoiding indiscriminate acts of terror associated with dissident violence, and
maintaining above ground political representation The mainstream targets the enemy
occupier directly, engaging in psychological warfare, which assaults the occupier's will
in-depth. The dissidents, on the other hand, unconstrained by above ground political
associations, commit acts of violence to indirectly provoke responses from audiences
removed from the source of conflict. The role of the united resistance is a combination
of mainstream and dissident roles: attempting to maintain its political respresentation,
while escalating the level of violence in order to force a political result. Accordingly, a
comparison of the roles played by the Jewish and the Palestinian terrorist groups will
reveal those instances when the role of the groups were clearly defined and those
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instances when they were not. Moreover, if terrorism is the systematic use of violence
by one or more groups to achieve political ends, then the system functions best when
the roles of each individual or group are clearly defined
2. Selecting a Target of Violence
To achieve the desired political ends, the terrorist must select a target of
violence (victim) that communicates a message. The terrrorist's selection of a target of
violence will be evaluated by the following: (1) accessbility of the target of violence
serves as a linkage for the terrorist to multiple audiences; (2) appropriateness of the act
given the consequences intended; (3) indiscrimination or randomness that either
enhances accessibility or produces unintended consequences; and (4) the symbolic
significance of the act that reduces message distortion and links the target of violence
with more specific audiences, controlling for unintended consequences. In the end, the
act of terror provokes audiences to respond, because of the real or perceived level of
identification with the victim.
3. Target Audiences
As the third analytical component, the level of identification brings into
focus the effect a specific act of terror will have on a the spectators The audiences
manifest level of identification is revealed by their feeling of vulnerability either as
potential victims themselves or as supporters of the terrorist's cause. Furthermore,
audience vulnerability is also enhanced by the timing, place, and scope of the attack.
For instance, the timing, place, and scope of the Palestinian Black September group's
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kidnapping of nine Israeli atheletes at the 1972 Olympics could not have been better.
By 9am 5 September 1972, the hooded Palestinian terrorists had the attention of the
international media at the first Olympic games in Germany since Hitler's hosting of the
1936 Games, which lasted for 22 hours and ended in the tragic deaths of all nine
hostages. The implications of Munich will be discussed more in detail in the following
chapter. Suffice it to mention that the Israeli atheletes would forever consider
themselves vulnerable, as would to some degree host governments and attending
spectators.
If an audience's level of identification varies relative to the victim selected,
then the selection of a victim conveys different messages to dissimilar audiences. The
success of terrorism depends on the accessibility and the vulnerability of selected
audiences to respond in a manner the terrorist anticipates. In order to promote the
desired response, the terrorist selects a target of violence that produces psychological
warfare effects and propaganda effects The terrorist uses psychological warfare to
directly assault the target of terror and the target of demands, and uses propaganda to
indirectly influence the target of attention and the target of opportunity. In this sense,
psychological warfare erodes the popular and political will of the occupying authority,
and propaganda builds popular support for the terrorist cause outside the source of the
conflict But, how then do the target audiences respond to the psychological warfare
and propaganda effects of terrorism?
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4. Measuring Audience Response
Fear, anxiety, curiosity, and so on are difficult responses to measure,
because they are personal and time sensitive. Unfortunately, the luxury of first hand
exposure to Jewish and Palestinian terror is not available, because without it measuring
the impact of terrorist violence relative to emotional responses would be pure
speculation and therefore empirically useless. Nonetheless, the Jewish and the
Palestinian acts of terror did provoke behavioral responses that can be analytically
measured. Any physical or material changes in the terrorist external enviroment will be
the general basis of measurement of audience response. There are two categories of
impact indicators, one direct and the other indirect. Direct impact indicators are those
that relate to those audiences that were the objects of psychological warfare. The direct
impact indicators include responsive actions (e.g., reprisals, curfews, searches,
roadblocks), target audience reaction (e.g., local and international news reports), and
constituent support for the forces of counter-terror (e.g., number of terrorists arrested
during the search). Furthermore, the direct impact indicators typically represent the
responses of the target of terror and target of demands. Indirect impact indicators
measure the audience response relative to the progaganda effect. These indicators




TERRORISM AS A PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATION
(TARGET AUDIENCE CONTROL SHEET).
Ultimate Objective:
(1)
Terrorist Group: (2) Mission: (3) Themes and Symbols: (4)


















What is the Ultimate Political Objective: Territorial compromise or no compromise.
Who is the group committing the act, is the group identified?
Mission: task is physical or material (e.g., sabotage) in order to achieve what psychological effect?
Theme or Symbol: Is this operation a continuation of similar activities and does the target of violence possess
symbolic significance (refer to block 14 for identification).
(5-8) Who are the target audiences or Who was influenced by the act of terror?
(9) Which audiences were propagandized?
(10) Which audiences were psyop'd?
(11) What was the psychological effect on each target audience?
(12) What conditions enhance or detract from the psychological effects of the operation (e.g., competing events)?
(13) How vulnerable were the target audiences to this act of terror (low, medium, high)?
(14) What was each audiences' level of identification with the target of violence (low, medium, high)?
(15) How accessible were/are the target of violence and the target audiences, and what means were/are available to
access the intended audiences (print or electronic media)?
(16) Impact indicators, those physical and material changes in the terrorist's external environment.
(17) Previous acts of terror that may have contributed to the psychological vulnerability or access to target audienc
(18) Specific event preceding this act of terror that serves as a basis of justification.
(19) If not a mainstream act, do they or don't they approve of the consequences (no comment equals approval)?
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Table 4-4 above is the terrorist's target audience control sheet, which breaks
down the terrorist act into its component parts The purpose of this table provides an
analytical guide and simplifies the process of terror by considering those psychological
and political forces the terrorist controls or potentially controls, and those forces he
does not. The legend clarifies what is meant by each block. Essentially, the Table
synthesizes the preceding discussion into a checklist for evaluating the Jewish and
Palestinian acts of terror.
5. Summary
It is beyond the scope of this paper to analyze all the Jewish and
Palestinian acts of terror (e.g., 1944-1947 and 1967-1974). However, certain incidents
will be discussed in order to illustrate the roles of the groups, characteristics of the act,
targeted audiences and their responses. In a chronological sense, the cumulative impact
of acts of terror will be considered relative to their contribution to the creation of a
political and social climate conducive to terrorist success. The intent is to bring into
focus the ldiosyncracies of the psychological warfare and propaganda components of
the Jewish and the Palestinian campaigns of terror, which in the case of the former
facilitated the accomplishment of the ultimate objective, and in the latter case did not.
I will demonstrate that the pivotal aspect of the Jewish successful use of terrorism was
the distinction between psychological warfare and propaganda target audiences.
Furthermore, Jewish success was enhanced by the efficacy of roles played by the three
terrorist groups. By comparison, the Palestinian were neither successful nor efficient,
political achievements were marginal at best.
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V. THE JEWISH RESISTANCE
In order to comparatively examine the role of terrorism in generating the
intended political consequences within the framework discussed above, the differences
between mainstream, dissident, and united resistance will illustrate their unique brands
of terrorism. The mainstream manipulated the effects of terrorist violence in order to
propagandize their cause and exploit the effects of the dissidents' instrumental terror.
The mainstreams' objectives were typically persuasive, coercive, competitive, and
morale-building, all of which were intended to propagandize their cause and keep the
campaign of terror focused on a political result Organizationally, the mainstream
directly targeted the occupying authority and deterred the dissidents from escalating
violence beyond levels that would jeopardize the life of the resistance.
While the dissidents intended to propagandize their cause, their acts of violence
had more of a psychological warfare effect. Instrumentally, the dissidents directly
targeted the occupying authority and intended to indirectly manipulate outside
audiences. The dissidents' objectives were disruptive, demonstrative, provocative, and
vengeance-related. However, as discussed above, psychological warfare can produce
some organizational benefits as well, whereby those audiences who identify more with
the terrorist and his cause than with the target of violence may be propagandized.
Ultimately, it was the dissident factions' target of violence that transmitted to world
audiences the plight of their subjected peoples.
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The ultimate intent of Zionist campaign was to focus world attention on the
"Palestine question" in order to illuminate the illegitimate, contradictory, and
repressive policies of the occupying authorities The efficacy of their campaign of
terror depended on the ability of the mainstream and the dissidents to perform their
proper roles. The success of the Zionist campaign depended on the appropriate
selection of a target of violence to produce the intended propaganda and psychological
warfare effect on domestic and international target audiences. The following analysis
will access the efficacy and level of success of the Jewish resistance relative to the
intended psychological and political outcome. Considering the effects of psychological
warfare and propaganda on multiple audiences will demonstrate how audiences relate
to the target of violence in general and how audiences respond to terrorist violence in
particular We turn now to a discussion of mainstream and dissident roles, target of
violence selection, instrumental and organizational objectives, and the specific
incidents of terrorist violence to illustrate the psychological warfare and propaganda
effects on multiple audiences.
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A. THE ZIONIST MAINSTREAM
As discussed in Chapter II, the 1939 White Paper and the British refusal to
increase the flow of European Jewish immigration at the end of World War II
precipitated the rise of militant mainstream Zionism. The 1939 White Paper restricted
European Jewish immigration to Palestine during a time when Hitler was intensifying
his attacks against German and Austrian Jews. Moreover, the White Paper was the
British answer to the Arab revolt, which was indicative of how violence could be
successfully employed to gain political advantage Accordingly, the mainstream
Haganah increased its efforts to support the flow of illegal immigration, and targeted
any British attempts to prevent such immigration. The Haganah's anti-British activity
generally subsided once the Britain became involved in World War II, except for some
minor sabotage operations directed against British activities and installations
interfering with illegal immigration. In September 1945, the Zionist hopes of a
relaxation of the British immigration policy were dashed when the newly installed
Labour Government contradicted their pro-Zionist stance during the war, and held to
the principles of the 1939 White Paper. 1
In the dark shadow of the Holocaust, Britain's blatant denial of the Jewish moral
right to a homeland outraged the Zionists. 2 Accordingly, the Haganah intensified its
attacks on the manifestations of British immigration control: inciting demonstrations in
'Michael J. Cohen, Palestine and the Great Powers, 1945-1948 (New Jersey: Princeton University Press,
1982), p. 69; Jon Kimche, Seven Fallen Pillars: The Middle East, 1915-1950 (London: Seeker and Warburg,
1950), p. 141; and Brian Crozier, The Rebels (Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 1960), p. 185.
2Albert M. Hyamson, Palestine Under the Mandate, 1920-1948 (London: Methuen, 1950), p. 157.
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Tel Aviv, Haifa, and Jerusalem; clashing with British soldiers on the Lebanese border
on 6 October 1945; liberating two-hundred and eight illegal immigrants from the Athlit
detention camp on the 10th; and conducting an arms raid on a military camp on the
11th.
3 On 31 October 1945, Kol Israel (Haganah's clandestine radio—the Voice of
Israel) proclaimed the existence of the Jewish Resistance movement (Tenuat Hameri)
composed of the Haganah, the Irgun, and the Stern Gang. That same night, the Jewish
Resistance launched simultaneous assaults throughout Palestine: the Palmach blew up
the Palestine railway system in 153 places; the Stern Gang successfully destroyed three
police launches in Haifa and Jaffa, while their attempt to blow up a Haifa refinery
failed; and the Irgun attacked the Lydda train station and rail yards, killing one British
soldier
4 The intent of this assault was to create a "single serious incident" that would
demonstrate to the British the gravity of the Zionists desires for a reconsideration of
their immigration policy and their dire need to create a Jewish national home.
Despite the apparent intensity of the Jewish mainstream's anti-British activities,
there was a cool political logic guiding the recent wave of terrorist incidents. David
Ben-Gurion, chairman of the Jewish Agency Executive (1939-1948), stressed that "the
Haganah was to avoid the personal terror activities of the Lehi (Stern Gang) and the
Irgun. ..each act of sabotage was to be calculated as to achieve maximum publicity,
3Cohen, p. 70. See also: The Times, 11 and 12 October 1946.
"Begin, The Revolt (New York: Shuman, 1951), pp. 186-191; Bell, Terror Out of Zion, pp. 144-146; and
The Times, 2 November 1945.
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while every effort should be made to avoid human casualties." 5 As Ben-Gunon had
hoped, the serious incident provoked the British to form a committee of inquiry and
not "go it alone," manifest in the introduction of the United States to help resolve the
problem." Britain's repudiation of the Balfour Declaration, enforcement of the 1939
White Paper, and the denouncement of the Biltmore Program provided Ben-Gunon
with sufficient cause to conclude that the British would not easily submit to Zionist
diplomacy. Unlike Dr. Chaim Weizman (President of the World Zionist Organization),
who favored dealing directly with the British, Ben-Gunon sought to indirectly
influence the British policy toward the Mandate by building strong support in the
United States. 7
By increasing the costs of maintaining stability in Palestine through controlled
incidents of mainstream terror directed at the manifestations of British immigration
policy, Ben-Gunon intended to enhance the propaganda potential of these incidents by
exploiting immigration as the moral weapon in order to generate international pro-
5Cohen, p. 70.
6Christopher Sykes, Crossroads to Israel (New York: World Publishing, 1965), p. 283. For a discussion of
the Anglo-American Committee: Cohen, pp. 96-115. David Ben-Gurion was convinced that the main arena of
diplomatic emphasis—outside Palestine—was not Britain but America. Aside from the Yishuv itself we had no
more effective tool at our disposal than the American Jewish community and the Zionist movement. ..Cited in:
Walid Khalidi (ed), From Haven to Conquest (Washington, DC: The Institute for Palestine Studies, 1987), p.
480.
7The Zionist propaganda campaign concentrated on winning the approval of American public opinion and
Congress, and through both, of the government, for the resettlement of European Jews in Palestine, the
abrogation of the White Paper, and a pro-Zionist solution of the Palestine problem along the lines of the
Biltmore Program (Jewish commonwealth): J.C. Hurewitz, The Struggle for Palestine (New York: WW. Norton,
1950), p. 174.
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Zionist sentiment in general and United States support in particular. 8 Nonetheless, the
mainstream Haganah's terror was nothing more than a tactic aimed at keeping pressure
on the British toward a pro-Zionist solution to the Palestine problem. 9 While the
Haganah's attacks on the British immigration controls were instrumentally disruptive,
they were meant more for increasing the organizational strength of the Palestinian
Jewish community than instrumentally decreasing the psychological strength of the
British occupier
Additionally, the mainstream's fear of being the tarred with the terrorist's brush
led to open collaboration with the British during their counter-terror campaign against
the dissidents (see below). While Ben-Gunon endorsed the selective use of terrorism
directed at the manifestations of British immigration policy, he feared uncontrolled
dissident violence would provoke severe British reprisals that could crush the Yishuv.
Ultimately, Ben-Gunon's fear of British ability to crush the Yishuv prompted him to
adopt a policy of restraint against the British and a hope for American sympathy. 10 In
sum, the mainstream's role was to isolate Great Britain diplomatically by driving a
political and psychological wedge between Britain and the United States. Furthermore,
the Jewish mainstream sought to deter dissident violence by employing the Haganah
8
After 1945, the Zionist Organization of America (ZOA) used mass meetings, protest rallies, and public
petitions as a mechanism to create the desired pressure on the Truman Admininstration. In August 1945, a
200,000 person rally gathered in New York's Madison Square Park to protest the British White Paper policy and
a similar rally was staged in 1946, refer Appendix A, Table A-l.
'Rayford, pp. 742-743.
Gordon E. Rayford, The Righteous Executioners: A Comparative Analysis of Jewish Terrorists of the
1940s and the Palestinian Terrorists of the 1970s (NY: City University of New York, Ph.D. Dissertation, 1980),
pp. 131-132; and J. Boyer Bell, Terror out of Zion (NY: St. Martin's Press, 1977), pp. 47-48.
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against the dissident Irgun and Stern Gang In the end, it was the dissidents, not the
mainstream, that used terrorism as an all consuming strategy, servicing as both an
instrumental and an organizational means to destroy the occupying authority's
psychological strength.
On 6 November 1944, the Stern Gang assassinated Lord Moyne, the British
minister of state in Cairo. The immediate general reaction was outrage. Following an
emotional speech by Winston Churchill to the House of Commons, "on 20 November
1944, the sixth Histadrut convention approved Ben-Gunon's four-part motion:
expulsion of members of separatists groups from their employment; denial to them of
shelter and refuge; no submission to threats and extortion; and most important,
cooperation with the British to wipe out the terror "" In other words, with the British
furious and the Jewish Agency stunned, they both agreed on an open season (Saisori)
against the dissidents.
12 On 11 January 1945, Lord Moyne's assassins were condemned
to death and subsequently executed on 23 March 1945. 13
Organizationally, the Saison was cruel and effective. Rather than turn the
dissidents over to the British immediately upon capture, the Haganah would subject
them to their own interrogation first: "fingers broken in door hinges, regular beatings,
"Bell, Terror Out of Zion, p. 127.
12Begin, p. 145.
13
J. Boyer Bell, Transnational Terror (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1975), p. 22; and Bell, Terror
Out ofZion, p. 100.
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burns, threats, more fake executions." 1
"4 From November 1944 to May 1945, more than
one-thousand dissidents had been turned over to the British. As Eliahu Golomb, the
Chief of the Haganah, noted "the organized Yishuv had [has] brought terrorist activity
to a standstill."
1
"' The assassination of Lord Moyne had exceeded the bounds of
mainstream organizational tolerance, whereby the dissidents—forced further
underground—were nearly extinguished
On 29 June 1946 (Black Saturday), the British authorities raided the headquarters
of the Jewish Agency in Palestine. Documents obtained in the raid revealed the
Agency's involvement in anti-British activities, prompting the subsequent detention of
over 2,700 Jews during the next two weeks 16 The British had effectively brought the
Jewish Agency to its knees, and more importantly, the Haganah's subversive activities
were exposed This incident and series of arrests eventually led to the bombing of the
King David Hotel on 22 July. The King David Hotel contained the executive offices
of the British Administration in Palestine. At 12:37pm on the 22nd, the dissidents
detonated a bomb in the basement of the Hotel's south wing, killing and wounding
over one hundred people. 17
14
Bell, Terror Out of Zion, p. 134. Asprey points out that by the end of 1944, 279 Irgunists and Sternists
had been captured and deported by the British to Eritrea: Robert B. Asprey, War In the Shadows: The Guerrilla
in History Vol. II (New York: Doubleday, 1975), p. 774.
15
Bell. Terror Out of Zion, pp. 133-134; and Hurewitz, p. 199. For a discussion of the Haganah's intelligence
organizations contribution to the Saison: Samuel M. Katz, Soldier Spies: Israeli Military Intelligence (Novato,
CA: Presidio Press, 1992), pp. 31-33.
6Cohen, p. 85; Hurewitz, pp. 254-255; Bell, Terror Out of Zion, p. 167; and Kimche, p. 146.
\ f
"For a detailed account of the King David Bombing, "Operation Chick:" Bell, Terror Out of Zion, pp. 168-
173.
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Again, the British and the Yishuv were outraged by the indiscriminate killing of
innocence The Jewish Agency immediately claimed no knowledge of the operation.
Yet, in spite of the Agency's and Haganah's claim to the contrary, there was evidence
that they had both knowledge and probable to cause to insure the plan was carried out,
due to the fact that the King David housed the incriminating documents seized by the
British on 29 June 18 Nonetheless, the mainstream would not allow itself to be linked
to the dissidents' indiscriminate acts of terror Accordingly, the Haganah collaborated
with the British, in the so-called mmi-Saison, to liquidate the dissidents which lasted
until mid-August 1946. Inevitably, Black Saturday, the King David atrocity, and the
mmi-Saison proved to Ben-Gunon that the political future of Palestine depended on
the mainstream's distance from indiscriminate terror and an ability to control it if need
be. Accordingly, on 23 August 1946, the united resistance was officially dissolved by
Ben-Gunon. He knew that the dissidents would continue their subversive activities,
while he was free to remain the recognized leader of mainstream Zionism in Palestine
with whom the British would have to negotiate. 19
From August 1946 until May 1948, mainstream and dissident unification was
infeasible due to the mainstream's collaboration with the British during 1944-1945 and
the Summer of 1946 anti-terror campaigns 20 Menachem Begin, the leader of the Irgun
(1943-48), refused to give in to organizational demands for retaliation against the
18Cohen, pp. 90-91; Bell, Terror Out of Zion, p. 168-169, Asprey, p. 776.
19Rayford, p. 202.
20
Rayford, pp. 181-85; and Bell, Terror Out of Zion, pp. 135-38.
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mainstream for their brutal treatment of captured dissidents 21 He was a man guided by
instrumental logic, who viewed terrorism as a means to achieve an ultimate political
end. Begin stated,
We decided not to suspend our struggle against the British rule, yet at the same
time we declined not to retaliate for the kidnappings, due to the denunciations
and the handing over of our men. ..Not logic, but instinct said imperatively: No;
not civil war. Not that at any price." And who knows: perhaps instinct is the
very heart of logic. 22
As J. Boyer Bell puts it:
to rid Palestine of the separatists [dissidents] at the cost of a huge pool of Jewish
blood would have given everyone pause...The Haganah's Season had maimed
without killing, created sympathy where none had existed before, endowed the
Irgun with a long denied legitimacy, and when ended, assured Begin that the
great divide had been safely if painfully passed: the revolt would have the
toleration of the Yishuv. With the toleration, and perhaps soon with positive
sympathy, the Irgun could persevere. 23
In sum, the mainstream used a small dose of instrumental terror to disrupt the
British anti-immigration efforts and used organizational terror against the dissident
Irgun and Stern Gang in order keep indiscriminate acts of terror from undermining
political progress. The two Seasons exemplified the mainstream's organizational
objectives, but only collaborating so far as to not jeopardize their image in front of the
Yishuv. The "single incident" demonstrated the mainstream's ability to exploit the
psychological potential of violence to provoke the intended result—British introduction
21
Bell, Terror Out of Zion, pp. 135-36; and Samuel Katz, Days of Fire (New York: Doubleday, 1968), p.
85.
22
Begin, p. 152; Rayford, p. 183; and Bell, Terror Out of Zion, p. 134.
23
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of the United States. Furthermore, this incident also illustrated the mainstream's
recognition of the merits of controlled dissident violence. In the end, the mainstream
was in a position to organizationally control the resistance and instrumentally benefit
from dissident acts of violence
B. THE JEWISH DISSIDENTS
Like the mainstream, the Jewish dissidents opposed the British immigration
policies, but their violence was precipitated by a different interpretation of events. By
comparison to the mainstream, the Irgun awaited neither the end of the second World
War nor the arrival of a pro-Zionist government in Britain to begin the "Revolt"
against the British occupier. 24 The British repudiation of the Biltmore Program was
enough to send the Irgun into final preparations for the armed struggle. An acceptance
of the Biltmore Program would have guaranteed the Jewish right to a state in
Palestine, whereby future immigration would be under the complete jurisdiction of a
Jewish authority But as it was, the British refused. This combined with the word of
continued extermination of Jews in Hitler's concentration camps provoked the Irgun
into action. The dissident Revolt began on 1 February 1944, with Begin proclaiming
that:
There is no longer any armistice between the Jewish people and the British
Administration in Eretz Israel which hands our brothers over to Hitler. Our
people is at war with this regime—war to the end...This then is our demand:
immediate transfer of power in Eretz Israel to a provisional Hebrew government.
24However, Begin would not allow the Irgun to attack the British Army until the war with Germany was
over: Katz, p. 83; and Asprey, p. 773.
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We shall fight, every Jew in the homeland will fight. The God of Israel, the
Lord of Hosts, will aid us. There will be no retreat. Freedom or death. 25
The dissident Revolt would eventually be instrumental in placing the Palestine
question on the international agenda. Through spectacular and daring acts, the
dissidents would simultaneously publicize their cause and illustrate for attentive
audiences the contradictory policies of the occupying British authorities. Begin's goals
were independence without territorial compromise (eventual Jewish state would be
mandate Palestine in its entirety) and the complete deterioration of British authority in
the Mandate. The effectiveness of the Arab revolt (1936-1939) in Palestine and the
Irish Republican Army in Ireland at forcing British concessions provided the basis for
Begin's strategy, which avoided direct confrontation with British forces by attacking
targets symbolic of British prestige.
Unlike the mainstream targets of violence, the Irgun's included not only
manifestations of British immigration policy, but also all targets symbolic of British
authority. Ultimately, Begin understood that the British presence in Palestine depended
on the maintenance of a prestigious international image which originated in British
popular will. 26 Accordingly, Begin wrote,
The very existence of an underground, which oppression, hanging, torture and
deportations fail to crush or to weaken must in the end, undermine the prestige
of the colonial regime that lives by the legend of omnipotence. Every attack
which it fails to prevent is a blow at its standing. Even if the attack does not




succeed, it makes a dent in that prestige, and that dent widens into a crack which
is extended with every succeeding attack. 27
In typical terrorist style, it was Begin's intention to provoke overreaction by the British
forces, thereby creating an immoral or an illegitimate incident for the world to see.
The dissidents' execution of daring and spectacular acts would arouse popular
resistance and force a British blow to play into their hands. The demonstrated potential
of an armed minority to commit acts of terror at will would prove the British
incapable of maintaining order, peace, and security in the Mandate.
The British frustrated attempts to crush the resistance manifest in acts of
repression would be exposed to the world with ever-increasing interest. Ultimately, the
dissidents acts of terror would erode the British will to resist. By attacking the
occupier directly and exposing his repressive tendencies, the Irgun intended to
psychologically separate the British occupation forces from their popular support base.
In other words, the exposure of the British repressive tendencies would cost Britain's
prestigious imperial image, which was a price, the dissidents reasoned, the British
public would not bare. As Begin said, Palestine resembled a glass house with its
transparency providing their shield of defense and arms their weapons of attack. 28
While the Irgun targeted the collective representation of British authority, the
Stern Gang targeted individual manifestations of anti-Zionism, adding assassination to




the dissident repertoire of terror. 29 The Stern Gang's targets of violence included those
deemed responsible for the colonization of Palestine; high commissioners, ministers of
state, chiefs of police, etc. By comparison, like the mainstream, the Irgun made it
standard practice to avoid civilian casualties, issuing warning prior to their assaults. 30
The Stern Gang's acts of violence were meant not only to instrumentally demonstrate
to the occupying British that a challenge to their authority existed, but to also break
the passive organizational restraint of the Jewish community in Palestine (Yishuv). In
sum, the dissidents' targets of violence consisted of the individual and collective
manifestations of British authority, whereas the mainstream's targets included those
singularly representative of British immigration policy. Through acts of extranormal
violence, the dissident Irgun and Stern Gang intended to erode British popular support
and ignite the Yishuv into active resistance against the British presence in Palestine.
All the Jewish resistance groups viewed immigration as a pressing problem, but
differed on what was the first priority, immigration or statehood. The mainstream
envisioned Jewish Palestine being built on an immigrant-by-immigrant basis. The
dissidents, on the other hand, saw statehood as a most pressing need and immigration
would follow thereafter. Furthermore, the mainstream and the dissidents differed on
the eventual size of the Jewish state. The mainstream was willing to accept territorial
partition, whereas the dissidents envisioned the future state of Israel encompassing the
29




entire British Mandate (stretching from the Jordan River in the east to the
Mediterranean coast in the west).
In order to achieve their ultimate political objective, the mainstream and
dissidents performed different roles. The mainstream disassociated itself with the
perceived dissident indiscriminate acts of terror, providing the necessary political
freedom of maneuver when the time came to assume control of the Jewish state.
Furthermore, the mainstream was committed to controlling the dissidents so as to not
jeopardize Zionist diplomatic initiatives. The dissidents' role, unconstrained by above
ground political associations, was to use acts of violence that would attract world-wide
attention to their cause Psychologically, this entailed the Stern Gang's selection of
targets of violence directly representative of the British imperial system in general and
Mandate administration in particular The Irgun's role, on the other hand, manifest in a
selection of targets of violence that indirectly targeted the psychological vulnerabilities
of the British occupier—their pride and prestige. In effect, Ben-Gunon was the
diplomat and Begin was the terrorist, the former exploiting the latter's campaign of
terror to political advantage. 31
31For a detailed discussion of the Irgun's strategy: J. Boyer Bell, "The Palestinian Archetype: Irgun and the
Strategy of Leverage," On Revolt. Strategies of National Liberation (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,
1976), pp. 33-70; and Lehi (Stern Gang) strategy: J. Boyer Bell, "The Anatomy of a Revolutionary Strategy:
Lehi, Lord Moyne, and Bernadotte," Transnational Terrorism (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1975), pp.
22-25; and for a summary of the Jewish anti-colonial struggle: Brian Crozier, "Terrorist Successes," The Rebels:
A Study of Post-War Insurrections (Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 1960), pp. 182-191.
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C. TARGET AUDIENCES
The preceding discussion should have made clear that the Zionist mainstream
influenced international audiences primarily through non-violent diplomatic channels
and the British authority in Palestine through terrorist tactics against manifestations of
immigration policy. By comparison, the dissidents transmitted a violent message to
both domestic and international audiences, whereby the targets of violence were
generally linked to audiences beyond the source of dispute. The following will
demonstrate how the psychological impact of terrorist violence induces changes in the
attitudes and the political behavior of multiple audiences. The answer to this question
will be provided by analyzing the audience responses to the Stern Gang's assassination
of Lord Moyne, the Irgun's bombing of the King David Hotel, and the Irgun's
campaign against the British judicial system. In order to get a sense of how terrorism
was or was not able to contribute to the political result (statehood), a brief discussion
of the cumulative impact of other acts of terror will be provided as well.
1. The Assassination of Lord Moyne
In February 1942, a Jewish immigration ship, the Struma, containing over
700 refugees was refused entry into Palestine. Sir Harold MacMichael, the British
High Commissioner, suspected that some of the passengers on board may have been
Nazi agents. On 14 February, while under tow in the Black Sea, the Struma broke free
and sank, leaving only one survivor. Soon thereafter, handbills were made up: "Sir
Harold MacMichael, known as the High Commissioner of Palestine, WANTED FOR
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MURDER by drowning 800 refugees aboard the SS Struma"* 2 From 1942 to August
1944, the Stern Gang attempted to assassinate MacMichael five times 33 When word
came of his departure, the Stern Gang searched for an appropriate substitute for the
inaccessible MacMichael.
Lord Walter Edwarde Guiness Moyne, the British minister of State of
Middle Eastern Affairs, MacMichael's superior, supporter of the 1939 White Paper, an
Arabist, and an ardent anti-Zionist, provided the Stern Gang an accessible and
appropriate substitute target of violence. 34 Bell states that Moyne was an ideal target of
violence because of his title, his cabinet rank, his connections in Britain, and his
friendship with Winston Churchill. In a single spectacular act, the Stern Gang would
internationalize the Palestine question, which they reasoned would prevent Britain
from handling Palestine like a colony and ultimately change the course of history.
On 6 November 1944, the Stern Gang assassinated Lord Moyne in Cairo.
The target audiences responded (see Figure 5-1 below): the targets of terror, the
Egyptians feared they'd be blamed and the Colonial administration was appalled; the
target of demands, the Parliament was outraged and wanted the Yishuv to help in
capturing the dissidents; and the targets of attention, the Jewish Agency and the
Yishuv were dismay and prepared to cooperate with the British counter-terror effort.
32Gerold Frank, The Deed (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1963), pp. 110-111.
"Christopher Sykes Crossroads to Israel (London: Collins, 1965), p. 249; Bell, Terror Out of Zion, p. 90-91;
and Frank, Chapter 14.
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The Assassination of Lord Moyne: Target Audiences
Accordingly, Winston Churchill stated "these harmful activities must cease and those
responsible for them must be radically destroyed or eliminated." 35 On 20 November,
Ben-Gunon echoed Churchill's remarks by devising a plan for the Jewish Agency and
the Haganah to cooperate with the British to wipe out dissident terror (see the Saison
above). 36 All considered, the assassination of Lord Moyne did not provoke the
intended consequences, the targets of attention and opportunity were not
propagandized positively toward the terrorist's cause.




With the world still involved in a Second World War, the assassination of
a minister of state by a oppressed minority was bound to have difficulty motivating
international sympathy. 37 The Stern Gang did calculate Moyne's appropriateness and
symbolic significance, yet failed to recognize the audiences' psychological dispositions
given the present historical circumstances. With the British furious and the Jewish
Agency stunned, they both agreed to liquidate the dissidents. 38 On 11 January 1945,
Lord Moyne's assassins were condemned to death and executed on 23 March 1945. 39
The audiences' applauded, colonization of the Mandate materialized, and history had
not changed positively for the terrorist's cause. Once the WWII ended, the world stage
awaited the next in a series of terrorist's dramas emanating from Palestine—the
bombing of the King David Hotel.
2. The Bombing of the King David Hotel
On 22 July 1946, a bomb exploded in Jerusalem's King David Hotel,
killing 91 and injuring 45. 40 The Hotel was the Mandatory headquarters housing the
British military command, the administration senior executives, and the Central
Intelligence Department (CID), and possessed impressive defenses. Ultimately, the
King David Hotel was the physical and symbolic representation of the center of British
'Walter Z. Laqueur, A History of Zionism (NY: Schocken, 1972), pp. 556-557.
38Begin, p. 145.
39
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social and diplomatic life and imperialism in the Middle East. The intention of the
attack was to present a severe blow to British prestige and destroy the incriminating
documents seized from the headquarters of the Jewish Agency on the 29th of June. 41
Yet, the perceived indiscrimation of the attack raised doubts about the dissidents'
intent, whereby the Jewish Agency refused to accept responsibility and the British
were quick to blame the dissidents. A controversy arouse over the Irgun's claim that a
warning was sent and the British claim that no such warning existed. 42 Nevertheless,
the general response was disgust, due to the loss of so many innocent lives and a lack
of justification that neither the mainstream nor the dissident terrorists could provide.
Figure 5-1 below illustrates the relationship between the target of violence-
-the King David Hotel—and the remaining target audiences. Clearly, the group that
most closely identified with the target of violence was the British administration-
target of terror. The symbolic significance of the target of violence facilitated further
identification relative to the target of demands—the British Parliament. The Yishuv and
British popular opinion, the target of attention, were effected because of the apparent
indiscrimination of the act. Moreover, such an atrocity lent to the introduction of the
target of opportunity, international public opinion in general and US public opinion in
particular. A description of the dynamics of the bombing will illustrate the responses
41
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The Bombing of the King David Hotel: Target Audiences
of each of the target audiences.
Indicative of the target of terror's response (British Administration) was the
initiation of strict curfew regulations, cordon and search operations, and the arrest of
suspected dissidents. Over three hundred Jews were eventually detained on suspicion
of the King David bombing. These measures lasted until 7 August. The Yishuv (target
of attention) was similarly outraged manifest in the Jewish Agency's condemnation of
the act. Accordingly, Ben-Gunon denounced the attack by stating that "the Irgun is the
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enemy of the people." 43 In response, Begin stated that "the Hebrew Resistance
Movement denounced the heavy toll of lives caused by the dissidents' operation at the
King David Hotel." 44 Despite Begm's plea, a 2000 pounds reward was placed on his
head.
45 The British Parliament (target of demands) hardened as reflected in a statement
by the British Prime Minister Clement Attlee:
The British Government have stated and stated again they will not be diverted
by acts of violence in their search for a just and final solution to the Palestine
problem46 . ..The authorities in Palestine will be provided with any sanctions they
need to prevent attacks by terrorists... 47
President Truman provided the best indication of the target of opportunity's feelings
toward the act, when he stated:
Such acts of terrorism will not advance but, on the contrary, might well retard
the efforts that are being made, and will continue to be made, to bring about a
peaceful solution of this difficult problem. 48
As Litvinoff suggests, "the Irgun had intended the explosions to be a
propaganda spectacular, not a mass murder." 49 Yet, the effect was of minimal
43Begm, p. 207.
44
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propaganda value. While the bombing of the King David Hotel may have advertised
the cause, it won few supporters. The bombing was a classic form of psychological
warfare in which the Irgun failed to control for the effects on multiple audiences.
Therefore, the bombing of the King David Hotel presented the dissidents with some
unanticipated consequences: polarizing the Yishuv, alienating the Jewish Agency, and
receiving condemnation from the international community. The Irgun (and the Stern
Gang), forced further underground by the extensive British counter-terror initiatives,
became cut-off from any potential political base. Moreover, the Jewish mainstream's
refusal to accept blame and condemnation of the dissidents undermined any hope of a
reestablishment of a united resistance. The united resistance was officially dissolved on
23 August 1946
Although this attack alienated the Irgun, the British eventually played into
their hands. General Barker, the British Military Commander in Palestine, apparently
took Attlee's sanctioning literally when he stated:
I am determined that they [Yishuv] should be punished and made aware of our
feelings and contempt and disgust at their behavior... I understand that their
measures will create difficulties for the troops, but I am certain that if my
reasons are explained to them, they will understand there duty and will punish
the Jews in the manner this race dislikes the most: by hitting them in the pocket,
which will demonstrate our disgust for them. 50
The Irgun created a wall poster out of this statement illustrating to the Yishuv the anti-
semitic character of the occupying authority.
50Cited in Bell, Terror Out of Zion, p. 174; See also: Jon Kimche, Seven Fallen Pillars: The Middle East,
1945-1952 (New York: Prager, 1953), p. 41-42.
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Consequently, while the initial responses of outrage and disgust were
negative, the process of terror eventually reversed these responses for the positive
benefit of the terrorist cause. The attack demonstrated the capability of a small
clandestine force to penetrate impressive British defenses, which brought into question
the British ability to maintain control over the Mandate. While British and Zionist
public opinion was outrage, they both began to question the legitimacy of the
occupying authority. Ultimately however, the attack undermined any hope of a unified
resistance due to Ben-Gunon's and the Haganah High Command's denial of any prior
knowledge of the operation. Therefore, the Irgun had to turn to a more comprehensible
means of violence, from which to convey a message that would not alienate their most
critical ally, the Yishuv.
3. The Campaign Against the Judiciary
The Irgun's campaign against the British judicial system provided the
means to communicate a more comprehensible message to both the Yishuv and the
British public (the targets of attention). The Irgun's campaign against the judiciary
began in June 1946. The intent was to present to the British public the contradiction
between their much acclaimed sense of "fair play" and the actions resulting from their
government's policy in Palestine. 51 Compared to the King David bombing, the selection
of the targets of violence were more discriminate during the Irgun's campaign against




different: the targets of violence were British soldiers, not a material structure like the
King David Hotel, the targets of terror were either those individuals most closely
related to the target of violence or those individuals most responsible for executing the


























The Campaign Against the Judiciary: Target Audiences
was the British colonial administration, because it was they who had the authority to
change these policies; and the targets of attention and opportunity remained the same
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Inevitably, the Irgun intended to expose the contradictory character of the British
judicial process—hangings, flogging, and martial law—to the targets of attention and
opportunity.
a. Floggings
In December 1946, two Irgunists were sentenced to 18 year prison
terms and 18 lashes of the whip While flogging may have been a common practice
during British colonization and symbolic of imperial mastery, it was not to be an
acceptable punishment in the Mandate. "Was an oppressor now to whip us in our own
country," asked Begin? 52 The Irgun's initial response was to publicize through wall
posters this ridiculous, inappropriate, and out-dated form of punishment. The Irgun
published a warning to the British stating:
For hundreds of years you have been whipping natives in your colonies—without
retaliation. In your foolish price you regard the Jews in Eretz Israel as natives,
too You are mistaken. Zion is not exile. Jews are not Zulus. You will not whip
Jews in their homeland. And if British authorities—officers will be whipped in
return.
53





A Hebrew soldier, taken prisoner by the enemy, was sentenced by an illegal
British Military "Court" to the humiliating punishment of flogging We warn the
occupation Government not to carry out this punishment,which is contrary to the
laws of soldiers' honour. If it is put into effect—every officer of the British
occupation army in Eretz-Israel will be liable to be punished in the same way: to
get 18 whips .
HARGUN HAZVAI HALEUMI (N.M.O.)
b'Eretz-Israel
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Despite the Irgun's propaganda efforts, on 27 December 1947 the British flogged one
Irgunist On 29 December, the Irgun answered the British flogging with the abduction
of one British major and three British non-commissioned officers, subsequently
flogged and released them. 55 The Irgun followed with a communique stating, "we shall
no longer answer with a whip. We shall answer with fire " 56 One week later, floggings
were abolished as part of British punishment. 57 As Begin best summarizes, all target
audiences from the Yishuv to Frenchmen to Russians to Canadians to Americans to
brother-Jews throughout the world rejoiced in the British humiliation 58
54Reproduced in Bell, Terror Out of Zion, pp. 252-53; and Rayford, p. 215.
"Begin, pp. 234; Bell, Terror Out of Zion, pp. 184-86; and Hurewitz, p 281.
56
Begin, p. 234.
"Jewish Agency tried for 25 years to have floggings cease, but violence paid: Center for Research in Social




b. The Threat of Martial Law
The mainstream concerns for the British ability to crush the Yishuv
were based on their continual threat of imposition of martial law. In the Spring of
1947, the Irgun decided to challenge the British martial law threat. They reasoned that
martial law could not be any worse than the curfews, cordon and search operations,
and arrests that swept the Mandate the previous year (refer Appendix A, Table A-l).
On 1 March 1947, the Irgun initiated 16 attacks on British facilities which resulted in
British casualties numbering 20 dead and 30 wounded. In London the Sunday Express
headline read: GOVERN OR GET OUT. 59 The next morning, the British selected an
authoritarian version of former, proclaiming martial law. They imposed a 24 hour
curfew, cut services, initiated search operations, limited gatherings to six persons,
replaced civilian courts with military courts, and warned that martial law would not be
terminated until the dissidents were crushed. 60
Despite the severe measures, the Irgun and the Stern Gang were able
to conduct operations every day while martial law was in effect: three attacks on 3
March, attacks in Haifa, Jerusalem and Rehovet on the 5th; three attacks in Tel Aviv
on the 8th, sniping, arson, roads mined, and hand grenade attacks throughout the
59
Bell, Terror Out of Zion, p. 190; and Katz, Days of Fire, p. 125. See also: The Times, 3 March 1947:
"British must get out of Palestine and stay out. Britain, unlike Nazi Germany, cannot repay terror with counter-
terror..." Also, note that by the end of 1946, the dissident Irgun and the Stern Gang had killed 373 persons, most
of whom were British.
'"For the British martial law plan: Begin, p. 320.
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Mandate on the 9th, and seven attacks on 12 March On 17 March martial law
ended 6I The British had arrested seventy-eight terrorists: fifteen Sternists, twelve
Irgunists, and fifty-one suspects, none of whom were of critical importance 6: All
considered, martial law was a miserable failure, the dissidents continued their acts of
terror unimpeded by British security measures As Bell notes, Churchill's question to
the House of Commons, "how long will this squalid warfare with all its bloodshed go
on.
The dissidents' acts provoked the intended consequences, the target of
demands (the British administration) imposed martial law, the targets of attention were
impressed, and the international community prepared to intervene The failure of
martial law to stop dissident acts of terror was a severe blow to British prestige, so
much so that the Secretary of the Colonies, Arthur Creech-Jones requested to the UN
General Assembly that a UN special committee be set up to investigate the status of
the Mandate. 64 Furthermore, General Sir Gordon MacMillan (commander of the British
security forces) banned the use of the word "terrorist" to describe the dissidents,
because in his opinion such a word suggested bravery, heroism, and "moreover the
word aroused fear in the British troops." 65 The British public (target of attention) was
61
Rayford, pp. 215-216.
"Ray ford, pp. 216-217; Bell, Terror Out of Zion, pp. 189-91.
"Bell, Terror Out of Zion, p. 191.
"UN agreed on September 1947 for consideration, but in the face of continued dissident assaults the
Secretary of the Colonies requested the date be moved to 28 April.
"Begin, p. 59; and The Times, 4 March 1947.
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dismayed by the Mandate's inability to control the terrorists. The London Times
reported martial law proved to be "useless as a weapon against terrorism and only
strangles the economic life of the country." 66
c Hangings
In response to the hanging sentences of two Irgumsts on 13 June 1946,
the Irgun issued a warning stating. "Do not hang the captive soldiers If you do, we
shall answer gallows with gallows." 67 Five days later, the Irgun kidnapped five British
officers from an officer's club in Tel Aviv. The sentences were eventually commuted,
which prompted the Irgun's release of the captives. On 16 April 1947, one Irgunist and
three Sternists were secretly executed in Acre Prison. Once the Irgun received word of
their execution, they warned, "the execution of prisoners of war is premeditated
murder. We warn the British regime of blood against the commission of this crime." 68
Nonetheless, the Irgun could not answer gallows with gallows, because the British
were confined to their bases. Frustrated by the inaccessibility of appropriate targets of
violence to be sent to the dissidents' gallows, the Irgun and the Stern Gang tightened
its noose around other terrorist activities to keep the psychological tension at fevers
pitch (refer Appendix A, Table A-l: bombings, mines deposited, ambushes, sniping).
On 4 May 1947, the dissidents breached the Acre prison, leading to
the escape of 251 detainees. Located in the Arab quarter of the old city of Acre, the






prison was a refurbished Ottoman fortress; surrounded by a moat, seventy foot walls
topped with barbed wire, and a single steel entrance gate The dissidents' ability to
breach such a structure combined with strong British defenses was another blow to
British prestige Accordingly, Begin quotes Haaretz as stating:
The attack on the Acre Jail was received here as a serious blow to British
prestige after the hangings on the eve of the UN session were to have
demonstrated Britain's resolute control of the situation. 69
Bell summarizes the influence the breach of the impregnable fortress had on the
targets of opportunity (international public opinion):
The New York Herald Tribune reported that the execution of this most
dangerous and difficult mission was perfect. The attack was spread all over the
front of the British newspapers as well. Outrage was expressed in the Commons.
Members felt it was impossible for the government to impose order merely by
force.
70 A Member of Commons stated: There has never been anything like it in
the history of the British Empire. 71
As Begin had stated, through daring and spectacular acts he would
erode the occupier's prestige and communicate to the world the desperation of an
oppressed peoples' desire for a homeland. Nonetheless, neither the Acre prison break
nor continued dissident threats could persuade the British to give up their gallows as a
symbol of "firm and resolute authority " 72
69Begm, p. 327.
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On 12 June 1947, the British again sentenced three more Irgunists to
death by hanging , but this time the world was watching The United Nations Special
Committee on Palestine had arrived to make recommendations for a resolution of the
Palestine question and the feasibility of a partition. The Irgun had sent a letter
informing the Committee of the British sentencing and requested their assistance in
gaining a reprieve. The Committee expressed their concern to the British
administration concerning the potential unfavorable repercussions that the execution of
the death sentences may provoke. Nonetheless, the British did not listen and three
Irgunists awaited the gallows. 73
Since 12 June, the Irgun had been trying to abduct British officers to
hold as leverage for the death sentences of the three Irgunists, but as Begin put it "the
Army dug in deeply into their hiding places." 74 Once the British authorities denied the
Committee's request for reconsideration, the Irgun continued its efforts to abduct an
officer, but was unsuccessful. On 14 July 1947, the Irgun kidnapped two British non-
commissioned officers, as an appropriate substitute. The British responded with
imposing a curfew and searching from house-to-house for the abducted soldiers, but
73





they too were unsuccessful 75 The Jewish Agency deplored the act and Members of
Parliament appealed for their release Samuel Katz summarizes the Irgun's response:
We recognize no one-sided laws of war. If the British are determined that their
way out of the country should be lined by an avenue of gallows and of weeping
fathers, mothers, wives, and sweethearts, we shall see to it that in this there is
not racial discrimination. The gallows will not be all one colour...Their price will
be paid in full. 76
On 29 July 1947, the British again ignored the warning and hung the three Irgunists.
Accordingly, the Irgun answered gallows with gallows and hanged the two British
NCOs and booby-trapped their bodies. 77
The British popular response (target of attention) to the latest bad
news from the Mandate was mixed with revenge and despair. The Daily Express stated
that "not in the black annuals of Nazi wickedness is there a tale of outrage more vile."
The British public responded with the following acts of vengeance: outraged editorials,
anti-Semitic demonstrations, Jewish businesses looted and vandalized, and synagogues
and Jewish cemeteries desecrated. By contrast, the headlines of the Manchester
75Meanwhile, the British were humiliated elsewhere. On 14 July 47, a British destroyer rammed the Exodus,
a Jewish immigration ship, off the coast of Palestine, killing one and wounding over 100 others. A general strike
broke out in Tel Aviv. The refugees were subsequently deported. Owing to Bevin's, the British Foreign
Secretary, policy of repatriation the Jewish refugees were to be returned to their European points of departure.
In France on 29 July 1947, the international press arrived in droves to report on the deplorable conditions
aboard ship and plight of these peoples without a home. Neither the French government wanted to repatriate
them nor did many of the refugees want to disembark. The next stop for the refugees was Hamburg Germany,
the press waited. Upon arrival (9 Sept), one thousand British troops backed by fifteen hundred German police
escorted the refugees off the ships. By returning the Jews from their promised land back into the hands of their




Begin, pp. 283-90; Bell, Terror Out of Zion, pp. 178-81, 303-309; and Dan Kurzman, Genesis 1948: The
First Arab-Israeli War (Cleveland, OH: World Publishing, 1970), p. 172.
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Guardian expressed British popular despair by stating "Time to Go," which was
indicative of the eroding popular support for the British continued presence in
Palestine.
78
Meanwhile, in Palestine the British security forces (the target of terror)
ran amok, shooting civilian cars and buses, destroying cafes, smashing windows, and
indiscriminately attacking passers-by. All totaled five Jews were killed, fifteen
wounded, and scores of others bruised or badly shaken. Nonetheless, the Yishuv was
paying a small price for the Irgun's campaign of terror that eventually paid big
political dividends. Eight weeks later, the British government (target of demands)
announced the surrender of the Mandate. 79
The cumulative effect of the Irgun's campaign against the British
judicial system was the deterioration of British authority and the popular will to
maintain their presence in the Mandate. The Irgun's exposure of the British flogging as
an out-dated form of punishment humiliated them in front of international audiences.
The failure of martial law to crush the dissidents exposed to the world in general and
the British public in particular that the subjected peoples were being oppressed by an
illegitimate authority. In June 1947, while a UN Special Committee was in Palestine
considering a political partition, the flogging and hanging incidents were in full view
78
Bell, Terror Out of Zion, p. 238-239.
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Katz, p. 164; and Begin, p. 330.
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and consequently became the focus of world attention. 80 The logical result was the
British discontinuation of these practices at the immeasurable cost of lost prestige The
Irgun's ability to expose the British sense of "fair play" in all its contradictory glory,
positively influenced the ultimate target of attention—British public opinion.
80
Bell, Terror Out of Zion, pp. 178-81, 303-9; Rayford, pp. 222-23; and Begin, pp. 283-90.
154
VI. THE PALESTINIAN RESISTANCE
The following section will comparatively examine the roles, objectives, target
selection, and the target audiences of the Palestinian mainstream and dissident terrorist
groups. Like the Jewish resistance, the Palestinian resistance can be sub-divided into
mainstream and dissident groups. Al-Fatah represented the Palestinian mainstream The
mainstream al-Fatah's nationalist platform manifested in a distinct Palestinian
nationalism, whereby the withdrawal of the Israeli occupier would be facilitated by the
radicalization and mobilization of the Palestinian masses in the refugee camps and the
occupied territory. In other words, the success of al-Fatah's armed struggle relied more
on the revolutionary potential of the Palestinian masses than a broader pan-Arab
mobilization. Accordingly, the feature that distinguished the dissidents from the
mainstream was their claim that Israel could not be driven into the sea until all the
Arab states bordering Israel in particular had been radicalized.
Therefore, the Palestinian dissidents, the PFLP and the PFLP-GC (among
others), expanded the scope of radicalization to include Arab states for the former and
the international community for the latter. Furthermore, the dissident Palestinians
viewed direct involvement in Arab politics as a necessary pre-condition for the
removal of the Israeli occupier. The mainstream al-Fatah, on the other hand, sought to
adhere to a policy of non-intervention in Arab state affairs, but this was easier said
than done Nevertheless, like the Jewish dissidents, it was ultimately the Palestinian
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dissidents' acts of indiscriminate violence that focused the attention of world audiences
on the Palestine problem. Accordingly, a comparison of the Palestinian mainstream
and dissident groups will illustrate the similarities and differences relative to the
Jewish resistance groups, illuminating those characteristics or circumstances that may
account for the formers' inability to achieve the ultimate political objective—statehood
A. THE PALESTINIAN MAINSTREAM
The role of the Palestinian mainstream was not as clearly differentiated as the
Jewish mainstream's role. As will become clear as the analysis progresses, al-Fatah
became consumed by indiscriminate acts of terror, supporting the dissident's attempt to
overthrow the Jordanian government in the early 1 970s and internationalizing its
campaign of terror under the cover of Black September Gabriel Ben-Dor emphasizes
the indicriminate terror typical of all Palestinian terrorist organizations when he states:
The Palestinian terrorist organizations have been extremely indiscriminate with
respect to the target country (Israel) as well as bystanders, on occasion; and, in
that sense—i.e., in terms of the indiscriminate means, not only the target and the
goals—the Palestinian organizations must be recognized as an extreme case. 1
While this is true in a general sense, al-Fatah can not be characterized as an extremist
or dissident group until after 1971. Prior to 1971, the mainstream role of al-Fatah can
best be understood by first considering its rise to prominence relative to other
Palestinian groups in general and Arab states in particular This will be illustrated by a
brief discussion of al-Fatah's role in the Battle of Karameh.
'Gabriel Ben-Dor, "The Strategy of Terrorism in the Arab-Israeli Conflict: The Case of the Palestinian
Guerrillas," In Yair Evron (ed.) International Violence: Terrorism, Surprise and Control (Jerusalem: Hebrew
University, 1979), p. 138.
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The Israeli occupation of the West Bank after the 1967 Arab-Israeli War and
their subsequent pacification efforts, forced the fedayeen (Palestinian terrorists) to
withdraw to Jordan's East Bank. 2 On 18 March 1968, an Israeli school bus ran over a
land mine, killing two adults and wounding twenty-eight children. 3 This incident
provided the Israelis pretext to launch a raid on the fedayeen headquarters in the East
Bank town of Karameh. Both the al-Fatah and the PFLP occupied this town, as well as
some eighteen-thousand civilians. The word of an impending attack sent the PFLP into
the hills, leaving a 300-400 man al-Fatah contingent to defend against the Israeli
assault.
4
On 21 March 1968, fifteen-thousand Israeli forces attacked and despite their
numerical and technological superiority, the battle lasted the entire day. Al-Fatah
combined with two Jordanian infantry brigades fought valiantly against the Israeli
onslaught. Despite conflicting casualty and equipment losses between the fedayeen and
the Israelis, the battle provided the Palestinians with a moral and a psychological
victory. The Karameh battle reclaimed for the Arab world a glimmer of pride they had
2As briefly mentioned in Chapter II, the West Bank Palestinian were culturally linked to Jordan, which
basically accounts for the difficulty al-Fatah and the PFLP had in igniting a popular revolution, as well as Israeli
counter-insurgency efforts. For a discussion of the Palestinian Resistances' activities immediately following
Israel's occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip: Janet and John Wallach, Arafat: In the Eyes of the
Beholder (New York: Carol Publishing, 1990), pp. 201-205; Helena Cobban, The Palestinian Liberation
Organization: People, Power, and Politics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1984), pp. 37-41, 170;
Gerard Chaliand, The Palestinian Resistance trans. Michael Perl (New York: Penguin Books, 1971), pp. 60-63;
and Yaan, pp. 127-131
3Gordon F. Rayford, Righteous Executioners: A Comparative Analysis of Jewish Terrorists of the 1940s and
Palestinian Terrorists of the 1970s (New York: City University, P.H. D. Dissertation, 1980), p. 439.
"John Laffin, Fedayeen: The Arab-Israeli Dilemma (New York: The Free Press, 1973), pp. 30-32; Cobban,
pp. 41-42.
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lost, due to their humiliating defeat at the hands of the Israelis the previous year/
1
Furthermore, the United Nations' condemnation of the Israeli attack added further
prestige to al-Fatah's valiant stand. John Laffin summarizes the psychological effect of
the Battle of Karameh:
The guerrillas burst on the scene as a major factor in the Arab-Israeli
confrontation...Karameh was responsible for restoring Arab self-esteem and for
showing the Palestinians that they not only could face the Israelis militarily but
that only through armed struggle could they ever hope to defeat Zionism...The
battle marks the beginning of large scale Palestinian resistance; it was
instrumental in bringing to light the existence of the Palestine Movement of
National Liberation, better known as Fatah, and to cause a ground swell of pro-
resistance feeling throughout the Arab world. 6
From the psychological victory of Karameh, al-Fatah reaped tangible benefits. 7
The leadership of Fatah decided that it was essentail to emerge from the underground
and present a public image On 16 April 1968, the Fatah High Command designated
Yasir Arafat as "its official spokesman and its representative for all official questions
of organization, finance, and information." 8 In the summer of 1968, Egypt's President
Nasser included Yasir Arafat, al-Fatah's leader, among the members of the United
Arab Republics delegation that visited the Soviet Union. 9 Al-Fatah's rise to mainstream
5John K. Cooley, Green March, Black September: The Story of the Palestinian Arabs (London: Frank Cass,





Chaliand, pp. 63-64. Note: "Karameh' in Arabic means 'dignity': Cooley, p. 102.
8Cited in: Cooley, p. 102. Al-Fatah's statement carried by major news agencies.
'William B. Quandt, Palestinian Nationalism: Its Political and Military Dimensions R-782-ISA (Santa
Monica, CA: The Rand Corporation, November 1971), p. 15.
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prominence also manifest in its numeric growth, increasing from 2,000 members in
1967 to 10,000 in 1969. 10 Furthermore, the Arab Gulf states began contributing
extensively to Fatah activities. The increased financial resources and numerical
strength enabled Fatah to escalate its attacks against the "Zionist occupier." From
August 1968 to December 1968, Fatah conducted nine-hundred and twenty two raids
into Israel, twice the 1967 total. By the end of 1969, they claimed that its attacks on
Israel had tripled the previous year's total, 2567 total missions in 1969 compared to
previous year's 922." In the end, Fatah's political recognition by Nasser, its numerical
strength, and escalation of attacks against Israel paid political dividends. On 3
February 1 969, Yasir Arafat was elected chairman of the newly formed Executive
Committee of the Palestinian Liberation Organization, with his al-Fatah winning a
majority of the seats in the Executive Council. 12
As Chairman of the Palestinian Liberation Organization, Yasir Arafat was in a
position to exercise Fatah's mainstream role. Arafat's and Fatah's intents were best
expressed by a manifesto issued in 1969:
10Ehud Yaan, Strike Terror: The Story of Fatah (New York: Sabra Books, 1970), pp. 278-282; O'Ballance,
Arab Guerrilla Power, p. 50; Quandt, p. 14; Cobban, p. 49; and Laffin, p. 39. O'Ballance and Laffin indicate
that Fatah's membership may have been as high as 20,000 by the end of 1969:
"Laffin, p. 38; and contradictory figures: Hanon Alon, "Countering Palestinian Terrorism in Israel: Toward a
Policy Analysis of Countermeasures N-1567-FF (Santa Monica, CA: The Rand Corporation, August 1980), p.
44: total number of Palestinian acts of terror for 1968 was 808 and 1969, 1480.
12Thomas Kiernan, A rafat: The Man and the Myth (New York: W.W. Norton, 1976), pp. 194-195, 211-213;
Yaari, pp. 228-232.
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Al Fatah, the Palestine National Liberation Movement, is the expression of
the Palestinian People and of its will to free its land from Zionist
colonisation in order to recover its national identity.
• Al Fatah, the Palestine Liberation Movement, is not struggling against the
Jews as an ethnic and religious community. It is struggling against Israel as
the expression of colonisation based on theocratic, racist and expansionist
system of Zionism and colonialism
• Al Fatah... rejects any solution that does not take account of the existence
of the Palestinian people and its nght to dispose of itself.
• Al Fatah... solemnly proclaims that the final objective of its struggle is the
restoration of the independent democratic state of Palestine...
• The struggle of the Palestinian people, like that of the Vietnamese people
and other peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America is part of a historic
process of the liberation of the oppressed peoples from colonialism and
imperialism. 13
These "Five Points" translated into campaign of terror directed at the Israeli occupier
and indirectly intended to mobilize the Palestinian masses by violent example, which
combined to ultimately facilitate the "Return" of the Palestinian diaspora to their
historic homeland. 14 While the return of the Palestinian diaspora to historic Palestine




Ibid.; and Cobban, p. 40.
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the total occupation of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip or the pre- 1967 Israeli
territory. In other words, the mainstream Fatah would accept a compromise, whereby
the minimal return of the occupied territories—the so-called mini-state idea—would
suffice for the short-term, with the eventual long-term objective being the
establishment of an democratic Palestinian state in which Palestinian Arabs were no
longer the minority
Accordingly, Fatah committed itself to a campaign of terror that was
organizationally and instrumentally intended to achieve the ultimate political result—the
"Return" of the Palestinian diaspora to historic Palestine. Instrumentally, Arafat's Fatah
used sabotage to provoke Israeli retaliation and repression of the Palestinian population
in the occupied territories and the refugee camps, hoping that this would liberate the
Palestinian masses and ignite popular resistance against the Zionist occupier. This
objective is articulated by Fatah's "Revolutionary Studies and Experiments," entitled
The Liberation of the Occupied Lands and Struggle Against Direct Imperialism:
The liberation action is not only the removal of an armed imperialist base, but
more important—it is the destruction of a society. [Our] armed violence will be
expressed in many ways. In addition to the destruction of the military force of
the Zionist occupying state, it will also be turned towards the destruction of the
means of life of Zionist society in all their forms—industrial, agricultural and
financial. The armed violence must seek to destroy the military, political,
economic, financial and ideological institutions of the Zionist occupying state, so
as to prevent all possibility of the growth of a new Zionist society. The aim of
the Palestine liberation war is not only to inflict military defeat but also to




Therefore, al-Fatah's targets of violence were the collective manifestations of Israeli
occupation By committing acts of terror in Israel's home territory, the Fatah would
provoke the occupying authority to introduce repressive measures that would expose to
the world audience the contradictory policies pursued by the Israeli occupier. While
Fatah's acts of terror were intended to be demoralizing, provocative, and disruptive to
the Israelis, they were also intended to have a morale building and a persuasive impact
on the Palestinian masses and their Arab host governments.
Although Fatah continued to represent the Palestinian mainstream in a strategic
sense throughout the period considered, after 1971 they assumed a dissident role in the
both the tactical and the psychological sense. Like the Irgun, the Fatah attacked all
manifestations of the occupying authority in order to expose their illegitimate claim to
a land that rightfully belonged to their oppressed peoples. 16 Furthermore, Fatah did not
commit itself to controlling the dissidents' indiscriminate acts of violence. Moreover,
al-Fatah waged a campaign of indiscriminate terror in the name of Black September, a
role neither feasible nor comparable with the Jewish terrorists, mainstream or dissident.
As time progressed, al-Fatah's sabotage operations failed to generate the intended
effect, there was neither a popular revolution in the occupied territories nor any
indication that the Israeli's were preparing to withdraw. Furthermore, while Battle of
Karameh provided Fatah with legitimacy and prestige among the Palestinian peoples
and the Arab governments, it was one of many Israeli operations that neither the
16By mid-June 1970, the Israeli government announced its official casualties from Arab action since the
1967 War: 543 soliders and 116 civilians killed and 1,763 soldiers and 629 civilians wounded: Cooley, p. 109.
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mainstream nor the dissidents had exploited for any political gain beyond the Middle
East. Inevitably, Fatah's sabotage operations were answered by Israeli reprisals that
targeted fedayeen base camps in the bordering Arab states These reprisals provoked
the targeted countries—Jordan and Lebanon primarily—to place restrictions on the
fedayeen activities, which led to open and violent confrontations between the host
Arab governments and the fedayeen In Jordan for instance, anti-Jordanian activities
had been fomenting as early October 1968, when George Habash adopted the political
motto, "the road to Tel Aviv runs through Amman."' 7 Accordingly, it was not long
until Arafat's policy of non-intervention in Arab politics and Fatah's mainstream role
were put to the test as a result of tension between the dissident PFLP and the
Jordanian government. Before discussing the Jordanian crisis and its effect on the
Palestinian resistance, an introduction to the dissidents is necessary.
B. THE PALESTINIAN DISSIDENTS
The dissident Palestinian factions consist of numerous splinter groups, many of
whom are organized and equipped by the Arab regimes bordering Israel, but for our
purposes we are most concerned with only two. The first is the Popular Front for the
Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) 18 The leader of the PFLP is Dr. George Habash, who
unlike Arafat, was opposed to any territorial compromise. Although Habash recognized
the "Retum"as the desirable end-state, the means by which he employed to achieve
17
Wallach, p. 210.
18The PFLP's international terror has been disguised by numerous names: Popular Struggle Front, Sons of
the Occupied Territory, Arab National Youth Organization, and Organization of Victims of Zionist Occupation.
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that end were decidedly different than Arafat's Habash's PFLP intended to radicalize
the Arab states as a necessary pre-condition to liberating Palestine, whereas Arafat
opposed intervention in Arab state affairs, liberating Palestine would be exclusively a
Palestinian armed struggle. Furthermore, whereas al-Fatah's targets of violence were
legitimized by attacking targets representative of Israeli authority, Habash's PFLP
possessed no clear distinction between combatants and non-combatants. The PFLP's
targets of violence encompassed a broad range of target audiences, from pro-Western
regimes in the Arab world and Anglo-American interests in the region to Zionist
manifestations the world over, innocence was irrelevant. 19 Habash summarizes:
We are struggling against imperialism, especially the American form...We
are struggling against Zionism—and therefore Israel—which is the ally of
imperialism... [and] We are struggling against Arab reaction, because the
governing classes in our countries are either involved in imperialism, or
quite incapable of solving the vital problems of our societies. 20
As Habash strove to radicalize the anti-Zionist sentiment among the Arab states
and promote anti-imperialist revolution by expansion of his attacks outside the Middle
East, Arafat remained content on attacking the Israelis directly. 21 Accordingly, Habash
decided to internationalize the Palestinian problem, because:
We intend to attack Imperialist and Zionist interests wherever we find
them in the world They are all legal targets22...When we set fire to a stone
"Yaari, p. 214.
20Chailand, pp. 165-166.
21Wadi Haddad, until 1978, was the leader of PFLP's international wing: Yonah Alexander and Joshua Sinai,
The PLO Connection (New York: Crane Russak, 1989), pp. 186, 189.
"Christopher Dobson, Black September: Its Short, Violent History (New York: MacMillan, 1974), p. 77.
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in London, those flames are worth the burning down of two kibbutzim
because we force people to ask what is going on. :3
Although the Jewish dissidents conducted international operations in order to arouse
popular support for their cause, they are not comparable in scale to that of the
Palestinian dissidents.
24 But like the Jewish dissidents, the Palestinian dissidents in
general and the PFLP in particular recognized the merits of spectacular and lethal acts
of terror that were capable of gaining world-wide attention In defense of his
international operations, Habash states:
At the time, the Palestinian cause was not well known in the world. There were
probably fewer than half the American people who were even aware of it...We
wanted people to do something that would force people to ask, why we are they
doing this?..We felt we had the right to attack any targets that would harm Israel
and Zionism because they were linked together outside Israel [he boasts]...we
achieved our goal: the Palestinian problem instantly known all over the world 25
The second Palestinian dissident faction was the PFLP-General Command
(PFLP-GC) The PFLP-GC broke away from the PFLP in October 1968, because of a
disagreement over the latter's desire for Arab-unity as a necessary pre-condition to
liberating Palestine. Therefore, while less interested in radicalizing the Arab states, the
PFLP-GC was more interested in arousing international support for the reversal of the
historic processes that brought the Jews to Palestine and displaced the Palestinians. But
like the PFLP, the PFLP-GC led by Ahmed Jibril who, like Habash, was opposed to
23
Laffin, p. 45; and Rayford, p. 444. For original citation: Oriana Fallaci, an Italian Journalist, reporting for
Life, 22 June 1970.
"For a discussion of the Irgun's international operations: Samuel Kate, "The Irgun in Europe," Days of Fire
(New York: Doubleday, 1968), pp. 99-115; and Bell, Terror Out of Zion, pp. 180-181, 282, 303-304.
"Wallach, p. 211.
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territorial compromise and supported the ultimate "Return" of the Palestinian diaspora
to the homeland they were forced to evacuate. Unlike Habash, Jibnl was not
particularly concerned with the political aspects of the struggle, concentrating more on
the military operations, which reflected his prior military service in the Syrian army.
But, like the PFLP, the distinction between combatant and non-combatant was equally
not clear in the PFLP-GC's selection of targets of violence Ultimately, the intent of
the Palestinian dissidents' acts of terror was to arouse anti-Zionist and anti-imperialist
(targets of opportunity) sentiment throughout the World in order to bring both regional
and international pressure to bear on the process of decolonization of the Israeli
imperialist outpost.
C. TARGET AUDIENCES
Again, the Palestinian target audiences were similar to those of the Jews
discussed in the previous chapter. The target audiences included: the target of violence,
the physical or material object of violence; the target of terror, those individuals or
groups of people that identify most with the target of violence by virtue of their close
proximity, either physically or psychologically; the target of demands, the occupying
authority and in some instances his allies; the target of attention, their own people or
those national or international audiences that identify most closely with the target of
violence or the terrorist group, and the target of opportunity, typically neutral or
potentially friendly, foreign or international public opinion.
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The following section will analyze the target audiences' response to specific
incidents of Palestinian acts of terror. The incidents include the February 1970 mid-air
explosion of a SwissAir jetliner, the September 1970 hijacking of three international
airliners to Jordan, the September 1972 kidnapping of Israeli athletes at the Munich
Olympic Games, and the March 1973 seizure of the Khartoum Embassy The
September 1970 hijacking of three international airliners is important for three reasons
First, the incident demonstrates the vulnerability of the international community to acts
of terror in that five governments became immediately involved, the three owning the
aircraft, and the Jordanian and Israeli governments. Second, the hijacking signaled the
beginning of the eventual showdown between the Palestinian dissidents and the
Jordanian government, which concluded in the suspension of Palestinian resistance
activities emanating from Jordan. Third, the mainstream Fatah became embroiled in
the dissident quagmire to such an extent that it too lost Jordan as a sanctuary and
launching pad for sabotage operations in Israel, which forced Fatah to internationalize
its acts of terror under the guise of Black September while consolidating its base
camps in Lebanon.
The remaining incidents are important because they demonstrate the
psychological warfare and the propaganda effect of terrorism on multiple audiences.
The motive behind each of the incidents was driven by either an organizational or
instrumental objective, such as the release of prisoners, the attention of a world forum
for the Palestine question, or the disruption of peace negotiations in which the
Palestinians were not appropriately represented. All incidents were conducted outside
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the source of dispute—being Israel. In each of the cases a wide array of audiences were
involved, which reflected a certain level of identification with either the target of
violence or the terrorist group, or a perceived vulnerability to future acts of Palestinian
terrorism.
From 1968 to 1974, the Palestinian mainstream and dissident terrorist conducted
a combined total of 97 acts of international terrorism, which represented less than 3
percent of all their domestic and international acts of terrorism While the other 97
percent of the incidents were occurring on Israel's home turf, the widening of the
playing field through acts of international terror introduced the spectators necessary to
achieve the desired political result nonetheless. The Israeli-Palestinian dispute was not
going to be resolved by either of the two parties, because neither one nor the other
recognized other's right to exist As the fedayeen continued their raids from Jordan and
Southern Lebanon, the Israeli's did not sit passively awaiting the next fedayeen foray,
they instituted intense counter-measures: air and ground reprisal raids, patrolling,
border police, home guards, fencing, flood lights, paving roads, sentries, and so on.
Consequently, as the Israeli's occupied an active defense, the Palestinian went on the
international strategic offense.
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1. Mid-air Explosion of a SwissAir Jetliner
Fly EL AL and the Popular Front commandos are at your service! 26
This warning from the PFLP was no exaggeration From the summer of
1968 to the spring of 1970, El Al airplanes or El Al passengers in airport terminals
had been the targets of violence on four separate occasions. On 23 July 1968,
members of the PFLP hijacked an El Al 707 from Rome to Tel Aviv and diverted it to
Algeria. This hijacking was followed by other attacks involving El Al aircraft: on 23
December 1968, an El Al 707 was attacked at the Athens international airport; and on
1 8 February 1 969, an El Al airliner preparing to take-off from Zurich to Tel Aviv was
riddled with bullets and fire-bombed. 27
On 29 August 1969, the PFLP shifted its target of violence to the United
States' Trans-World Airlines (TWA), skyjacking a 707 enroute from Pans to Athens.
Then on 21 December 1969, a PFLP attempt to hijack a TWA plane bound from
Rome to New York was foiled by Italian airport security. 28 Accordingly, the PFLP
shifted to more accessible targets of violence by attacking El Al passengers in the
26
Demaris, p. 153.
27By March 1969, the international community had begun to enact preventive measures against hijackings:
the International Civil Aviation Organization voted on 3 March 1969 to consider the subject of "unlawful
interference" with airliners; by January 1970, the International Air Transport Association, representing 103
scheduled airlines had asked governments of its member airlines to seek "UN action in regard to armed
intervention involving aircraft in shceduled service, and on 26 March 1970, the International Federation of
Airline Pilots Associations, representing 44,000 pilots in 54 countries adopted a a resolution threatening reprisals
against states that refused to institute "appropriate punishment" against hijackers. For more details on these and
other initiatives to prevent hijacking and other forms of international terrorism: Lester A. Sobel (ed.), Political
Terrorism Volume 1 (NY: Facts on File, 1975), pp. 279-283.
28A PFLP statement justified this shift to non-Israeli airliners: "Any aircraft of any company that flies to
Israel is a target for us": Dobson, p. 154.
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Munich airport terminal on 10 February 1970 One week later, on 17 February 1970,
the PFLP tried its hand at hijacking again, yet this attempted seizure of El Al airliner
was thwarted as well
Considering the difficulties of the PFLP, the PFLP-GC shifted to
explosives as the most appropriate method of gaining access to the target of violence-
El Al aircraft. On 21 February 1970, in its first international operation, the PFLP-GC
planted a bomb on a SwissAir jetliner enroute from Zurich to Tel Aviv The bomb
exploded in mid-air sending smoke into the crew's compartment, which clouded the
pilot's vision and he crashed. All 47 passengers and crew were killed, including 14
Israelis and six Americans On the same day a PFLP bomb exploded in an Austrian











The Bombing of a SwissAir Jetliner Target Audiences
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In combination, these recent attacks and the preceding assaults on
international airlines and El Al agencies provoked a wide array of responses from the
target audiences Figure 6-1 above illustrates the connection between the target of
violence and the various target audiences The Palestine Liberation Organization (the
target of attention) condemned the attacks and claimed to have no connection with the
operations. Indicative of the target of opportunity's attitude toward the recent wave of
Palestinian assaults on international airlines was their suspension of airtraffic to Israel
and restrictions on Arab flights into their airports. On 22 February 1970, several
European airlines suspended cargo flights to Israel, SwissAir imposing the longest ban
lasting until 5 March. Furthermore, the Swiss government placed restrictions on entry
into Switzerland of Arab nationals. On 23 February, Olympic Airways of Greece
followed suit with a similar ban. On 24-25 February 1970, ground crews at London's
Heathrow airport refused to service airlines of 8 Arab countries and Israel's El Al
airline for apparent safety reasons. Israel, as the target of demands, responded as
expected, raiding fedayeen staging areas in Jordan on 5 March and base camps in
southern Lebanon on the 7th of March.
While the restrictions on air travel to Israel, Israel's reprisals, and the
PLO's denial of involvement are indicative of the negative consequences of the
Palestinian dissidents' act of violence, there were two intended consequences that were
consistent with the Palestinian dissidents' organizational and instrumental objectives.
First, the dissident's bombing was intended to disrupt the on-going peace process
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between the Israeli, Jordanian, and Egyptian governments in which the PLO hoped to
be a party :9 The dissidents were adamantly opposed to a compromise solution that
could potentially be worked out if the PLO were to take part in the peace process
Therefore, the indiscriminate bombing of the SwissAir jetliner undermined the PLO's
possible participation in spite of their condemnation of the act and the apparent lack of
knowledge The second intended consequence was the building of organizational
morale among their Palestinian and Arab constituents. Invariably, the scale of the
international operations provided the Palestinian's in the refugee camps the only
glimmer of hope for an eventual solution to their desperate situation, because Fatah's
border raids were consistently answered with Israeli reprisals to whom the Palestinian
masses bore the brunt.
In May 1970, President Nasser of Egypt invited the United States to renew
political initiatives in spite of the Palestinian campaign of international terror. On 6
August 1970, Egypt agreed to a cease-fire with Israel, which went into affect the
following day. This action closed the Egyptian-Israeli border to further fedayeen
infiltration, which increased the importance of the Jordanian border exponentially. The
fedayeen raids from Jordan had provoked numerous Israeli reprisals, which destablized
the Jordanian government considerably. Accordingly, King Hussein of Jordan placed
29On 18 December 1969, US Secretary of State William Rogers expanded the planned settlement of the
Egypt-Israeli (Roger's Plan) dispute by devising a parallel settlement between Jordan and Israel. The Rogers Plan
(which was accepted by Egypt and not by Israel) proposed that Israel withdraw behind her pre- 1967 borders,
and that the UN Security Council Resolution 242 of November 1967 be implemented. The PLO rejected
Resolution 242 because it referred to the Palestinians as refugees and not to their right to return to their
homeland.
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restrictions on the Palestinians' activities: limiting them to certain areas, prohibiting the
carrying of arms, and wearing of uniforms. From June to September 1970, the
Palestinian dissidents' demanded greater freedom of maneuver, which led to open
clashes with the Jordanian military who were not willing to submit to the dissidents'
desires (refer Chronology, Appendix B, Table B-l). Furthermore, the PFLP called on
the Palestinian masses to revolt against Hussein's government. Amid these clashes and
anti-Hussein pronouncements, Yasir Arafat found himself further drawn from the
mainstream mantel as indicated by his Fatah bearing the brunt of the casualties~200
dead and 500 wounded. 30 Therefore, it wasn't surprising that the mainstream Fatah
refused to take coercive action against the dissidents. Ultimately, the Jordanian
government and the Palestinian resistance showdown came during Black September
2. The Hijacking of Three International Airliners to Jordan
On 6 September 1970, the PFLP hijacked a SwissAir DC-8, a TWA 707
and PanAm 707. 31 The SwissAir and the TWA 707 were flown to Dawson field in
Jordan, while the PanAm 707 was eventually flown to Cairo where it was blown up
minutes after the crew and passengers disembarked. The PFLP held the 306 occupants
of the SwissAir and the TWA airliners as hostages for the release of imprisoned
commandos in Israel, Switzerland and West Germany. A PFLP spokesman stated that
the TWA and the PanAm airliners were seized:
30Rayford, p. 450.
31Wallach, p. 1 5 1 . A fourth hijacking of an El Al plane bound for Amsterdam was thwarted when Israeli
skypolice shot one and arrested the other (Leila Khaled). For a full account of this hijacking attempt: Dobson,
pp. 32-33.
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To give the Americans a lesson after they supported Israel after all these years
and retaliation for the US peace initiative in the Middle East
The spokesman added that the SwissAir hijacking was in retaliation for the sentencing
of three terrorists for their 18 February 1969 attack on a plane in Zurich (see above). 32
On 9 September 1970, a British Overseas Airways Corporation VC-10 was
hijacked after taking off from Bahrain and eventually joined the SwissAir and TWA
planes at Jordan's Dawson field A PFLP spokesman stated the plane and the 105
passengers were being held for the release of a imprisoned female commando in a
London jail. In less than three days, the PFLP had directly involved the three
governments represented by the aircraft (US, Great Britain, Switzerland), two holding
Palestinian prisoners (Israel and West Germany), and the Jordanian government in a
terrorist drama that lasted until 25 September 1970. 33
The successful hijacking of four airliners was clearly the most spectacular
act of international terrorism to date, but did it produce the intended consequences: did
the target audiences respond positively toward the Palestinian cause Figure 6-2 depicts
the target audiences, but what it can not show is each audiences' level of identification
with the target of violence. As early as 8 September, the International community (the
target of opportunity) became directly involved. 34 The International Red Cross
32For details of the trial: Edgar OTBallance, The Language of Violence: The Blood Politics of Terrorism (San
Rafael, CA: Presidio Press, 1979), pp. 72-74.
"Lester A. Sobel (ed.), Political Violence Volume 1 (New York: Facts on File, 1975), pp. 26-28.
34As a result, on 16 December 1970, the Convention for Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft met in
the Hague to redefine aircraft jurisdication and modify the offense of aircraft piracy to conform to specific
requirements: Louis G. Fields, Jr, Terrorism: Summary of Applicable US and International Law," In Yonah
Alexander and Robert A. Kilmarx (eds.) Political Terrorism and Business: The Threat and Response (NY:
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The Hijacking of Three International Airliners: Target Audiences
established a committee to negotiate a release of the hostages. Meanwhile, airports
around the world tightened security in order to avoid being one of the PFLP's future
targets of violence. The US, British and the Swiss ownership of the aircraft was
indicative of a high level of identification with the target of violence, which pulled
them into the fray as the target of demands; typically a spot reserved for Israel.
Furthermore, the Jordanian government can be considered along with the others as a
target of demands, for the obvious reason that the three hijacked aircraft were on its
Praeger Publishers, 1979), pp. 162-163.
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territory Furthermore, although Figure 6-2 does not illustrate any significant changes
in the targets of attention or opportunity, the fact that there were 580 total passengers
victimized by the hijacking had to represent more than the seven countries directly
involved Therefore, the propaganda effect of this incident was weak, whereas the
psychological warfare effect was intense due to the number of audiences that identified
with the target of violence.
The general response was outrage The Kuwaiti ambassador to the United
States stated that the hijacking "do not serve the cause of the Palestinian people." And
an Egyptian newspaper summed up the Arab attitude of the target of attention:
One of the main goals of the battle is to gam world public opinion on the side of
the Palestinian struggle and not to lose it...It is evident that the attack on
international civil aviation does not encourage world feeling of solidarity with
the Palestinian cause.
The PLO, exercising its mainstream muscle, suspended the PFLP's Executive
Committee membership. 35 The Jordanian government (the target of demands) was
determined to liquidate the dissidents. They placed a reward of $12,000 for the heads
of Habash and Hawatmeh, leaders of the dissident PFLP and the PDFLP respectively. 36
On 7 September fighting broke out between the Jordanian Army and the fedayeen,
which lasted for 21 days. During this crisis, Arafat compromised his mainstream
position by siding with the dissidents' demand for popular revolution and dissolution
of the national authority in Jordan. As Arafat became more enmeshed in the dissident




quagmire, he stated "the Palestine Revolution will fight to defend itself to the end and
until the fascist military regime is overthrown." 37
On 16 September 1970, Hussein appointed a military government charged
with the duty of driving the Palestinian resistance out of the country As clashes
intensified and 54 passengers remained hostages, the US, Israel, and Syria planned to
intervene. The US Sixth Fleet was ninety miles off the Israeli coast, with the aircraft
carrier John F Kennedy enroute. The US 8th Infantry Division and a task force from
the 82d Airborne Division were put on alert. The Israeli army moved to the Jordanian
border. The Syrians sent in a tank brigade, which the Jordanian airforce beat back. 38
On 25 September, the Arab League arranged a truce, which left the Jordanian military
to clean out the remainder of the fedayeen base camps. Subsequently, the remaining 54
hostages were released in exchange for seven terrorists held in Britain, West Germany,
and Switzerland (16 on the 15th, 32 on the 26th, and 6 on the 29th of September); the
Israelis did not release any Palestinian prisions. And the three aircraft were blown up,
at a cost of $35 million dollars. 39
The unconventional hijacking that began on 6 September 1970 nearly cost
the Middle East another conventional war. The effect on all target audiences was
psychological warfare, the PFLP had no friendly audiences. The international
"Rayford, p. 455.
38
Jillian Becker, The PLO: The Rise and Fall of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (London:
Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1984), p. 76; Dobson, pp. 34-36.
"CBallance, Language of Violence, p. 91; and Richard L. Clutterbuck, "The Politics of Air Piracy," Living
With Terrorism (New York: Arlington House, 1975), p. 101.
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community continued to express indignation for the act. On 1 October 1970, the
International Civil-Aviation Organization adopted a resolution stating that governments
failing to cooperate with international extradition law and safety of aircraft and
passengers would be suspended from international civil air transportation services. The
Jordanian crisis concluded with both Arafat and King Hussein losing substantial
flexibility over the Palestinian problem The fedayeen would lose Jordan as a base of
operations from which it could no longer launch attacks into Israel Organizationally,
the Palestinian resistance was bankrupt, the confrontation with the Jordanian military
cost the fedayeen the largest land border with Israel and constrained them to Lebanon
Instrumentally, international and domestic public opinion hardened and the Palestinian
cause became associated more with terrorism than with the desperate people living in
the squalor of refugee camps. By June 1971, the Jordanian Army concluded its
"maneuvers with live ammunition," killing over 200 fedayeen and taking captive
twenty-three hundred The Jordanian Army's harsh treatment of the fedayeen inevitably
cost Hussein the allegiance of the West Bank Palestinians, but at a price he was
willing to bear. 40 This was Black September, a name taken in revenge by al-Fatah to
further internationize the Palestinian problem. 41
40Ovid Demaris, Brothers In Blood: The International Terrorist Network (New York: Charles Scribner's,
1977), pp. 172-174.
41
Black September's first (revenge) operation was the assassination of the Jordanian Prime Minister Wasfi
Tal in Cairo on 28 November 1971. Wasfi Tal was the Jordanian military commander who was in charge of the
drive to rid the country of the fedayeen from September 1970 to July 1971.
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3. The Munich Massacre
In a summer when no body thought anything much was
happening, and when the only flame that has really been
attracting attention is the Olympic one, the fires of potential
conflict in the Middle East...have quietly started to burn lower,
and the world may be much easier... The Economist, 2 SEP 72.
In the early morning hours of 5 September 1972, eight members of the
Palestinian Black September organization entered the Israeli dormitory in Munich's
Olympic Village, taking hostage 9 Israeli athletes. The subsequent 22 hour drama was
played out by extensive news coverage of approximately 6000 journalists, who
generated front page headlines and live broadcasts of the hooded terrorists on the
balcony of the Israeli dormitory. This was the most sensational terrorist act ever
committed, and television brought it into the comfort of home. Neither the before
mentioned Dawson field hijacking nor the Irgun's spectacular bombing of the King
David Hotel were a match for this symbolically devastating act. The presence of the
Games in West Germany was intended to erase the memory of Hitler's 1936 Berlin
Games and one of Hitler's most notorious extermination centers just minutes from
Munich, Dachau. 42 Ultimately, the drama culminated in a gun battle between the
terrorists and German security forces, resulting in the deaths of all nine hostages and
five of the eight terrorists, the remaining three terrorists were taken into German
"Furthermore, the kidnapping was a further embarrassment of the W. German government, because they had
coined the slogan "The Games of Joy and Peace." CBallance, The Language of Violence, p. 117; and Cooley,
p. 126.
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The Munich Kidnapping: Target Audiences
On 7 September, 1972, the Israeli Olympic team returned to Tel Aviv with
their slain comrades in coffins Mrs Golda Meir thanked the West German government
for its efforts and submitted statement condemning the International Olympic
43Note: two other Israelis were killed by the terrorists during the initial seizure of the athletes. Furthermore,
one of the Israeli athletes killed was David Berger from Cleveland Ohio. For a full account, see: Dobson, pp.
80-88; Laffin, pp. 152-156; OBallance, The Language of Violence, pp. 115-125; and Serge Groussard, The
Blood of Israel: The Massacre of the Israeli Athletes, the Olympics, 1972 (NY: William Morrow, 1975). See
also: The Economist, Sept 9, 72.
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Committee for continuing the Games. Indicative of the indignation felt by the target of
demands, Yosef Burg, the Minister of Interior, stated that "Israel's blood is not for the
taking." Subsequently, Golda Meir added her feeling when she stated that "we have no
choice but to strike at them," 44 which manifested in the "biggest-ever" Israeli air
strikes on Palestinian base camps in Lebanon and Syria, killing an unknown number of
people.
45 King Hussein of Jordan was the only Arab target of attention to openly
condemn the incident He stated on Amman radio that "the crime was planned and
carried out by sick minds that had nothing in common with humanity " 46 On 14
September, The PLO declared that it was not responsible for the Munich killings,
insisting that their objective "was only aimed at pressuring Israel to release detained
guerrillas from Israeli jails." Yet, Arafat's Voice of Palestine broadcasted:
All glory to the men of Black September. The gold medal you have won in
Munich is for the Palestine nation47 ... The world must accept violence as the way
to counter Israeli violence.
48
While these contradictory claims made it hard to determine where the
Palestinians stood on the Munich incident, the Libyan government made its position
clear. On 12 September 1972, the Libyan government provided the five slain terrorists
a hero's welcome and a burial with honors, and Qaddafi reportedly gave Arafat a $5
44Dobson, p. 88; Cooley, p. 129; and Rayford, p. 479.
458 September 1972: Lester A. Sobel (ed.), Palestinian Impasse: Arab Guerrillas and International Terror
(New York: Facts on File, 1977), pp. 121-22; and Cooley, p. 129.
*6The Economist, "Black September," 9 September 1972, p. 34; and Cooley, p. 128.




million reward for the success of the operation. 49 Nonetheless, Arab sentiment
eventually turned against the Palestinian terrorists in general and international public
opinion hardened toward the Palestinian cause in particular 50 Letters to Time
magazine, 2 October 1972 were indicative of international public opinion:
Once again, the legitimate interests of the Arab people have been betrayed—by
Arabs. ..If the Arabs have had an argument to which reasonable people would
listen, it is now gone for ever. 51
The Israeli, the United States, and the West German governments created special
counter-terrorist organizations in order to deal more effectively with similar situations
in the future.
52 The Israeli government fired three senior officials of the Shin Bet, the
Department of Internal Security, and established a special anti -terrorist unit composed
of army and secret service personnel—the Wrath of God (Mitzan Elohim) 53 The United
States submitted a draft convention and resolution to the United Nations General
Assembly regarding terrorist acts commited by individuals and their prevention and
prosecution. 54 Similarly, West Germany's Secretary General, Kurt Waldheim called on
49
Laffin, p. 155; Dobson, p. 87; and CBallance, The Language of Violence, p. 124.
50Rayford, 478.
51Cited in: Laffin, p. 156.
"By January 1974, European anti -terrorist units and police had captured 50 Arab terrorists, yet they were
able to obtain few convictions. Of the 50 captured, only 7 were convicted and 7 awaited trial, the others were
released for various reasons: Paul Wilkinson, "Terrorism versus Liberal Democracy: The Problems of Repsonse,"
In Shaw et al. (eds.) Ten Yers of Terrorisn: Collected Views (NY: Crane, Russak, & Co., 1979),p. 28; and
Sobel, p. 68.
"Dobson, p. 86; and CBallance, The Language of Violence, p. 125.
54
For a discussion of the UN dilberation on the US proposal: M. Cherif Bassiouni (ed), International
Terrorism and Political Crimes (IL: Charles C. Thomas, 1973), pp. 496-501. For domestic legislation on
terrorism—On October 24, 1972 the US amended the Criminal Code (Title 18, USC) by adding crimes directed
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the UN to institute "measures to prevent terrorism and other forms of violence which
endanger or take innocent human lives or jeopardize fundamental freedoms. " 5 ~ Further
indications of the West German government's attitude toward terrorism in general and
Palestinian terrorism in particular manifested in the subsequent deportation of 100
militant Palestinian university students and the disbanding of the General Union of
Palestinian Workers and the General Union of Palestinian Students. 56 Although the
Soviet Union recognized the rights of the Palestinian people to self-determination,
Andrei Gromyko, the Soviet Foreign Minister, condemned the act stating:
It is certainly impossible to condon the acts of terrorism by certain elements
from among the participants in the Palestinian movement which have led,
notably, to the recent tragic events in Munich ...These criminal actions deal a
blow also to the national interests and aspirations of the Palestinians... Acts of
violence which serve no positive ends and cause loss of human life. 57
Like the Jordanian crisis, the Munich kidnapping had a minimal
propaganda effect, and had a maximum psychological warfare impact Instrumentally,
the act was disruptive, suspending the Olympic Games for two days. Yet, the Games
against foreign officials and official guests of the United States: Louis G. Fields, Jr., "Terrorism: Summary of
Applicable US and International Law," In Yonah Alexander and Robert A. Kilmarx (eds), Political Terrorism
and Business: The Threat and Response (NY: Praeger Publishers, 1979), p. 161-162.
"Sobel, p. 279.
56As mentioned in Chapter II, Arafat attended the University of Stuttgart where the General Union of
Palestinian Students formed its European branch (the other major branch was in Egypt). Consequently, the
Palestinians had a relatively large support base in W. Germany. As of 1972, there were 4000 Palestinians
studying in W. German universities and 37,000 Palestinians working in German factories. However, on 29
October 1972, the West German government gave into the Palestinian terrorists demands during the hijacking of
a Lufthansa airliner and threat to blow it up and kill 17 passengers if the three Munich BSO terrorists were not
released. The West German government released the terrorists.
"Sobel, p. 280.
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did go on with the flags of 122 participating nations flying at half-mast. In the end, the
Palestinians did not get a single medal out of the 1,109 medals awarded What they
did get was the Wrath of God, the Israeli anti -terrorist unit that systematically killed
six Palestinian leaders in Europe over the course of the next year and an international
community turned cold to the Palestinian cause (see Chronology, Appendix B, Table
B-l). 58 Palestinian terrorism had won few friends and made many enemies Yet,
Munich did provide the Palestinians access to the media, whereby their cause was
heard. But the cause remained faceless. The plight of the Palestinian people became
obscured behind the mask of hooded terrorist. This became the image of the
Palestinian problem, a problem many wanted to ignore. The target audiences had an
image to attach to the Palestinian cause—the hooded terrorist on the balcony of the
Olympic village—the challenge to the Palestinian leadership became one of changing
images.
Organizationally, the wave of hijackings and Munich did produce the
intended effect among a small minority within target of opportunity. Unquestionably,
these actions had a morale building and a competitive impact on the Palestinians in the
camps and international terrorist community. The dissident Palestinian factions' and
Black September's spectacular acts of violence had become the standard by which all
domestic and international terrorism would be measured. Nonetheless, the Palestinian
"Dobson, pp. 89-109.
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question in the occupied territories was left unanswered The desired political result
was neither generated by Palestinian mainstream nor dissident terrorist action
4. The Seizure of the Khartoum Embassy
On 21 February 1973, Israeli Phantoms shot down a Libyan Boeing 727
lost in a sandstorm over the Israeli-occupied Sinai, killing the 106 passengers and
crew. The world was outraged Despite Israeli claims that warnings were issued to the
Libyan plane, the incident provided the Arab world in general and the Palestinians in
particular an immediate propaganda coup. Qaddafi vowed to seek revenge stating: "by
all objective standards the deliberate shooting down of a civilian airliner cannot be
allowed to pass unpunished ." This killing of innocence blemished Israel's reputation
and the Arab nations felt that for the first time world opinion had turned in their
favor.
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Yet, the success of terrorism as a psychological operation hinges on the
ability to exploit the negative and enhance the positive. This Israeli action provided the
Palestinians an opportunity to enhance the shift of world opinion by provoking
additional acts of Israeli retaliation that would exploit the negative image this atrocity
projected on Israel. Nonetheless, the propaganda potential of this Israeli atrocity was
erased by the seizure of the Khartoum Embassy on 1 March 1973. 60
59Dobson, pp. 111-112.
^ote: Laffin points out the symbolic significance of the day, it was the eve of the first anniversary of the
peace settlement of the 17-year war with the southern Sudanese: Laffin, p. 157.
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On the evening of 1 March 1973 during a farewell dinner for the departing
US Deputy Chief of Mission, Mr George Curtis Moore, members of the Black
September Organization stormed the Saudi Embassy in Khartoum. Once the initial
shock of their assault wore off, the terrorists made their demands. They demanded the
release of sixteen Black Septembensts being held in Jordan, Sirhan Sirhan in the
United States, Baader-Meinhof prisoners in West Germany, and various other Arab
commandos held Israeli jails. In exchange, the Black September terrorists held hostage
five embassy diplomats: the Saudi, the Jordanian, the US, and the Belgian charge
d'affaires, the US Ambassador to Sudan, and Mr. Moore for whom the affair was
dedicated The negotiations continued through the night, but the Israeli, the US and the
Jordanian governments refused to give in to the terrorist's demands. 61
Figure 6-4 below illustrates the audience involvement. President Nixon's
statement was representative of the attitude of the target of demands: "The US would
do everything we can" to have the hostages released, but it would "not pay
blackmail." 62 Similarly, the Jordanian Foreign Minister stated "the Jordanian
Government will not give in to pressure, no matter what the circumstances; nor is it
ready to bargain over any demands." 63 Subsequently, amid staled negotiations, the
terrorists shot and killed the two American diplomats and the one Belgian diplomat
Again, the Palestinian terror produced a psychological warfare effect. The US and the
61 Sobel, pp. 59-60; Dobson, pp. 112-115; Laffin, pp. 157-160; and Clutterback, p. 41.
"Sobel, p. 60; and Laffin, p. 159.
"Laffin, p. 159.
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Israelis became openly committed to liquidating the dissidents, manifest in the CIA's
secret involvement in subsequent operations against the Palestinian terrorists. The
targets of attention and opportunity were appalled President Sadat of Egypt said in
disbelief:
We always do it No sooner do we gain an advantage [referring to the Israeli
downing of the Libyan airliner] than we destroy it ourselves No sooner do we
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"Dobson, p. 112.
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The Saudi Arabian king, one of the principal financiers of the fedayeen activity for the
past decade, described the operation as "harmful to the Arab cause." 65 Although the
PLO condemned the attack and Arafat expressed that Fatah was not connected in any
way, a Sudanese raid on the PLO headquarters in Khartoum uncovered documents
linking both the PLO and al-Fatah to the operation. Accordingly, the Sudanese
government banned the PLO and al-Fatah from its country. While Arafat suspected
CIA involvement in the Sudanese counter-terrorist activities (which may have been
true), his worst fears were yet to come. Meanwhile, Black September issued a
statement after the Khartoum affair:
War against Zionist and American imperialism and their agents in the Arab
world will continue. Our rifles will remain brandished against both the substance
and the shadow. 66
And that they did. During the remainder of March 1973 and once in April,
the Black September attacked targets of violence representative of Zionist and US
interests in Lebanon, the US, and France before an Israeli counter-terrorist force struck
(see Chronology Appendix B, Table B-l for details). On 10 April 1973, Israeli
commandos raided Palestinian bases in the center of Beirut and in the coastal town of
Saida, in southern Lebanon. Twelve persons were killed during the assault including
three key Palestinian leaders. Furthermore, documents found during the raid identified
Palestinian contacts in Israel and the occupied territories, which eventually dealt a




Significantly, this operation was the first Israeli anti-terrorist operation that was openly
admitted, as demonstrated by Mrs Golda Meir's statement before the Knesset, "We
killed the murders who were planning to kill again " As Dobson puts it:
Individual assassinations were judged to be within the limits set by world
opinion and American pressure but anything larger was taboo But then came
Khartoum and, backed by the blazing anger of the United States, the Israelis saw
the green light for a major operation inside the city. 67
he Sudanese raid on the PLO headquarters and the Israeli raid on Beirut led the Arab
world to suspect US direct involvement in these major counter-terrorist windfalls.
Arafat continued the suspicion and his threats. "Revenge will come soon...and it will
be terrible." The Voice of Palestine announced "death to Americans." 68
5. Summary
From the hijackings in the late 1960s to the seizure of the Saudi Embassy
in Khartoum, the Palestinian resistance engaged in a campaign of terror that produced
psychological warfare effects on both domestic and international audiences. The
hijacking of the four international airliners in September 1970 gripped the world's
attention for over three weeks, but failed to generate an answer to the Palestinian
question. During this incident, the mainstream Fatah became embroiled in the dissident
PFLP's quagmire with the Jordanian government, which eventually led to loss of
Jordan as a sanctuary and a launching pad for raids into Israeli territory. While





in the Munich massacre And again, the world was captivated, but the message was
blurred behind the mask of Black September The world knew of only the Palestinian
terrorist who threatened an international sporting event dedicated to peace among
nations The response was outrage and the Israelis went to war against the Palestinian
terrorists. But once again Black September struck at Khartoum and this time the
United States became more directly involved, facilitating the Sudanese and Israeli
counter-terrorist raids The Palestinian resistance became victims of the technological
age, believing that guns, bombs, and planes could somehow combine to produce the
answer to their problem The answer was not forthcoming because the targets of
attention and opportunity were not propagandized, they were victimized and feeling




Terrorism provided the Jewish and the Palestinian resistance a means to convey
a political message to multiple target audiences and compensated for their physical and
material weaknesses. The key to the Zionist's successful use of terrorism was the
targeting of the occupying authority's sources of power, which included Britain's
popular constituency and the United States By comparison, Palestinian terrorism failed
to appropriately target similar Israeli sources of power, victimizing these constituencies
at the expense of their own oppressed peoples destined to remain under occupied
control and in the squalor of the refugee camps. The following will conclude with a
few comments on the differences between the Zionist and the Palestinian terrorist
campaigns and the unique features that accounted for the former's success.
The first period considered the British Administration's response to the Jewish
Revolt in Mandate Palestine from 1944 to 1947, during which the indigenous Jewish
minority population and the immigrating European Jewish community were attempting
to establish a homeland in all or part of Palestine. The second period considered was
the Israeli response to the Palestinian campaign of terror from 1968 to 1973, during
which the Palestinian diaspora attempted to reclaim the homeland they were forced to
evacuate. Consequently, during each of their respective periods, first the Zionists and
then the Palestinians, each attempted to lay claim to the same territory. The distinct
difference between the two cases was whether or not the terrorist's "inevitable" victory
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was within the realm of the possible The European anti-semitism, the Holocaust, and
international Zionism were historic forces that made the Jewish terrorists' inevitable
well within the possible. By contrast, the Palestinian terrorists wanted to reverse the
processes of history by radicalizing Arab nationalism and viewing the Jewish state in
Palestine as a Western colonial outpost, which made their inevitable not entirely
possible
The intent of this analysis was to demonstrate how terrorism is a psychological
operation, and as a psychological operation, how terrorism generates psychological
warfare and propaganda effects on specific target audiences. The propaganda effects
are informative, persuasive, and compelling on neutral or friendly audiences, whereas
the psychological warfare effects are disruptive, demonstrative, and provocative to
enemy or hostile audiences. Each of these effects parallels the conventional wisdom's
instrumental and organizational perspectives of terrorism The instrumental perspective
is essentially oriented toward psychological warfare; the disruptive, disorienting,
demonstrative, provocative, and vengeance related functions of terrorism. The
organizational perspective relates to the propaganda impact of terronst violence; the
morale-building, competitive, coercive, and persuasive, group-centric functions of
terrorism. Ultimately, these perspectives were synthesized within the preceding
analytical framework that considered the psychological warfare and propaganda effects
of terrorism on neutral, friendly, and hostile audiences.
In both cases, we observed the organizational and instrumental functions of
terrorism. The basis of Jewish and Palestinian terrorism was instrumental reason,
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which manifest in the use of terrorism to achieve a rational political end—statehood
As a strategy of a minority, terrorism compensated for the inherent organizational
weaknesses of the two resistance movements: their dispersed populations, lack of
conventional means to confront the occupying authority, and the inability to use less
violent means of political expression due to their disenfranchised political status.
Consequently, terrorism provided both of the resistance movements an organizational
means to generate support and compensate for weakness among its own constituents
and potential sympathizers, and an instrumental means to confront the occupying
authority.
Ultimately, Zionist inspired terrorism in mandate Palestine was instrumental in
the forcing British withdrawal and subsequent establishment of a Jewish state. By
contrast, Palestinian terrorism failed to force a similar Israeli response and has been
unable reclaim any portion of the territory they were forced to evacuate. Although
recent developments have made this previous point somewhat negligible, the purpose
of this inquiry was to illustrate the fundamental differences between the two
campaigns in order to reveal to how Jewish inspired terrorism motivated audiences to
respond consistent with their inteneded consequences and Palestinian terrorism did not.
Jewish terrorism was effective because it avoided the enemy's strengths; targeted its
weaknesses: the British sources of power rather than center of power; and most
importantly anticipated target audience response and controlled for the psychological
effects multiple audiences. By comparison, the Palestinians neither targeted the Israeli
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sources of power nor controlled for the psychological effects on domestic target
audiences in general and international target audiences in particular.
Ultimately, terrorism represents Clausewitz's politics by other means where
"propaganda of the deed" and "armed struggle" are the only means of conveying a
message to specific audiences The terrorist's armed struggle serves as the instrumental
means to achieve the desired political ends, whereas propaganda of the deed is
generally an organizational means of arousing support for the terrorist's cause.
Instrumentally, the provocative, disruptive, and demonstrative characteristics of
terrorism are designed to destroy the will of the enemy. For instrumental terror to have
the intended consequences it must directly victimize the targets of terror and demands,
while controlling for the psychological warfare effects on the targets of attention and
opportunity. The psychological warfare effects on the targets of attention and
opportunity are regulated by selecting a target of violence whose identification with
the targets of attention and opportunity is low. Only in the case of the Irgun's
campaign against the British judicial system did we observe this dynamic at work,
where audiences not victimized by the dissident's terror were free to relish in British
humiliation. By comparison, the Palestinian's propaganda windfall after the Israeli
downing of a Libyan airliner was subsequently undermined by the psychological
warfare effects of the seizure of the Saudi Embassy in Khartoum. The level of
discrimination in the selection of the target of violence was the key feature of Jewish
terrorism that controlled for the psychological warfare effects on the targets of
attention and opportunity. Ultimately, Palestinian terrorism created a psychological
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state of mind among many audiences; in the terrorist's mind total war, the Israeli
government's mind annoyance, in their public's mind a horror, and in the world's
chaos—a phenomenon with a psychological life of its own.
Therefore, the violent impact of terrorism has the potential to assume a life of its
own, independent of the perpetrators intentions The act generates a message, framed
in the context of the historical moment, which is transmitted by the media to multiple
audiences. These audiences shape this message through preexisting images and
analogies, which in turn shape their response. For audience response to be positive
relative to the terrorist's cause, it must be a component of a larger strategic campaign
that is cognizant of the images and analogies held by their target audiences. The
number of audiences and the environment was infinitely more complex for the
Palestinians than the Jews. The expanse of electronic media served as an asset and a
liability for the Palestinian terrorists. For example, a typical American family could
watch footage of US soldiers being killed in Vietnam on one television channel, and
see a Palestinian terrorist hijacking a plane from a European airport on another. While
hijacking could not control for multiple viewing audiences, it did serve as an effective
transmitter of the Palestinian message during a period when there was intense
competition for media coverage with a multitude of world events (i.e. Vietnam,
Soviets in Czechoslovakia, student demonstrations, etc.). By comparison, the Jewish
terrorists did not have the benefit of visual imagery in order to portray their oppressive
circumstances to a world audience.
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The benefits of the media and the target selection were factors considered by
both the mainstream and dissident leadership. The Jewish resistance possessed a
strategic framework that appropriately considered these factors relative to the domestic
and international audiences, whereas the Palestinians possessed only a moderate
consideration of the importance of the media's ability to shape a particular violent
event. No matter the incident, from the Irgun's bombing of the King David Hotel to
Black September's kidnapping of the Israeli athletes at Munich, acts of violence
perceived as indiscriminate were counter-productive—possessing little propaganda
value. In both cases, international outrage precipitated a drive to liquidate the
terrorists But only in the Zionist case did we observe a concerted effort by the
mainstream to control the dissidents' indiscriminate acts of terror. During the two
Saesons, the Zionist mainstream pinned Jew against Jew at a cost of taming the
dissidents, which facilitated further dialogue with the British and the international
Zionist community, at a price low enough to reap the psychological benefits of more
highly selective dissident terrorist acts. The mainstream Palestinians, on the other
hand, were not willing to tame the dissident fringe, which led to the near destruction
of the entire Palestinian resistance movement during their clashes with the Jordanian
military in 1970 and the Israeli reprisal raids on southern Lebanon and Beirut
Jewish terrorism was successful in achieving its ultimate political objective,
because of their ability to anticipate audience response and indirectly attack sources of
British power and prestige The British Administration in Palestine derived its power
not from the Mandate, but from the British public and Great Britain's alliance with the
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United States Consequently, the social and economic devastation brought on by the
second World War II increased Britain's dependence on both of these sources of
power The Jewish terrorists avoided direct confrontation with British security forces,
attacking targets of symbolic of British prestige The short-term objective of the
Zionist mainstream was to drive a wedge between British and American public opinion
by attacking targets symbolic of British immigration policy and exploiting the Mandate
Authority's tendency to over-react m the face of continued dissident violence.
The efficacy of Jewish and Palestinian terrorist campaigns depended on the roles
played by mainstream and dissident factions. The mainstream and dissident roles for
both the Jews and the Palestinians were remarkably similar. The mainstream typically
espoused some form of territorial compromise, a "Return" (immigration) of the
diaspora, the maintenance of diplomatic dialogue with either regional or international
powers, and the endorsement of the selective use of terrorism against the
manifestations of authority in the occupied region. The dissidents espoused the indirect
approach by raising the conscious recognition of the plight of their peoples to
international audiences In doing so, they rejected territorial compromise and
negotiations with the occupying authority, but like the mainstream they supported the
idea of the "Return" of their peoples to historic Palestine. Furthermore, the dissidents
were less discriminate in their selection of a target of violence (attacking all
manifestations of the occupying authority) than the mainstream terrorists. Despite these
similarities, however, there are some unique differences that deserve mention. These
differences will be indicative of the efficacy of the Jewish campaign of terror.
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The Jewish mainstream's use of the Haganah to attack manifestations of British
immigration policy was more selective in nature than can be attributed to the
Palestinian mainstream, al-Fatah. Al-Fatah's choice of attacking all manifestations of
Israeli authority was more like the dissident Irgun than the mainstream Haganah. Ben-
Gunon recognized the counter-productive aspects of terrorist violence that could
provoke British reprisal He, therefore, restrained the Haganah's actions to the initiation
of incidents that would frustrate British authority and not provoke a counter-productive
response By contrast, Arafat exhibited no such restraint in his attacks on the
manifestations of Israeli authority, doing more to harden Israeli resolve than to weaken
their grip on control Furthermore, Ben-Gunon would not be tarred with the dissident
brush, which led to open collaboration with the British dunng their drive to liquidate
the dissident, facilitating the maintenance of diplomatic dialogue and exploiting
controlled dissident violence to political advantage. By contrast, Arafat was not willing
to pin Fatah against the dissident Palestinian factions. He compromised his mainstream
platform by getting inextricably involved in the dissident operations in Jordan (1970)
such that he nearly sacrificed the entire Palestinian resistance.
The Irgun, on the other hand, differed from the Palestinian dissidents in one
important respect. Begin understood that in order to gain and maintain popular support,
tactics were never used with the intention of creating non-combatant casualties. As a
general rule, when attacks were conducted in close proximity to civilian by-standers
warnings were issued. Neither the Palestinian mainstream nor the Palestinian dissidents
possessed a similar rule. In fact, the distinction between combatants and non-
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combatants was never quite clear regarding both Palestinian mainstream and dissident
terrorist groups Finally, the Jews and the Palestinians possessed a moral imperative to
establish a homeland in all (or part) of Palestine, justified by the Holocaust for the
former and the "exodus" of 1948 for the later Therefore, we turn to "audience
response" in order to observe how each of the cases informed their audiences about the
moral claim of their oppressed constituents to a homeland.
The occupation of the West Bank and Gaza by the Israeli Defense Forces after
the Six-Day War provided the Palestinian terrorists (fedayeen) two strategic advantages
that had not previously existed. The first was the number of Palestinians under Israeli
domination had quadrupled, which intensified a sense of Palestinian nationalism. And
second, it provided the fedayeen a potential base of popular support for future attacks
against the Israeli occupation forces. In spite of these strategic improvements, the
defeated Arab states did not renounce their claims to the newly Israeli-occupied
territories. Many West Bank Palestinians held onto a hope of a Jordanian settlement
and Egypt's "war of attrition" in the Sinai and Gaza resulted in escalating Israeli
reprisals at the expense of Palestinian unity. The Egyptian, Jordanian, and Syrian
involvement in Palestinian affairs undermined fedayeen efforts to establish a popular
support base which forced them further underground. While the plight of the
Palestinian refugees was given international attention, the ability of the fedayeen to
overcome regional disputes, avoid Israeli reprisal raids, and launch a unified "armed
struggle" was difficult at best. Therefore, the fedayeen's inability to wage a successful
terrorist campaign was undermined by internal and external rivalries, denying them the
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ability to communication violent message from a clearly identifiable source and
accurately target the Israeli sources of power
During the Jordanian crisis, Arafat compromised the mainstream policy of non-
intervention, leading to the fedayeen loss of Jordan as base of operations. US peace
initiatives, the Roger's Plan, generated a cease-fire in the Sinai which further restricted
the fedayeen's freedom of maneuver. In apparent hope not to be overcome by events,
the fedayeen placed their emphasis on international terrorism, which continued to
provoke Israeli reprisals without much notice from the world community. Ultimately,
the fedayeen's frustration created Munich With a television audience of more than two
million viewers, the world took notice But the inevitable result was negative, the
Palestinian cause became synonymous with terrorism Unfortunately, from 1967 to
1973 the Palestinian historical processes were not aligned in such a way as to permit a
successful attainment of their goals. The fedayeen neither threatened Israeli sources of
power nor correctly anticipated audience response
From 1944 to 1947, the Jewish mainstream endorsed the selective use of
terrorism in order to force British acceptance of the Jewish Agency's (Jewish quasi-
government in mandate Palestine) immigration demands and created "incidents" that
would frustrate British attempts to maintain control. The British policies were attacked
by three organizations. The mainstream Haganah (with its offensive force—the
Palmach) focused on countering British immigration policy and the dissident Irgun and
Stern Gang attacked symbolic manifestations of British authority. The Stern Gang's
assassination of Lord Moyne illustrated the counter-productive aspects of dissident
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violence, whereby the murder was perceived as highly inappropriate considering the
British involvement in the second World War. While the Irgun's attack on the King
David Hotel severed any hope of unified action against the British, the subsequent
British overreaction manifest in General Barker's anti-semitic statement provided the
Irgun an immediate propaganda windfall and concrete evidence for the Yishuv of the
British prejudices. The dissident campaign against the judiciary was a crucial factor in
the deterioration of British authority in the Mandate. It exposed to the world in general
and the British public in particular the contradictory character of British policy, which
drove a wedge between British popular will and continued British presence in the
Mandate.
The terrorist acts committed by the Jewish dissidents were guided within the
confines of Ben-Gunon's and Begin's strategic framework. Neither saw it useful to
confront the British in a conventional contest, nor did they want to commit the Yishuv
to such a useless ordeal. Consequently, Ben-Gurion and Begin saw the utility of the
indirect approach, the former focusing of the United States and the latter on the British
public. This combined strategy enabled the Jewish resistance to target British sources
of power and prestige. They exposed to the United States and the British public the
illegitimate and repressive policies of the British Administration in Mandate Palestine.
The ability to understand target audience response became crucial in their selection of
targets of violence. The discriminate character of their attacks combined with
propaganda transmitted a positive image to the target audiences, which made the
Jewish resistance a more credible force. This credibility inevitably led to the
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deterioration of the British authority in the Mandate and the subsequent creation of a
Jewish state
Terrorism is a psychological process that systematically uses violence to achieve
political ends, involving the efficient roles played by mainstream and dissident
factions, the discriminate selection of a target of violence, the anticipation of audience
response and the control for the psychological effects on multiple audiences. Only in
the case of the Jewish resistance did we observe a differentiation between mainstream
and dissident roles, which tailored the dissidents' selection of targets of violence
consistent with the mainstream's psychological and political objectives On the
terrorist's psychological battlefield success can not be assured without considering the
psychological impact of violence on multiple audiences The Jewish terrorists
successfully targeted vulnerable audiences along domestic and international fronts
exploiting psychological vulnerabilities that previously existed or manipulating those
conditions they created. The Jewish strategy of terrorism directly targeted the British
administration in the Mandate and indirectly targeted audiences removed from the
source of dispute. The impact of Jewish terrorism on the British authority was
psychological warfare; destroying British will to resist and eroding their cherished
imperial prestige. Jewish terrorism propagandized the British sources of power by
selecting targets of violence that did not victimize international audiences—innocence
mattered Palestinian terrorism was psychological warfare for effect, victimizing
domestic and international audiences at the expense of a solution to the Palestine
question. Jewish terrorism resolved the Palestine question by committing to a
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campaign of terrorism designed as a psychological operation, which demanded a direct
answer to their question from the targets of terror and demands using its psychological
warfare potential and informed and persuaded international audiences (targets of
attention and opportunity) by propaganda of the deed. This balance of propaganda and
psychological warfare gave the Jewish terrorists there answer on 14 May 1948—Israel,
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ESTIMATED NUMBER OF JEWS KILLED DURING THE HOLOCAUST
Country Estimated Total Population prior Estimated Jewish Population
to the Holocaust. Exterminated
Number Number Percent
Poland 3,300,000 3,000,000 90
Baltic 253,000 228,000 90
Countries 240,000 210,000 90
Germany/Austria 90,000 80,000 89
Protectorate 90,000 75,000 83
Slovakia 70,000 54,000 77
Greece 140,000 105,000 75
The Netherlands 650,000 450,000 70
Hungary 375,000 245,000 65
SSR White Russia 1,500,000 900,000 60
SSR Ukraine 65,000 40,000 60
Belgium 43,000 26,000 60
Yugoslavia 600,000 300,000 50
Rumania 1,800 900 50
Norway 350,000 90,000 26
France 64,000 14,000 22
Bulgaria 40,000 8,000 20
Italy 5,000 1,000 20




Total 8,861,800 5,933,900 67




JEWISH CASUALTIES IN MANDATE PALESTINE
(Percentage of Total Jewish Population)
Jewish Casualties
Period Fatalities Wounded Total Jewish Population
April 1920 25 (.037) 200+ (.29) 67,000
May 1921 47(056) 146(17) 83,000
June-September 1929 234(15) 439(28) 156,000
1936-1939 Arab Revolt* 620(14) 1108(25) 445,000
1947-1948 Civil War 1256 (.2) 2102 (.3) 628,000
Total 2182 3995
Sources: Cited from Hanan Alon, Countering Palestinian Terrorism in Israel: Toward a Policy Analysis of
Countermeasures (Santa Monica, CA: The Rand Corporation, August 1980), N-1567-FF, p. 10. * 10,000 Arab
Palestinians took part in the Arab Revolt, of whom 4,000 were killed or wounded: James P. Jankowski, "The
Palestinian Arab Revolt of 1936-1939," Muslim World (July 1973): Vol. LXVIII, No. 3, pp. 228-229; and for
a concise breakdown on the Arab Revolt's casualty figures Walid Khalidi, From Haven to Conquest
(Washington, DC: The Institute for Palestine Studies, 1987), pp. 846-849.
Notes: Prior to the Arab Revolt, fedayeen attacks were limited to specific areas of the Mandate: 1920 in




THE STRENGTH AND SUPPORT OF THE JEWISH RESISTANCE
(as of 1945)
Armed Men
















Irgun or IZL (National Military
Organization in Palestine)
Stern Gang or LEHI (Fighters







Sources: Bell, Terror Out of Zion, pp. 144-145. In 1945, the total Fighting strength of the Jewish resistance
was a little more than 3,000; the remaining numbers provided replacements and support. By 1948 and the
war of independence against the Arab Armies, the Jewish resistance (Israeli Defense Force) had acquired
10,000 rifles, 3,500 submachine guns, 160 medium machine guns, 885 light machine guns, 670 mortars, and
84 three-inch mortars by smuggling, arms raids against the British, local fabrication, purchase and foreign
arms deals: Ze'ev Schiff, A History of the Israeli Army: 1874 to the Present (New York: MacMillan, 1974),
p. 22. For more on the Jews' smuggling of weapons into Palestine: Leonard Slater, The Pledge (New York:




JEWISH IMMIGRATION TO THE US AND PALESTINE,
(1932-1943).
Jewish Immigration to the US and







































Source: Walid Khalidi, From Haven to Conquest (Washington, DC: The Institute For Palestine
Studies, 1987), p. 855, See also: Center for Research in Social Systems, Challenge and Response in
Internal Conflict, Volume 1 (Washington, DC: The American University, 1967), p. 59, and The
Middle East, 1958, 6th Ed. (London: Europa Publications, 1958), p. 216.. Note: In 1939, the British
issued a White Paper that restricted the flow of Jewish immigrants to Palestine. From May 48 to July
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1949 b 1970 c 1975 d 198T 1982 f
Israel 133,000 363,600 436,100 550,800 574,800
West Bank




Gaza (org.) 88,520 345,600 390,300 451,000 476,300
Gaza (ref) 190,000
Lebanon 100,000 247,000 288,000 358,207 492.240
Syria 75,000 155,700 183,000 222,525 229,868
Egypt 7,000 33,000 39,000 45,605 35,436
Iraq 4,000 30,000 35,000 20,604 21,284
East Bank 70,000 591,000 644,200 1,148,334 1,189,600
Kuwait 140,300 194,000 229,710 308,177
Saudi Arabia 31,000 59,000 136,779 147,549
Rest of Gulf 15,000 29,000 113,643 64,037
Libya 5.000 10,000 23,759 23,759





Total 1,387,520 2,665,900 3,121,000 4,446,938 4,739,158
"Cited in Laurie A. Brand, Palestinians in the Arab World: Institution Building and the Search for State. (NY: Coumbia University Press, 1988), 9.
''Figures for 1949 are taken from United Nations: Report of the Economic Survey Mission of the Middle East (New York, 1949), p. 22. However, the i
lists the original population of the west Bank and the Gaza as one figure, 529,000. The figures presented here were derived from taking the figure 88,520 x*
orginal figure for Gaza. See Muhammad 'Ali Khulusi, A l-Tanmiyyah al-Iqtisadtyyah fi-Qita' Ghazzah, Filastm, 1948-1966 [Economic Growth in the Gaza S t,
Palestine] (Cairo: United Commercial Press, 1967), p. 51. This figure was then subtracted fron 29,000 and rounded to give an original West Bank population
440,000.
c
From Nakleh and Zureik, The Sociology of the Palestinians, table 1.4, p. 31.
d
Ibtd., chart 2, p. 27.
"From the Palestinian Statistical Abstract for 1981 (Damascus: Palestinina Central Bureau of Statistics, 1982). The figures for Saudi Arabia and the rest I
Gulf appear high.
f
From the Palestinian Statistical Abstract for 1983 (Damascus: Palestinian Bureau of Statistics, 1984) There has been no statistical abstract published sii:
1984. In 1987, estimates of the total population had reached five million. For a comparison of the US State Department and the PLO figures for 1982, see It
Cobban, The Palestinian Liberation Organization: People, Power, and Politics. (NY: Cambridge University Press, 1984) p. 9.
gOriginal population.










12 June-31 Dec 67 66 5 1
1968 450 54 9 39
1969 219 53 71 75
Jan - Mar 1970 40 10 13 13
775 122 101 128
Source: Ehud Yaari, Strike Terror: The Story of Fatah, translated from the Hebrew by Ester Yaari, (New
York: Sabra Books, 1970), p. 370.
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TABLE B-4
THE STRENGTH AND SUPPORT OF THE PALESTINIAN RESISTANCE
(as of 1970).
Organization
Al-Fatah (Palestine Na il
Liberation Movement
PFLP (Popular Front f< le
Liberation of Palestine j
PDFLP (Popular Democratic
Front for the Liberation of
Palestine)
PFLP-GC (Popular Front for
the Liberation of Palestine-
General Command)
Syria's Al-Sa'iqah (Vanguards
of the Popular Liberation War)
Iraq's ALF (Arab Liberation
Front)
Major Sources of Aid
Armed Men Regional International
10,000 Libya, Syria, Kuwait,
Saudi Arabia, Algeria,
private Palestinians
3,000 Iraq, Libya, Dhina
* 1,500 Syria
500 Syria, later Libya and Iraq
*8,000 Syrian Ba'ath party




Sources: *New York Times, 19 September 1970 stated that the PFLP numbered 1,000 and Syria's Al-Sa'iqah
7,000. Ovid Demans, Brothers in Blood (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1977), p. 175; William B.
Quandt, Palestinian Nationalism: Its Political and Military Dimensions R-782-ISA (Santa Monica, CA: The
Rand Corporation, November 1971), p. 26, and Bard E. O'Neill, Armed Struggle in Palestine: A Political-
Military Analysis (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1978), p. 253.
Note: New York Times, 11 February 1970 quoting Israeli sources indicated that the fedayeen could field only
5-6,000 fighters, the remainder of whom consisted of support and political elements.
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TABLE B-5
THE NUMBER OF JAILED TERRORISTS WHOSE RELEASE WAS






8 MAY 72 Hijacking of a Sabena airliner to Tel-Aviv Airport
5 SEP 72 Takeover of Israeli atheletes at the Munich Olympic Games
28 DEC 72 Takeover of the Israeli embassey in Bangkok






*These operations were carried out by Al-Fatah under the cover name of Black September Organization
(BSO).
Source: Ariel Merari, "Government Policy in Incidents Involving Hostages," On Terrorism and Combating





Total # of # of Incidents







1967 296 4 1.35% 4 9
1968 600 20 3.3% 27 258
1969 592 19 3.2% 25 171
1970 500 11 2.2% 21 118
1971 232 5 2.1% 5 45
1972 85 12 12.9% 28 112
1973 125 6 4.8% 1 15
1974 174 19 7.3% 62 211
Total 2604 96 3.7% 173 939
Source: IDF Spokesman, quoted from Hanon Alon, Countering Palestinian Terrorism in
Israel: Toward a Policy Analysis of Countermeasures, N-1567-FF (Santa Monica, CA: The
Rand Corporation, August 1980), p 58
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TABLE B-7
MODE OF OPERATION IN TERRORIST STRIKES INVOLVING CIVILIAN
CASUALTIES,
BY NUMBER OF INCIDENTS AND CASUALTIES,*
(1967-1974).
Mode of Operation
Small Artillery Hostage Total
Year Mining Explosives Arms Fire Bargaining
1 2 1
(3K, 4W) (IK, 4W) - (1W)
5 8 4 3
(13K.33W (13K, 150W) (62W) (13W)
1 11 3 4
(IK, 21W) (8K, 112W) (13K, 16W) (3K, 22W)
2 15 3
(5K, 2W) (2K, 33W) (13K, 61W) (13K, 61W)
2 2 1
(2W) -- (IK, 11W) (4K, 32W)
3 5 3 1
(IK, 15W) (19W) (27K, 76W) (2W)
1 4 1
(2W) (12W) (IK, 1W)
8 7 13
(4K, 95W) (8K, 18W) (1W) (48K, 98W)
Incidents 15 39 25 14 3 96
(Killed and
Wounded) (23K, 79W) (28K, 425W) (63K, 245W) (20K, 132W) (48K, 98W) (173K, 939W)
Total
Casualties 102 453 380 152 146 1112
Source: Drawn from IDF spokesman chronologies; quoted from Hanan Alon, Countering Palestinian
Terrorism in Israel: Toward a Policy Analysis of Countermeasures (Santa Monica, CA: The Rand
Corporation, August 1980), Rand Note N-1567-FF, 59.
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